

O/0879/26

TRADE MARKS ACT 1994

**IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION NUMBER 4153892
IN THE NAME OF TESCO STORES LIMITED
FOR THE TRADE MARK**

POWERHOUSE

IN CLASSES 6, 16, 21 AND 24

AND

**THE OPPOSITION THERETO UNDER NUMBER 454316
BY ALDI STORES LIMITED**

Background and pleadings

1. Tesco Stores Limited (“the applicant”) filed an application for the trade mark POWERHOUSE (number 4153892) on 29 January 2025 (“the relevant date”) for goods in classes 6, 16, 21 and 24:

Class 6: *Metal foil for cooking; aluminium foil for cooking purpose.*

Class 16: *Kitchen paper; kitchen rolls [paper]; plastic cling film; baking paper; parchment paper; greaseproof paper; paper towels; rubbish bags; dustbin bags; garbage bags of plastic; plastic bin liners; bags of plastics for lining refuse bins; freezer bags; sandwich bags.*

Class 21: *Rubber household gloves; household scouring pads; pads for cleaning; dish cloths; kitchen sponges; cloths for cleaning; dusting cloths.*

Class 24: *Kitchen towels of cloth.*

2. Aldi Stores Limited (“the opponent”) opposes the application under sections 5(2)(b) and 5(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (“the Act”). The opponent relies upon the following goods of its earlier trade mark registrations for the section 5(2)(b) ground:

(i) 3941785

POWER FORCE

Filing date: 3 August 2023; registration date: 27 October 2023

Class 3: *Bleaching preparations and other substances for laundry use; cleaning, polishing, scouring and abrasive preparations; bleaching preparations for household use; degreasing sprays; descaling preparations for household purposes; glass cleaning preparations; impregnated cleaning pads impregnated with toilet preparations; cloths impregnated with a detergent for cleaning; polishing preparations;*

mould removing preparations; shoe cleaners [preparations]; eyeglass wipes impregnated with a detergent.

Class 6: *Metal containers for storage or transport; aluminium foil.*

Class 16: *Paper and cardboard; plastic sheets, films and bags for wrapping and packaging; garbage bags of paper or of plastics; rubbish bags; carrier bags; parchment paper; plastic film for wrapping; cling film; plastic film for packaging.*

Class 21: *Household or kitchen utensils and containers; combs and sponges; brushes, except paintbrushes; articles for cleaning purposes; anti-static cloths for household use; eyeglass cleaning cloths; gloves for household purposes; household gloves for cleaning purposes; microfiber cloths for cleaning; cleaning pads; sponges; scouring sponges; cloths for cleaning.*

Class 24: *Textiles and substitutes for textiles; household linen; sponge cloths for textile use.*

(ii) 1585272

POWERFORCE

Filing date: 16 September 1994; registration date: 23 June 1995

Class 3: *Cleaning, polishing, scouring, rust removing, scale removing, de-greasing, bleaching, and paint removing preparations; abrasive preparations; detergents; all included in Class 3.*

3. Under section 5(2)(b), earlier mark (i) is relied upon to oppose all the goods of the application and earlier mark (ii) is relied upon to oppose only the class 21 goods of the application. The opponent claims that the parties' goods are identical and similar and that the marks are similar, leading to a likelihood of confusion.

4. Under section 5(3), the opponent claims a reputation in its marks for all the goods for which they are registered. In the case of earlier mark (i), this is a wider list of goods than those relied upon for section 5(2)(b). The complete list of goods relied upon for section 5(3) is shown in the annex to this decision. The opponent claims that the reputation of its marks and the similarities between the parties' marks will result in the relevant public believing that the parties' marks are used by the same undertaking or an economically connected undertaking, thereby deriving financial advantage. It claims that there will also be unfair advantage because the contested mark will ride on the coat-tails of the opponent's reputation, unfairly benefitting from the opponent's marketing and advertising efforts. It also claims that there would be detriment to the distinctive character and repute of the earlier marks. As to the former, the opponent claims that consumers would be less able to identify the earlier marks as an exclusive indicator of origin and their strength will be impaired. The claim to detriment to repute is made on the basis that the opponent will have no control over the quality of the applicant's goods.

5. The opponent states that it has made genuine use of earlier mark (ii) which was registered more than five years prior to the relevant date.

6. The applicant filed a defence and counterstatement, denying the grounds and putting the opponent to proof of genuine use of earlier mark (ii) and proof of reputation for the earlier marks.

7. The opponent is represented by Freeths LLP and the applicant has been represented up until, and including, the filing of written submissions in lieu of a hearing by Haseltine Lake Kempner LLP.¹ Both parties filed evidence and both filed submissions in lieu of attendance at a hearing, no hearing having been requested by either party. I make this decision after careful consideration of all the papers on file, referring to them as necessary.

¹ Pinsent Masons LLP was appointed as the applicant's representative after the applicant had filed written submissions in lieu of a hearing.

Proof of use

8. Earlier mark (ii) is subject to proof of use because section 6A of the Act states:

“(1) This section applies where

- (a) an application for registration of a trade mark has been published,
- (b) there is an earlier trade mark of a kind falling within section 6(1)(a), (aa) or (ba) in relation to which the conditions set out in section 5(1), (2) or (3) obtain, and
- (c) the registration procedure for the earlier trade mark was completed before the start of the relevant period.

(1A) In this section “the relevant period” means the period of 5 years ending with the date of the application for registration mentioned in subsection (1)(a) or (where applicable) the date of the priority claimed for that application.

