

O/0198/26

TRADE MARKS ACT 1994

IN THE MATTER OF INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION NO. 1464826

IN THE NAME OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY <<BERKANA 7>>

TO REGISTER THE FOLLOWING TRADE MARK:



IN CLASSES 3 & 35

AND

THE OPPOSITION THERETO UNDER NUMBER 448009

BY SHAIKH MOHD. SAEED EST.

Background and pleadings

1. Limited liability company <<Berkana 7>> is the holder of the International Registration (“the IR”) shown on the cover page. The IR was registered on 10 December 2018. With effect from the same date, the holder designated the UK as a territory in which it seeks to protect the IR. The holder seeks protections in the UK for the following goods and services:

Class 3: Non-medicated cosmetics and toiletry preparations; non-medicated dentifrices; perfumery, essential oils; bleaching preparations and other substances for laundry use; cleaning, polishing, scouring and abrasive preparations.

Class 35: Advertising; business management; business administration; office functions.

2. On 14 June 2024, Shaikh Mohd. Saeed Est. (“the opponent”) opposed the trade mark based upon Section 5(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (“the Act”).¹ This is on the basis of its earlier UK trade mark:

MAXI

UK registration number: UK00003836948

Filing date: 7 October 2022

Registration date: 27 January 2023

Relying on all goods, namely:

Class 3: Non-medicated cosmetics and toiletry preparations; perfumery, essential oils; perfumes.

3. By virtue of its earlier filing date, the above registration constitutes an earlier mark in accordance with section 6 of the Act. In accordance with section 6A of the Act, the

¹ The opponent originally brought the opposition under 5(2)(b), 5(3) and 5(4)(a). On 2 June 2025, the opponent contacted the Tribunal by email to state that it would no longer be relying on the 5(3) and 5(4)(a) grounds. An amended TM7 was filed on 14 June 2025.

earlier mark is not subject to proof of use. The opponent may therefore rely upon all the services for which its mark is registered.

4. In its pleadings, the opponent claims that the respective services are identical or similar and that the marks are highly similar. As such, the opponent submits there will be a likelihood of confusion between the marks, including a likelihood of association.

5. Neither party filed evidence. No hearing was requested. Only the opponent filed submissions in lieu of a hearing.² This decision is taken following a careful perusal of the papers.

6. The opponent is represented by Groom Wilkes & Wright LLP. The holder is represented by Handsome I.P. Ltd.

7. The provisions of the Act relied upon in these proceedings are assimilated law, as they are derived from EU law. Although the UK has left the EU, section 6(3)(a) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (as amended by Schedule 2 of the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023) requires tribunals applying assimilated law to follow assimilated EU case law. That is why this decision refers to decisions of the EU courts which predate the UK's withdrawal from the EU.

Decision

8. Section 5(2)(b) of the Act is as follows:

(b) it is similar to an earlier trade mark and is to be registered for goods or services identical with or similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is protected, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark". Section 5A of the Act is as follows:

9. Section 5A of the Act is as follows:

"5(2) A trade mark shall not be registered if because-

² The holder did request to file written submissions in lieu of a hearing, but this request was rejected in a letter from the Tribunal on 20 October 2025.

“5A Where grounds for refusal of an application for registration of a trade mark exist in respect of only some of the goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is applied for, the application is to be refused in relation to those goods and services only.”

10. The following standard summary of the principles applicable to the assessment of the likelihood of confusion was approved by the Supreme Court in *Iconix Luxembourg Holdings SARL v Dream Paris Europe Inc & Anor*, [2025] UKSC 25:

(a) the likelihood of confusion must be appreciated globally, taking account of all relevant factors;

(b) the matter must be judged through the eyes of the average consumer of the goods or services in question, who is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably circumspect and observant, but who rarely has the chance to make direct comparisons between marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them he has kept in his mind, and whose attention varies according to the category of goods or services in question;

(c) the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details;

(d) the visual, aural and conceptual similarities of the marks must normally be assessed by reference to the overall impressions created by the marks bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components, but it is only when all other components of a complex mark are negligible that it is permissible to make the comparison solely on the basis of the dominant elements;