(2) In opposition proceedings, the registrar shall not refuse to register the trade mark by reason of the earlier trade mark unless the use conditions are met.

(3) The use conditions are met if –

- (a) within the relevant period the earlier trade mark has been put to genuine use in the United Kingdom by the proprietor or with his consent in relation to the goods or services for which it is registered, or
- (b) the earlier trade mark has not been so used, but there are proper reasons for non- use.

(4) For these purposes -

- (a) use of a trade mark includes use in a form (the “variant form”) differing in elements which do not alter the distinctive character of the mark in the form in which it was registered (regardless of whether or not the trade

mark in the variant form is also registered in the name of the proprietor),
and

(b) use in the United Kingdom includes affixing the trade mark to goods or to the packaging of goods in the United Kingdom solely for export purposes.

(5)-(5A) [Repealed]

(6) Where an earlier trade mark satisfies the use conditions in respect of some only of the goods or services for which it is registered, it shall be treated for the purposes of this section as if it were registered only in respect of those goods or services.”

9. The relevant period for proof of use is the five years ending on the filing date of the contested application: 30 January 2020 to 29 January 2025. The burden of proof lies with the opponent, as the proprietor of the earlier mark, because Section 100 of the Act states:

“If in any civil proceedings under this Act a question arises as to the use to which a registered trade mark has been put, it is for the proprietor to show what use has been made of it.”

10. In *easyGroup Ltd v Nuclei Ltd & Ors* [2023] EWCA Civ 1247, Arnold LJ summarised the law relating to genuine use as follows:²

“105. The principles applicable to determining whether there has been genuine use of a trade mark have been considered by the CJEU in a considerable number of cases, the principal decisions being Case C-40/01 *Ansul BV v Ajax Brandbeveiliging BV* [2003] ECR I-2439, Case C-259/02 *La Mer Technology Inc v Laboratories Goemar SA* [2004] ECR I-1159, Case C-416/04 P *Sunrider*

² The provisions of the Act relied upon in these proceedings are assimilated law, as they are derived from EU law. Although the UK has left the EU, section 6(3)(a) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (as amended by Schedule 2 of the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023) requires tribunals applying assimilated law to follow assimilated EU case law. That is why this decision refers to decisions of the EU courts which predate the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.

Corp v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs) [2006] ECR I-4237, Case C-442/07 *Verein Radetsky-Order v Bundervsvereinigung Kamaradschaft 'Feldmarschall Radetsky'* [2008] ECR I-9223, Case C-495/07 *Silberquelle GmbH v Maselli-Strickmode GmbH* [2009] ECR I-2759, Case C-149/11 *Leno Marken BV v Hagelkruis Beheer BV* [EU:C:2012:816], Case C-609/11 *Centrotherm Systemtechnik GmbH v Centrotherm Clean Solutions GmbH & Co KG* [EU:C:2013:592], Case C-141/13 *P Reber Holding & Co KG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)* [EU:C:2014:2089], Case C-689/15 *W.F. Gözze Frottierweberei GmbH v Verein Bremer Baumwollbörse* [EU:C:2017:434] and Joined Cases C-720/18 and C-721/18 *Ferrari SpA v DU* [EU:C:2020:854].

106. Ignoring issues which do not arise in the present case, such as use in relation to spare parts or second-hand goods and use in relation to a sub-category of goods or services, the principles may be summarised as follows:

(1) Genuine use means actual use of the trade mark by the proprietor or by a third party with authority to use the mark: *Ansul* at [35] and [37].

(2) The use must be more than merely token, that is to say, serving solely to preserve the rights conferred by the registration of the mark: *Ansul* at [36]; *Sunrider* at [70]; *Verein* at [13]; *Centrotherm* at [71]; *Leno* at [29]; *Ferrari* at [32].

(3) The use must be consistent with the essential function of a trade mark, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the goods or services to the consumer or end user by enabling him to distinguish the goods or services from others which have another origin: *Ansul* at [36]; *Sunrider* at [70]; *Verein* at [13]; *Silberquelle* at [17]; *Centrotherm* at [71]; *Leno* at [29]; *Gözze* at [37], [40]; *Ferrari* at [32].

(4) Use of the mark must relate to goods or services which are already marketed or which are about to be marketed and for which preparations to secure customers are under way, particularly in the form of advertising campaigns: *Ansul* at [37]. Internal use by the proprietor does not suffice: *Ansul* at [37]; *Verein* at [14]. Nor does the distribution of promotional items as a reward for

the purchase of other goods and to encourage the sale of the latter: *Silberquelle* at [20]-[21]. But use by a non-profit making association can constitute genuine use: *Verein* at [16]-[23].

(5) The use must be by way of real commercial exploitation of the mark on the market for the relevant goods or services, that is to say, use in accordance with the commercial *raison d'être* of the mark, which is to create or preserve an outlet for the goods or services that bear the mark: *Ansul* at [37]-[38]; *Verein* at [14]; *Silberquelle* at [18]; *Centrotherm* at [71].

(6) All the relevant facts and circumstances must be taken into account in determining whether there is real commercial exploitation of the mark, including: (a) whether such use is viewed as warranted in the economic sector concerned to maintain or create a share in the market for the goods and services in question; (b) the nature of the goods or services; (c) the characteristics of the market concerned; (d) the scale and frequency of use of the mark; (e) whether the mark is used for the purpose of marketing all the goods and services covered by the mark or just some of them; (f) the evidence that the proprietor is able to provide; and (g) the territorial extent of the use: *Ansul* at [38] and [39]; *La Mer* at [22]-[23]; *Sunrider* at [70]-[71], [76]; *Centrotherm* at [72]-[76]; *Reber* at [29], [32]-[34]; *Leno* at [29]-[30], [56]; *Ferrari* at [33].