(e) nevertheless, the overall impression conveyed to the public by a composite trade mark may, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components;

(f) and beyond the usual case, where the overall impression created by a mark depends heavily on the dominant features of the mark, it is quite possible that in a particular case an element corresponding to an earlier trade mark may

retain an independent distinctive role in a composite mark, without necessarily constituting a dominant element of that mark;

(g) a lesser degree of similarity between the goods or services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa;

(h) there is a greater likelihood of confusion where the earlier mark has a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the use that has been made of it;

(i) mere association, in the strict sense that the later mark brings the earlier mark to mind, is not sufficient;

(j) the reputation of a mark does not give grounds for presuming a likelihood of confusion simply because of a likelihood of association in the strict sense; and

(k) if the association between the marks creates a risk that the public might believe that the respective goods or services come from the same or economically linked undertakings, there is a likelihood of confusion.

Comparison of the goods and services

11. In comparing the respective specifications, all relevant factors should be considered, as per *Canon*, where the CJEU stated at paragraph 23 of its judgment:

“In assessing the similarity of the goods or services concerned, as the French and United Kingdom Governments and the Commission have pointed out, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services themselves should be taken into account. Those factors include, inter alia, their nature, their intended purpose and their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary.”

12. The relevant factors identified by Jacob J. (as he then was) in the *Treat* case, [1996] R.P.C. 281, for assessing similarity were:

- a. The respective uses of the respective goods or services;

- b. The respective users of the respective goods or services;
- c. The physical nature of the goods or acts of service;
- d. The respective trade channels through which the goods or services reach the market;
- e. In the case of self-serve consumer items, where in practice they are respectively found or likely to be, found in supermarkets and in particular whether they are, or are likely to be, found on the same or different shelves;
- f. The extent to which the respective goods or services are competitive. This inquiry may take into account how those in trade classify goods, for instance whether market research companies, who of course act for industry, put the goods or services in the same or different sectors.

13. In *Gérard Meric v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market*, Case T- 133/05, the GC stated that:

“29. In addition, the goods can be considered as identical when the goods designated by the earlier mark are included in a more general category, designated by trade mark application (Case T-388/00 *Institut fur Lernsysteme v OHIM- Educational Services (ELS)* [2002] ECR II-4301, paragraph 53) or where the goods designated by the trade mark application are included in a more general category designated by the earlier mark.”

14. Further, in *Kurt Hesse v OHIM*,³ the CJEU stated that complementarity is an autonomous criterion capable of being the sole basis for the existence of similarity between goods. In *Boston Scientific Ltd v OHIM*,⁴ the GC stated that “complementary” means:

“...there is close connection between them, in the sense that one is indispensable or important for the use of the other in such a way that

³ Case C-50/15 P

⁴ Case T-325/06

customers may think that the responsibility for those goods lies with the same undertaking.”

15. Finally, the judgement of Jacob J (as he then was) in *Avnet Incorporated v Isoact Limited* is also relevant:⁵

“In my view, specifications for services should be scrutinised carefully and they should not be given a wide construction covering a vast range of activities. They should be confined to the substance, as it were, the core of the possible meanings attributed to the rather general phrase.”

16. With this in mind, the goods and services for comparison are as follows:

Opponent's goods:	Holder's goods and services:
Class 3: Non-medicated cosmetics and toiletry preparations; perfumery, essential oils; perfumes.	Class 3: Non-medicated cosmetics and toiletry preparations; non-medicated dentifrices; perfumery, essential oils; bleaching preparations and other substances for laundry use; cleaning, polishing, scouring and abrasive preparations. Class 35: Advertising; business management; business administration; office functions.

Non-medicated cosmetics and toiletry preparations; perfumery, essential oils

17. In its counterstatement, the holder admits that the above goods are identical to the opponent's 'non-medicated cosmetics and toiletry preparations; perfumery, essential oils'.

Non-medicated dentifrices

18. The above goods are preparations for cleaning the teeth which are not medicated. I consider these goods to fall under the scope of the opponent's 'non-medicated

⁵ [1998] F.S.R. 16.

cosmetics and toiletry preparations'. These goods are therefore considered identical according to the principles set out in *Meric*.