(7) Use of the mark need not always be quantitatively significant for it to be deemed genuine. Even minimal use may qualify as genuine use if it is deemed to be justified in the economic sector concerned for the purpose of creating or preserving market share for the relevant goods or services. For example, use of the mark by a single client which imports the relevant goods can be sufficient to demonstrate that such use is genuine, if it appears that the import operation has a genuine commercial justification for the proprietor. Thus there is no *de minimis* rule: *Ansul* at [39]; *La Mer* at [21], [24] and [25]; *Sunrider* at [72]; *Leno* at [55].

(8) It is not the case that every proven commercial use of the mark may automatically be deemed to constitute genuine use: *Reber* at [32]."

The opponent's evidence

11. The opponent's evidence comes from Claire Griffiths, its Brand Director. She explains that POWER FORCE is an own brand label used by the opponent in all its UK stores since at least 1995. The opponent has over 1,000 stores throughout the UK and is the UK's fourth largest supermarket, with an approximate market share of 10%. Ms Griffiths states that POWER FORCE is physically applied to goods and/or their packaging including but not limited to cleaning, polishing, scouring and abrasive preparations; bleaching preparations for household use; cleaning cloths and sponges; rubber gloves; garbage bags; rubbish bags; compost bags. A selection of photographs showing the following mark are provided in Exhibit CG 1, although none of them are dated; for example:



12. Examples of POWER FORCE goods are shown on the opponent's website screenshots in Exhibit CG 7. Ms Griffiths states that this exhibit shows current use but she explains that the goods sold under the POWER FORCE trade mark have been presented in the same way for many years. She adds that it is difficult to find examples from previous years relating to specific goods using the Internet Archive. Exhibit CG 2 comprises examples of store product cards, but none of them are dated:



13. Ms Griffiths provides unparticularised sales and turnover figures for goods sold under the POWER FORCE trade mark in the UK:

Year	Number of products sold	Turnover
2020	1,681,052	£3,789,224
2021	133,461,091	£205,522,874
2022	244,004,674	£193,312,291
2023	138,673,500	£144,246,299
2024	14,034,004	£20,352,468

14. Exhibit CG 3 comprises a sales data report for POWER FORCE goods during the five years prior to the relevant date. The report shows sales of goods such as scrubs and scourers, cleaning sprays and cleaners for kitchens, bathrooms and windows, polish, bleach, kitchen towel, bin liners, cleaning wipes, travel wipes, cloths, household gloves, dish drying mats and washing up brushes. Exhibit CG 9 includes supplier agreements from 2023 and 2024, showing the supply of POWER FORCE polish and bathroom cleaning sprays to the opponent by third parties.

15. Exhibit CG 4 comprises details from three of the opponent's "SPECIALBUYS" magazines/newsletters between 2020 and 2024, which Ms Griffiths states promote POWER FORCE goods and which provide information about weekly offers in the

opponent's stores. There are some examples, but they are few in number considering how many pages of the magazines have been provided in the exhibit. The magazines/newsletters are available for customers to pick up in the opponent's stores, and online at [Leaflet | ALDI UK](#), and customers can sign up to receive them via the opponent's website. Ms Griffiths states that POWER FORCE goods have been promoted in various national and regional publications, including *Mirror.co.uk*, *Express.co.uk*, *Metro.co.uk*, *thegrocer.co.uk*, *thesun.co.uk*, *glasgowtimes.co.uk* and *Kamcity.com*. A selection of press articles is shown at Exhibit CG 5 showing the mark in relation to cleaning sprays and bottles of cleaners during the five years prior to the relevant date. There is also evidence from 2024 about a TikTok 'influencer' who, Ms Griffiths states, has two million followers, reviewing a POWER FORCE disinfectant liquid.

16. Ms Griffiths states that the opponent has over 2 million followers on Facebook, over 679,000 on X and over 864,000 on Instagram. These figures, presumably, date from when Ms Griffiths signed her witness statement. Three examples of screenshots from the opponent's Facebook page are shown at Exhibit CG 7, which include POWER FORCE cleaning goods. Exhibit CG 8 comprises posts about POWER FORCE goods on YouTube, although I note that at least one is clearly not a UK post and some date from over five years ago.

17. External use of the mark has been as two words, POWER FORCE, with POWER above FORCE, superimposed on a shield-like device. It is arguable whether this is acceptable variant use of the single word POWERFORCE. For reasons which will become clear, I will proceed on the basis that it is acceptable variant use.

18. Although the opponent has not provided breakdowns of the number of goods sold or of the turnover, elsewhere the evidence shows what sort of goods have been sold. The specification of earlier mark (ii) is *Cleaning, polishing, scouring, rust removing, scale removing, de-greasing, bleaching, and paint removing preparations; abrasive preparations; detergents; all included in Class 3*. Not all of these goods are in evidence, such as rust-removing and paint-removing preparations. The evidence shows use in relation to ordinary household cleaning goods. A fair specification, which takes this into account without being unduly restrictive, is *Cleaning, polishing,*

scouring, scale removing, de-greasing, bleaching preparations; abrasive preparations; detergents; all for household use. I mention here that all of these goods are covered by earlier mark (i), which is not subject to proof of use.

Section 5(2)(b) of the Act

19. Section 5(2)(b) states:

“5. (2) A trade mark shall not be registered if because –

[...]

(b) it is similar to an earlier trade mark and is to be registered for goods or services identical with or similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is protected,

there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark.”

20. Section 5A states:

“Where grounds for refusal of an application for registration of a trade mark exist in respect of only some of the goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is applied for, the application is to be refused in relation to those goods and services only.”³

21. The following standard summary of the principles applicable to the assessment of the likelihood of confusion was approved by the Supreme Court in *Iconix Luxembourg Holdings SARL v Dream Pair s Europe Inc & Anor*, [2025] UKSC 25:

(a) the likelihood of confusion must be appreciated globally, taking account of all relevant factors;

³ This section also applies to the ground raised under section 5(3) of the Act.

(b) the matter must be judged through the eyes of the average consumer of the goods or services in question, who is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably circumspect and observant, but who rarely has the chance to make direct comparisons between marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them he has kept in his mind, and whose attention varies according to the category of goods or services in question;

(c) the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details;

(d) the visual, aural and conceptual similarities of the marks must normally be assessed by reference to the overall impressions created by the marks bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components, but it is only when all other components of a complex mark are negligible that it is permissible to make the comparison solely on the basis of the dominant elements;

(e) nevertheless, the overall impression conveyed to the public by a composite trade mark may, in certain circumstances, be dominated by one or more of its components;

(f) and beyond the usual case, where the overall impression created by a mark depends heavily on the dominant features of the mark, it is quite possible that in a particular case an element corresponding to an earlier trade mark may retain an independent distinctive role in a composite mark, without necessarily constituting a dominant element of that mark;

(g) a lesser degree of similarity between the goods or services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa;

(h) there is a greater likelihood of confusion where the earlier mark has a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the use that has been made of it;

(i) mere association, in the strict sense that the later mark brings the earlier mark to mind, is not sufficient;

(j) the reputation of a mark does not give grounds for presuming a likelihood of confusion simply because of a likelihood of association in the strict sense; and

(k) if the association between the marks creates a risk that the public might believe that the respective goods or services come from the same or economically linked undertakings, there is a likelihood of confusion.

Comparison of goods

22. In comparing the respective specifications, all relevant factors should be considered, as per *Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc.*, Case C-39/97 where the CJEU stated at paragraph 23 of its judgment:

“In assessing the similarity of the goods or services concerned, as the French and United Kingdom Governments and the Commission have pointed out, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services themselves should be taken into account. Those factors include, inter alia, their nature, their intended purpose and their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary.”

23. Additionally, the criteria identified in *British Sugar Plc v James Robertson & Sons Limited* (“*Treat*”) [1996] R.P.C. 281 for assessing similarity between goods and services also include an assessment of the channels of trade of the respective goods or services.

24. In *Boston Scientific Ltd v Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)* (OHIM), the General Court (“GC”) stated that complementary means:⁴

“82 ... there is a close connection between [the goods], in the sense that one is indispensable or important for the use of the other in such a way that

⁴ Case T-325/06, the General Court.

customers may think that the responsibility for those goods lies with the same undertaking...”.⁵

25. In *YouView TV Ltd v Total Ltd* [2012] EWHC 3158 (Ch), Floyd J. (as he then was) stated that:

“... Trade mark registrations should not be allowed such a liberal interpretation that their limits become fuzzy and imprecise: see the observations of the CJEU in Case C-307/10 *The Chartered Institute of Patent Attorneys (Trademarks) (IP TRANSLATOR)* [2012] ETMR 42 at [47]-[49]. Nevertheless the principle should not be taken too far. Treat was decided the way it was because the ordinary and natural, or core, meaning of 'dessert sauce' did not include jam, or because the ordinary and natural description of jam was not 'a dessert sauce'. Each involved a straining of the relevant language, which is incorrect. Where words or phrases in their ordinary and natural meaning are apt to cover the category of goods in question, there is equally no justification for straining the language unnaturally so as to produce a narrow meaning which does not cover the goods in question.”

26. I will firstly look at the goods of earlier mark (i) which is relied upon against all the goods of the application.

Earlier mark (i)	Application
Class 3: <i>Bleaching preparations and other substances for laundry use; cleaning, polishing, scouring and abrasive preparations; bleaching preparations for household use; degreasing sprays; descaling preparations for household purposes; glass cleaning preparations;</i>	Class 6: <i>Metal foil for cooking; aluminium foil for cooking purpose.</i> Class 16: <i>Kitchen paper; kitchen rolls [paper]; plastic cling film; baking paper; parchment paper; greaseproof paper; paper towels; rubbish bags; dustbin bags; garbage bags of plastic; plastic</i>

⁵ In *Kurt Hesse v OHIM*, Case C-50/15 P, the CJEU stated that complementarity is capable of being the sole basis for the existence of similarity between goods and services.