Bleaching preparations and other substances for laundry use; Cleaning, polishing, scouring and abrasive preparations

19. In its submissions in lieu, the opponent submits that, as home and cleaning products are increasingly influenced by perfume and cosmetic scent, and are located in the same room, the above goods are similar to the opponent's goods. I will compare the above goods to the opponent's 'non-medicated cosmetics and toiletry preparations; perfumes'. The purpose of the goods differs as the above goods are intended to clean clothing or home surfaces, while the opponent's goods are intended to clean or enhance the appearance of the body. The goods may overlap insofar as they may all be in liquid, cream or gel form; however, their nature clearly differs where the above goods contain bleach and other abrasive substances that would not be suitable for cosmetic and toiletry goods. The users overlap as all the goods will be used by members of the general public, although I note that the above goods may also be used by professional laundries and cleaners (as opposed to beautician or hairdressers who would use the opponent's goods). Trade channels overlap very broadly as all the goods may be sold in supermarkets. However, home cleaning and laundry goods will likely be sold in a different aisle to cosmetic and toiletry goods. There is no competition or complementarity between the goods. Overall, I find the above goods dissimilar to the opponent's 'non-medicated cosmetics and toiletry preparations; perfumes'.

Advertising

20. In its submissions in lieu, the opponent submits that the above services are similar to its goods because the services could relate to cosmetic and perfume goods. I will therefore compare the above services to the opponent's 'non-medicated cosmetics and toiletry preparations; perfumes'. The purpose and nature of the goods and services clearly differ. The users differ as advertising services will be used by the manufacturer or retailer of the goods, while the opponent's goods will be used by members of the general public. Trade channels differ as the above services will be sold via advertising and business management companies, while the opponent's

goods will be sold through pharmacies, supermarkets and health and beauty retailers, as well as via online marketplaces. There is no competition between the goods and services. The advertising of perfumes, for example, requires the perfumes themselves. Although it is possible that an entity selling perfumes would have an in-house advertising department, I find it unlikely that this department would offer advertising services to consumers. As a result of this, and the users of the goods and services differing, there is therefore no complementarity. Overall, I find the above services dissimilar to the opponent's 'non-medicated cosmetics and toiletry preparations; perfumes'.

Business management; business administration; office functions

21. In its submissions in lieu, the opponent also submits that the above services are similar to its goods because the services could relate to cosmetic and perfume goods. As above, the purpose, nature and users of the goods and services clearly differ. Trade channels also differ and there is no competition. Business management, administration and office functions of entities selling goods does not require the goods themselves, nor would consumers conclude that the same entity would be responsible for both. Overall, I find the above services dissimilar to the opponent's 'non-medicated cosmetics and toiletry preparations; perfumes'.

Conclusion of goods and services comparison

22. There can be no likelihood of confusion in respect of section 5(2)(b) of the Act regarding the applicant's services which were found to be dissimilar to the opponent's goods.⁶ In light of my findings above, the present opposition fails against the following services:

Class 3: 'Bleaching preparations and other substances for laundry use; Cleaning, polishing, scouring and abrasive preparations.'

Class 35: 'Advertising; business management; business administration; office functions.'

⁶ *eSure Insurance v Direct Line Insurance*, [2008] ETMR 77 CA

23. I will proceed to consider the likelihood of confusion in relation to the goods that I have found to be identical or similar.


Comparison of marks

24. It is clear from *Sabel BV v. Puma AG* (particularly paragraph 23) that the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details. The same case also explains that the visual, aural and conceptual similarities of the marks must be assessed by reference to the overall impressions created by the marks, bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components. The CJEU stated at paragraph 34 of its judgment in Case C-591/12P, *Bimbo SA v OHIM*, that:

“.....it is necessary to ascertain, in each individual case, the overall impression made on the target public by the sign for which registration is sought, by means of, inter alia, an analysis of the components of a sign and of their relative weight in the perception of the target public, and then, in the light of that overall impression and all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, to assess the likelihood of confusion.”

25. It would be wrong, therefore, to dissect the trade marks artificially, although it is necessary to take into account the distinctive and dominant components of the marks and to give due weight to any other features which are not negligible and therefore contribute to the overall impressions created by the marks.