<i>impregnated cleaning pads impregnated with toilet preparations; cloths impregnated with a detergent for cleaning; polishing preparations; mould removing preparations; shoe cleaners [preparations]; eyeglass wipes impregnated with a detergent.</i> <i>Class 6: Metal containers for storage or transport; aluminium foil.</i> <i>Class 16: Paper and cardboard; plastic sheets, films and bags for wrapping and packaging; garbage bags of paper or of plastics; rubbish bags; carrier bags; parchment paper; plastic film for wrapping; cling film; plastic film for packaging.</i> <i>Class 21: Household or kitchen utensils and containers; combs and sponges; brushes, except paintbrushes; articles for cleaning purposes; anti-static cloths for household use; eyeglass cleaning cloths; gloves for household purposes; household gloves for cleaning purposes; microfiber cloths for cleaning; cleaning pads; sponges; scouring sponges; cloths for cleaning.</i> <i>Class 24: Textiles and substitutes for textiles; household linen; sponge cloths for textile use.</i>	<i>bin liners; bags of plastics for lining refuse bins; freezer bags; sandwich bags.</i> <i>Class 21: Rubber household gloves; household scouring pads; pads for cleaning; dish cloths; kitchen sponges; cloths for cleaning; dusting cloths.</i> <i>Class 24: Kitchen towels of cloth.</i>
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27. The law requires that goods and services be considered identical where one party's description of its goods and services encompasses the specific goods and services covered by the other party's description (and vice versa): *Gérard Meric v OHIM*.⁶ On this basis, or because the terms themselves are identical, all of the goods of the application are identical to goods in the corresponding class specifications of earlier mark (i). The applicant accepts this to be the case (or, at least, submits that they are identical or closely similar) in relation to the goods of the application, except for *kitchen towels of cloth*, in class 24.⁷ The applicant does not explain why it denies that these goods are identical or even similar to goods covered by earlier mark (i). It makes no submissions at all, other than a bare denial, in relation to *kitchen towels of cloth*. In my view, they are covered by the opponent's class 24 term "household linen".

Earlier mark (ii):

28. Earlier mark (ii) is relied upon only against the class 21 goods of the application:⁸

Earlier mark (ii)	Application
Class 3: <i>Cleaning, polishing, scouring, scale removing, de-greasing, bleaching, preparations; abrasive preparations; detergents; all for household use.</i>	Class 21: <i>Rubber household gloves; household scouring pads; pads for cleaning; dish cloths; kitchen sponges; cloths for cleaning; dusting cloths.</i>

29. The parties' goods are not identical. However, they are all for use during household cleaning and will be sold cheek-by-jowl in supermarkets and general stores. They therefore share purpose, users and close channels of trade. Some items may be sold as a kit, such as scouring pads and abrasive preparations, or oven-cleaning (de-greasing/abrasive) preparations and rubber gloves. There is a medium to high degree of similarity between the parties' goods.

⁶ Case T-33/05, GC

⁷ Written submissions in lieu of a hearing, dated 15 January 2026

⁸ I note that the opponent's written submissions in lieu of a hearing, dated 15 January 2026, compare earlier mark (ii) with the applicant's class 16 goods, but this was not pleaded.

Average consumer and the purchasing process

30. As the caselaw cited above indicates, it is necessary to decide who the average consumer is for the goods and services at issue and how they purchase them. “Average consumer” in the context of trade mark law means the “typical consumer.”⁹ The average consumer is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. For the purpose of assessing the likelihood of confusion, it must be borne in mind that the average consumer's level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question: *Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co GmbH v Klijsen Handel B.V.*, Case C-342/97. In *Lidl Great Britain Limited & anor v Tesco Stores Limited & anor* [2024] EWCA Civ 262, Lord Justice Arnold explained:

“16. First, the average consumer is both a legal construct and a normative benchmark. They are a legal construct in that consumers who are ill-informed or careless and consumers with specialised knowledge or who are excessively careful are excluded from consideration. They are a normative benchmark in that they provide a standard which enables the courts to strike a balance between the various competing interests involved, including the interests of trade mark owners, their competitors and consumers.

17. Secondly, the average consumer is neither a single hypothetical person nor some form of mathematical average, nor does assessment from the perspective of the average consumer involve a statistical test. They represent consumers who have a spectrum of attributes such as age, gender, ethnicity and social group.

18. Thirdly, assessment from the perspective of the average consumer is designed to facilitate adjudication of trade mark disputes by providing an objective criterion, by promoting consistency of assessment and by enabling courts and tribunals to determine such issues so far as possible without the need for evidence.

⁹ *Hearst Holdings Inc, Fleischer Studios Inc v A.V.E.L.A. Inc, Poeticgem Limited, The Partnership (Trading) Limited, U Wear Limited, J Fox Limited*, [2014] EWHC 439 (Ch).

19. Fourthly, the average consumer's level of attention varies according to the category of goods or services in question.

20. Fifthly, the average consumer rarely has the opportunity to make direct comparisons between trade marks (or between trade marks and signs) and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of the trade mark they have kept in their mind.”¹⁰

31. The average consumer of the goods is a member of the general public who will pay a normal level of attention to the purchase, taking into account, for example, efficacy and sustainability factors. The goods are likely to be selected from shelves and displays in stores, from printed catalogues or from websites. Therefore, the selection process is likely to be primarily visual, but sales assistance and word of mouth orders/recommendations may also play a part in the selection process in some retail situations, so the way the marks sound must also be considered.

Comparison of marks

32. *Sabel BV v. Puma AG*, Case C-251/95 explains that the visual, aural and conceptual similarities of the marks must be assessed by reference to the overall impressions created by the marks, bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components. The CJEU stated at paragraph 34 of its judgment in Case C-591/12P, *Bimbo SA v OHIM*, that:

“.....it is necessary to ascertain, in each individual case, the overall impression made on the target public by the sign for which registration is sought, by means of, inter alia, an analysis of the components of a sign and of their relative weight in the perception of the target public, and then, in the light of that overall impression and all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, to assess the likelihood of confusion.”

¹⁰ Approved by the Supreme Court in *Iconix Luxembourg Holdings SARL v Dream Pairs Europe Inc and anor* [2025] UKSC 25, at paragraph 30.

33. It is necessary to take into account the distinctive and dominant components of the marks and to give due weight to any other features which are not negligible and therefore contribute to the overall impressions created by the marks.