26. The respective trade marks are shown below:

The opponent's earlier mark	The applicant's contested mark
MAXI	

27. In its submissions in lieu, the opponent submits that the marks are highly visually, aurally and conceptually similar. It also submits that the word “power” is non-distinctive, as it conveys the idea of the products being strong or high-performance.

28. In its submissions in lieu, the holder denies that the word “power” is non-distinctive, noting that the mark should not be artificially dissected. It submits that the second word contributes to create significant visual, aural and conceptual differences.

Overall impression

29. The opponent’s mark is a word-only mark consisting of the word “MAXI”. There are no other elements so this element is dominant.

30. The holder’s contested mark is a figurative mark consisting of the words “MAXI POWER” in a standard font in a black colour, surrounded by two outlines in different greyscale colours. I note that the word “MAXI” is at the beginning of the mark where the consumer tends to pay more attention, and that the word “POWER” is in a slightly smaller font, but this is not significant enough to make the words appear separate; instead, they appear as a phrase. However, the words hang together and, as such, I consider that both words are dominant in the mark. I consider the figurative elements to play a minor role in the mark.

Visual comparison

31. The visual similarity between the marks resides in the first word “MAXI”. The visual difference resides in the contested mark’s containing the second word “POWER”, and in the minor figurative elements. Overall, I consider that the marks to have a medium visual similarity.

Aural comparison

32. Both marks comprise the word “MAXI”. This word will be pronounced identically in both marks. The applicant’s contested mark further comprises the dictionary word “POWER”, which will be pronounced in the usual way. The marks therefore overlap aurally in the first word and differ where the holder’s contested mark further contains a second word. Overall, I consider the marks to have a medium aural similarity.

Conceptual comparison

33. The opponent's earlier mark consists only of the word 'MAXI'. This does not directly refer to anything specific and could be construed in a number of ways. As noted by the opponent, it can be understood to mean: (of a garment) reaching the ankle; a type of large racing yacht; or a shortened form of maximum.

34. The contested mark further comprises the word "POWER", which is qualified by the word "MAXI", and the words hang together. In this context, it is highly likely that the word "MAXI" will be understood to be a contraction of the word 'maximum'. The word 'maximum' will be understood to mean as great or high as possible. The mark as a whole will be understood to indicate that the goods provide the greatest cleaning potential, in the context of the goods. The mark as a whole is allusive of a characteristic of the goods.

35. Given that the contested mark conveys a concrete message, while the earlier mark does not refer to anything specific and is open to interpretation, I find the marks to have a low conceptual similarity.

Average consumer and the purchasing act

36. As the case law above indicates, it is necessary to determine who the average consumer is for the respective parties' services. I must then determine the manner in which the services are likely to be selected by the average consumer.

37. The average consumer is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. For the purpose of assessing the likelihood of confusion, it must be borne in mind that the average consumer's level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question: *Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer*, Case C-342/97.

38. In *Iconix Luxembourg Holdings SARL v Dream Paris Europe Inc & Anor*, [2025] UKSC 25, the Supreme Court approved the comments of Arnold LJ in *Lidl Great Britain Ltd & Anor v Tesco Stores Ltd & Anor (Rev1)* [2024] EWCA Civ 262, where he pointed out that:

(a) Consumers who are ill-informed or careless, or consumers with specialised knowledge or who are excessively careful are excluded from consideration;

(b) The average consumer provides a standard which enables the courts to strike a balance between the competing interests involved, such as trade mark owners, their competitors and consumers;

(c) The average consumer is neither a single hypothetical person nor a mathematical average; assessment from the perspective of the average consumer does not involve a statistical test. There is no single meaning rule and if, having regard to the perceptions and expectations of the average consumer, the court considers that a significant proportion of the relevant public is likely to be confused, a finding of infringement may properly be made;

(d) Assessment from the perspective of the average consumer is intended to facilitate adjudication of trade mark disputes by providing an objective criterion, by promoting consistency of assessment and by enabling courts and tribunals to determine such issues so far as possible without the need for evidence;

(e) The average consumer's level of attention varies according to the category of goods or services in question; and

(f) the average consumer rarely has the opportunity to make direct comparisons between trade marks (or between trade marks and signs) and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of the trade mark they have kept in their mind.