34. The marks to be compared are:

Earlier marks	Application
Earlier mark (i): POWER FORCE	POWERHOUSE
Earlier mark (ii): POWERFORCE	

35. The application comprises a single word, POWERHOUSE. There are no other elements which contribute to the overall impression, which lies in the word itself. Earlier mark (i) comprises two elements, both of which contribute roughly equally to the overall impression. Earlier mark (ii) comprises a single element in which the overall impression lies.

36. All the parties' marks consist of ten letters, and all start with POWER, have an O in the second half of the mark and end in E. There is slightly more visual similarity between the application and earlier mark (ii) because these marks comprise single words. I find that there is a medium degree of visual similarity between the application and earlier mark (i) and a slightly higher degree of visual similarity between the application and earlier mark (ii) (but still not high).

37. All the marks consist of three syllables, the first two of which are identical. Although there is a sibilant sound at the end of the third syllable in all the marks, the vowel sound is different. In FORCE, the combination of the O and R creates a different sound ("orr") to that of the O and U ("ow"). The letters F and H also sound different. Overall, the parties' marks are aurally similar to a medium degree.

38. POWER and FORCE have similar meanings. Together, they are somewhat tautologous. The overall concept of the earlier marks is of a powerful force. Turning to the applicant's mark, the opponent submits (in relation to visual similarity) that "the sequence POWERHOUSE is likely to be readily understood as two separate components". I disagree. *Collins Online Dictionary* gives the following definition for "powerhouse":¹¹

"1. countable noun

A powerhouse is a country or organization that has a lot of power or influence.

The country is an economic powerhouse.

2. countable noun

If you say that someone is a powerhouse, you mean that they are very energetic.

[informal]"

39. Although all the marks share the word POWER at the beginning, the applicant's mark is a single word in its own right, with its own meaning, as shown in the above dictionary definition. Like "greenhouse", it is more than the mere sum of its parts. In my view, the conceptual similarity is low because, whilst there is some similarity of meaning created by POWER, the applicant's mark has its own, specific meaning which goes beyond the meaning of POWER, FORCE or a combination of the two. POWERHOUSE is a common dictionary word and its meaning will be known to the average consumer.

Distinctiveness of the earlier mark

40. The assessment as to whether there is a likelihood of confusion includes considering whether the distinctive character of the earlier marks has been enhanced (i.e. more distinctiveness has been acquired) through the use made of them. If a mark

¹¹ Accessed on 15 September 2026. *Collins* is a standard dictionary used by this tribunal.

has an inherently high, or an enhanced, level of distinctiveness, the likelihood of confusion is increased.¹²

41. I will firstly consider the inherent distinctive character of the earlier marks which are comprised of two dictionary words, either separately or joined. The applicant has filed evidence from its professional representative, Christopher Morris, aimed at showing that POWER is commonly used in relation to household cleaning goods, which has a negative effect on its distinctiveness.¹³ For example:



- kitchen towel on the website of Home Bargains, from the Web Archive, dated 24 May 2022. Exhibit CM2;



- surface cleaner on the website of Lakeland, from the Web Archive, dated 8 August 2020, Exhibit CM7.

42. Other images are undated and, as the opponent points out, there is no evidence that the goods reached the market, although it is a reasonable assumption that they would not have been on the websites of major UK retailers such as Home Bargains and Lakeland if they were not being sold. The opponent submits that the evidence

¹² *Sabel BV v Puma AG*, Case C-251/95.

¹³ Witness statement dated 24 October 2025 and exhibits

above does not constitute trade mark use. The applicant submits “POWER is a common English word with an immediately and readily understood meaning. In the context of household and cleaning products it has positive promotional implications of strength and potency.” Even without the applicant’s evidence, my view is that POWER is descriptive and/or devoid of any distinctive character in relation to cleaning products and other household goods, denoting efficacy and strength, such as for tough cleaning jobs or robust wrapping. Much the same is true of FORCE. The distinctiveness arises through the combination of elements. The applicant submits that, inherently, the earlier marks are of low to average distinctiveness. I find accordingly.

43. Distinctive character is a measure of how strongly an earlier mark identifies the goods or services for which it is registered, determined, according to *Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co.*, partly by assessing the proportion of the relevant public which, because of the mark, identifies the goods or services as originating from a particular undertaking. At paragraph 23 of its judgment, the CJEU stated:

“In making that assessment, account should be taken, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of the mark, including the fact that it does or does not contain an element descriptive of the goods or services for which it has been registered; the market share held by the mark; how intensive, geographically widespread and long-standing use of the mark has been; the amount invested by the undertaking in promoting the mark; the proportion of the relevant section of the public which, because of the mark, identifies the goods or services as originating from a particular undertaking; and statements from chambers of commerce and industry or other trade and professional associations (see *Windsurfing Chiemsee*, paragraph 51).”

44. The opponent’s unit and turnover figures are certainly huge. Unfortunately, despite being able to say that certain goods have been sold in view of a combination of the data report in Exhibit CG 3, supplier agreements and images, it is difficult to say which goods have achieved such large figures because the figures are unparticularised. I note that the supplier agreements and the sales data report figures are in respect of large volumes, which is commensurate with the size of the sales figures. For the purposes of this decision, taking the specified goods in the sales data

report with the turnover figures and press exposure, the evidence lifts the marks to being distinctive through use to a medium level for scrubs and scourers, cleaning sprays and cleaners for kitchens, bathrooms and windows, polish, bleach, kitchen towel, bin liners, cleaning wipes, travel wipes, cloths, household gloves, dish drying mats and washing up brushes.

Likelihood of confusion

45. Deciding whether there is a likelihood of confusion is not scientific; it is a matter of considering all the factors, weighing them and looking at their combined effect, in accordance with the authorities set out earlier in this decision. One of those principles states that a lesser degree of similarity between goods and services may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the trade marks, and vice versa. In this case, the goods are identical.

46. There are two types of confusion, direct and indirect.¹⁴ Direct confusion occurs where marks are mistaken for one another, flowing from the principle that the average consumer rarely has the opportunity to make direct comparisons between trade marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them which has been retained in the mind.

47. It is important to remember that the level of distinctiveness of the common element, POWER, is a key factor in the global analysis of the likelihood of confusion. In *Kurt Geiger v A-List Corporate Limited*, Mr Iain Purvis QC, sitting as the Appointed Person, pointed out that the level of ‘distinctive character’ of an earlier mark is only likely to increase the likelihood of confusion to the extent that it resides in the element(s) of the marks that are identical or similar.¹⁵ He said:

“38. The Hearing Officer cited *Sabel v Puma* at paragraph 50 of her decision for the proposition that ‘the more distinctive it is, either by inherent nature or by use, the greater the likelihood of confusion’. This is indeed what was said

¹⁴ *Liverpool Gin Distillery Ltd & Ors v Sazerac Brands, LLC & Ors* [2021] EWCA Civ 1207

¹⁵ BL O/075/13

in *Sabel*. However, it is a far from complete statement which can lead to error if applied simplistically.

39. It is always important to bear in mind what it is about the earlier mark which gives it distinctive character. In particular, if distinctiveness is provided by an aspect of the mark which has no counterpart in the mark alleged to be confusingly similar, then the distinctiveness will not increase the likelihood of confusion at all. If anything it will reduce it.”

48. In other words, simply considering the level of distinctive character possessed by the earlier mark is not enough. In *PLANETART LLC and anor v PHOTOBOX LIMITED and anor* [2020] EWHC 713 (Ch), Daniel Alexander QC, sitting as a Deputy Judge, said:

“26. One aspect of the approach to determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion which is important to this case is the significance of the adoption of common descriptive elements. In *Reed Executive plc v. Reed Business Information Ltd* [2004] EWCA Civ 159 at [83]-[84] the Court of Appeal said:

“...where you have something largely descriptive the average consumer will recognize that to be so, expect others to use similar descriptive marks and thus be alert for detail which would differentiate one provider from another”.

See also *Elliott v. LRC Products* (O/255/13 at [57]) where the Appointed Person, Daniel Alexander QC, observed that consumers are less likely to think that two descriptive marks denote businesses that are connected with one another because a credible and dominant alternative explanation exists for the similarity in marks which has nothing to do with their denotation of a common trade source, namely that the similarity is attributable to their descriptiveness.

27. The case law does not suggest that there are general rules as to how descriptiveness should be taken into account but it is clear that it should be done. The fact sensitivity of such is illustrated in a number of cases. For, example, one concerning registration of a figurative mark incorporating "VAPE & Co" for e-

cigarettes which was opposed by the proprietor of a prior registration for a figurative mark including the words "The Vape Co" (*Nicoventures Holdings Ltd v The London Vape Company Ltd* [2017] EWHC 3393 (Ch)). Birss J said (see [31]-[36]):

"The nature of the common elements needs to be considered and in a case like this, in which the common elements are elements which themselves are descriptive and non-distinctive...it is necessary somewhere to focus on the impact of this aspect on the likelihood of confusion. As has been said already it does not preclude a likelihood of confusion but it does weigh against it. There may still be a likelihood of confusion having regard to the distinctiveness and visual impact of the other components and the overall impression but the matter needs to be addressed."

28. That approach drew on the analysis by Arnold J of the case law of the European courts in *Whyte and Mackay v Origin* [2015] EWHC 1271 (Ch) where he said at [44]:

"...what can be said with confidence is that, if the only similarity between the respective marks is a common element which has low distinctiveness, that points against there being a likelihood of confusion".

29. These cases show that there is no hard rule that use of a descriptive term cannot lead to a finding that there is confusion but they also show that such a case is harder to establish. It also has the impact of somewhat downgrading the significance of conceptual similarity in the evaluation of the likelihood of confusion at least in so far as the mark is descriptive of the goods and services in question."

49. It is, therefore, important to ask 'in what does the distinctive character of the earlier mark lie?' POWER *per se* is descriptive and/or non-distinctive for the goods. The distinctiveness of the earlier mark lies in the combination of the words. It is, also, therefore not of assistance to the opponent that POWER is at the beginning of the parties' marks because it is descriptive and/or non-distinctive for the goods. Added to this is the average consumer's perception that the application has a meaning in its own right. It is not simply a conjunction of two separate words POWER and HOUSE,

which amount to no more than the sum of their parts. POWERHOUSE does amount to more than the sum of POWER and HOUSE: it is a dictionary word with its own meaning. That the parties' marks include, on a high level, the meaning of POWER is not determinative because, as set out in *Planetart*, the conceptual similarity is downgraded because of the descriptiveness, or at least low distinctiveness, of POWER. Even if it could be said that there is a low degree of conceptual similarity, it is not a distinctive concept for the goods. The marks are not distinctively similar and the application has its own meaning.