39. The goods at issue will all be used by the general public as well as professionals. In both cases, consideration will be given to pricing and the quality of the goods. The goods and services are not likely to be particularly expensive and they will be somewhat regular purchases. Both groups of consumers will pay a medium degree of attention during the purchasing process.

40. The goods will typically be accessed in a supermarket, where consumers will see the goods on a shelf. They may also be accessed online, where they will be viewed on webpages. Visual considerations will therefore dominate. In some circumstances,

verbal recommendations may be given by sales associates, so I do not discount aural considerations.

41. As I have found no similarity between the contested services and the opponent's goods, I will not consider the average consumer of these services.

Distinctive character of the opponent's mark

42. In *Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v Klijsen Handel BV*, Case C-342/97 the CJEU stated that:

“22. In determining the distinctive character of a mark and, accordingly, in assessing whether it is highly distinctive, the national court must make an overall assessment of the greater or lesser capacity of the mark to identify the goods or services for which it has been registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods or services from those of other undertakings (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 May 1999 in Joined Cases C-108/97 and C-109/97 *Windsurfing Chiemsee v Huber and Attenberger* [1999] ECR I-0000, paragraph 49).

23. In making that assessment, account should be taken, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of the mark, including the fact that it does or does not contain an element descriptive of the goods or services for which it has been registered; the market share held by the mark; how intensive, geographically widespread and long-standing use of the mark has been; the amount invested by the undertaking in promoting the mark; the proportion of the relevant section of the public which, because of the mark, identifies the goods or services as originating from a particular undertaking; and statements from chambers of commerce and industry or other trade and professional associations (see *Windsurfing Chiemsee*, paragraph 51).”

43. Registered trade marks possess varying degrees of inherent distinctive character, ranging from the very low, because they are suggestive or allusive of a characteristic of the goods/services, to those with high inherent distinctive character, such as invented words which have no allusive qualities. The distinctiveness of a mark can be

enhanced by virtue of the use that has been made of it. There is no evidence regarding the use of the earlier mark. Consequently, I have only the inherent position to consider.

44. The earlier mark consists of the word “MAXI”, which does not directly describe or strongly allude to the goods and services. As noted above, this word may be understood in a number of ways, including as a contraction of the word ‘maximum’, which will be understood to mean as great or high as possible. This word is therefore laudatory. I consider that the earlier mark possesses a low level of inherent distinctiveness.

GLOBAL ASSESSMENT – Conclusions on Likelihood of Confusion

45. There is no scientific formula to apply in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion; rather, it is a global assessment where a number of factors need to be borne in mind. The first is the interdependency principle, i.e., a lesser degree of similarity between the respective trade marks may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the respective goods (or services) and vice versa (*Canon* at [17]). It is necessary to keep in mind the distinctive character of the opponent’s trade mark, the average consumer of the goods and the nature of the purchasing act. In doing so, I must be alive to the fact that the average consumer rarely has the opportunity to make direct comparisons between trade marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them that they have retained in their mind (*Lloyd Schuhfabrik* at [26]).

46. Confusion can be direct or indirect. Direct confusion involves the average consumer mistaking one mark for the other, while indirect confusion is where the average consumer realises the marks are not the same but puts the similarity that exists between the marks and the services down to the responsible undertakings being the same or related.

47. Earlier in this decision, I found the services to be dissimilar, and the goods to either have a low similarity or to be identical. I found the marks to have a medium visual and aural similarity. I found the marks to have a low conceptual similarity. I found the opponent’s earlier mark to possess a low level of inherent distinctive character for the relevant goods. I identified the average consumer to be either members of the general

public or professionals, both paying a medium degree of attention. I found that the goods would be selected primarily by visual means, although I did not discount aural considerations.

48. As noted above, the average consumer rarely has the opportunity to make direct comparisons between trade marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them that they have retained in their mind (*Lloyd Schuhfabrik* at [26]).

49. Given that the words of the contested mark hang together, I am satisfied that the average consumer would not overlook the second word, “power”, in the contested mark. Consumers would therefore not directly mistake the parties’ marks for each other, even on identical goods. I do not find a likelihood of direct confusion between the parties’ marks for any of the contested goods or services.

50. I will therefore proceed to consider whether there is a likelihood of indirect confusion, whilst reminding myself that, as James Mellor QC sitting as the Appointed Person pointed out in *Cheeky Italian Ltd v Sutaria* (O/219/16) at [16], “a finding of a likelihood of indirect confusion is not a consolation prize for those who fail to establish a likelihood of direct confusion”.

51. In *L.A. Sugar Limited v By Back Beat Inc*, BL O/375/10, Mr Iain Purvis Q.C., as the Appointed Person, explained that:

“16. Although direct confusion and indirect confusion both involve mistakes on the part of the consumer, it is important to remember that these mistakes are very different in nature. Direct confusion involves no process of reasoning – it is a simple matter of mistaking one mark for another. Indirect confusion, on the other hand, only arises where the consumer has actually recognized that the later mark is different from the earlier mark. It therefore requires a mental process of some kind on the part of the consumer when he or she sees the later mark, which may be conscious or subconscious but, analysed in formal terms, is something along the following lines: ‘The later mark is different from the earlier mark, but also has something in common with it. Taking account of the common element in the context of the later mark as a whole, I conclude that it is another brand of the owner of the earlier mark’.

17. Instances where one may expect the average consumer to reach such a conclusion tend to fall into one or more of three categories:

- (a) where the common element is so strikingly distinctive (either inherently or through use) that the average consumer would assume that no-one else but the brand owner would be using it in a trade mark at all. This may apply even where the other elements of the later mark are quite distinctive in their own right ('26 RED TESCO' would no doubt be such a case).
- (b) where the later mark simply adds a non-distinctive element to the earlier mark, of the kind which one would expect to find in a sub-brand or brand extension (terms such as 'LITE', 'EXPRESS', 'WORLDWIDE', 'MINI' etc.).
- (c) where the earlier mark comprises a number of elements, and a change of one element appears entirely logical and consistent with a brand extension ('FAT FACE' to 'BRAT FACE' for example)."

52. Earlier I found that both words of the contested mark "MAXI POWER" contribute equally to the impression of the mark and that the words hang together to indicate that the goods provide the greatest cleaning potential. Considering this combined meaning and the overall impression of the mark, I do not consider in this instance that either of the words of the contested mark has distinctive significance independently of the whole.

53. I consider that a consumer who is aware of the opponent's earlier mark may note the use of "MAXI" in both marks. I found the earlier mark to have a low degree of distinctive character. I do not consider the earlier mark to be so distinctive that the consumer would assume that no one else other than the opponent would be using the word "MAXI" in a trade mark. Additionally, considering the combined meaning of the contested mark and the low conceptual similarity, I particularly do not consider that consumers would make that assumption in this context.

54. I find it likely that any consumers noticing the use of "MAXI" in both the opponent's earlier mark and the contested mark would assume that the marks represented goods

or services deriving from two different entities and simply put the use of “MAXI” in both (if noticed) down to coincidence.

55. I therefore do not consider there to be a likelihood of indirect confusion between the parties’ marks for any of the contested goods or services.

Final Remarks

56. The opposition has been unsuccessful in its entirety and, subject to any successful appeal, the contested mark will proceed to registration.

COSTS

57. The holder has achieved success in these proceedings and is therefore entitled to a contribution towards its costs. In the circumstances, I award the holder the sum of £250 as a contribution towards the cost of the proceedings, in accordance with Tribunal Practice Notice 1/2023. The sum is calculated as follows:

Considering the TM7 and statement of grounds and preparing and filing the TM8 and counterstatement:	£250
Total:	£250

58. I therefore order Shaikh Mohd. Saeed Est. to pay Limited liability company <<Berkana 7>> the sum of £250. The above sum should be paid within twenty-one days of the expiry of the appeal period or, if there is an appeal, within twenty-one days of the conclusion of the appeal proceedings.

Dated this 12th day of March 2026

K HARBACH

For the Registrar