50. Even though earlier mark (ii) is conjoined and may therefore be said to be visually closer than earlier mark (i), the goods are further away in similarity than with regard to earlier mark (i) (albeit not by much). As earlier, although visually there are similarities between the marks to a medium (or slightly higher) degree, there is an obvious concept to the application which is different to the tautologous meaning of the earlier marks. That different meaning will be immediately obvious to the UK average consumer, even if they paid less than a normal degree of attention to the purchasing process. The visual similarity chiefly arises through the common element which is low in distinctiveness and will be perceived as such by the average consumer. The average consumer will be alive to the conceptual differences and, in any event, regard the inclusion of POWER as coincidental use, as per *REED*: "...where you have something largely descriptive the average consumer will recognize that to be so, expect others to use similar descriptive marks and thus be alert for detail which would differentiate one provider from another". There is no likelihood of direct confusion.

51. Nor will the marks be indirectly confused. This type of confusion was explained by Mr Iain Purvis QC, sitting as the Appointed Person, in *Back Beat Inc v L.A. Sugar (UK) Limited*, BL O/375/10:

"16. Although direct confusion and indirect confusion both involve mistakes on the part of the consumer, it is important to remember that these mistakes are very different in nature. Direct confusion involves no process of reasoning – it is a simple matter of mistaking one mark for another. Indirect confusion, on the other hand, only arises where the consumer has actually recognized that the later mark is different from the earlier mark. It therefore requires a mental

process of some kind on the part of the consumer when he or she sees the later mark, which may be conscious or subconscious but, analysed in formal terms, is something along the following lines: *“The later mark is different from the earlier mark, but also has something in common with it. Taking account of the common element in the context of the later mark as a whole, I conclude that it is another brand of the owner of the earlier mark”*.

17. Instances where one may expect the average consumer to reach such a conclusion tend to fall into one or more of three categories:

(a) where the common element is so strikingly distinctive (either inherently or through use) that the average consumer would assume that no-one else but the brand owner would be using it in a trade mark at all. This may apply even where the other elements of the later mark are quite distinctive in their own right (“26 RED TESCO” would no doubt be such a case).

(b) where the later mark simply adds a non-distinctive element to the earlier mark, of the kind which one would expect to find in a sub-brand or brand extension (terms such as “LITE”, “EXPRESS”, “WORLDWIDE”, “MINI” etc.).

(c) where the earlier mark comprises a number of elements, and a change of one element appears entirely logical and consistent with a brand extension (“FAT FACE” to “BRAT FACE” for example)."

52. That the three categories in that case are non-exhaustive was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in *Liverpool Gin Distillery and others v Sazerac Brands, LLC and others*. However, there is nothing from the opponent which suggests that there is any other type of indirect confusion operating in the present case. The common element is clearly lacking in distinctive character or, at least, can be said to take the present case outside of the three examples give in *LA SUGAR*. Confusion can work both ways, but the replacement of FORCE with the element HOUSE does not appear to be

a logical brand extension, particularly because POWERHOUSE will be perceived a dictionary word with its own meaning.

53. Indirect confusion is not a consolation prize for an opponent which has not succeeded in a finding of direct confusion. Differences between marks which are the reason why there is no likelihood of direct confusion might also be the reason why there is no indirect confusion. That is the case here.¹⁶

54. The section 5(2)(b) ground fails.

Section 5(3)

55. Section 5(3) of the Act states:

“(3) A trade mark which-

is identical with or similar to an earlier trade mark, shall not be registered if, or to the extent that, the earlier trade mark has a reputation in the United Kingdom and the use of the later mark without due cause would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trade mark.

(3A) Subsection (3) applies irrespective of whether the goods and services for which the trade mark is to be registered are identical with, similar to or not similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is protected.”

56. The relevant case law can be found in the following judgments of the CJEU: Case C-375/97, *General Motors*, Case C-252/07, *Intel*, Case C-408/01, *Adidas-Salomon*, Case C-487/07, *L’Oreal v Bellure*, Case C-323/09, *Marks and Spencer v Interflora* and Case C-383/12 P, *Environmental Manufacturing LLP v OHIM*. The law appears to be as follows.

¹⁶ See the comments of Mr James Mellor QC, sitting as the Appointed Person, in *Cheeky Italian Limited v Ashish Sutaria*, BL O/219/16

(a) The reputation of a trade mark must be established in relation to the relevant section of the public as regards the goods or services for which the mark is registered; *General Motors*, paragraph 24.

(b) The trade mark for which protection is sought must be known by a significant part of that relevant public; *General Motors*, paragraph 26.

(c) It is necessary for the public when confronted with the later mark to make a link with the earlier reputed mark, which is the case where the public calls the earlier mark to mind; *Adidas Saloman*, paragraph 29 and *Intel*, paragraph 63.

(d) Whether such a link exists must be assessed globally taking account of all relevant factors, including the degree of similarity between the respective marks and between the goods/services, the extent of the overlap between the relevant consumers for those goods/services, and the strength of the earlier mark's reputation and distinctiveness; *Intel*, paragraph 42.

(e) Where a link is established, the owner of the earlier mark must also establish the existence of one or more of the types of injury set out in the section, or there is a serious likelihood that such an injury will occur in the future; *Intel*, paragraph 68; whether this is the case must also be assessed globally, taking account of all relevant factors; *Intel*, paragraph 79.

(f) the more immediately and strongly the earlier mark is brought to mind by the later mark, the greater the likelihood that use of the latter will take unfair advantage of, or will be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier mark; *L'Oreal v Bellure NV*, paragraph 44.

(g) Detriment to the distinctive character of the earlier mark occurs when the mark's ability to identify the goods/services for which it is registered is weakened as a result of the use of the later mark, and requires evidence of a change in the economic behaviour of the average consumer of the goods/services for which the earlier mark is registered, or a serious risk that

this will happen in future; *Intel*, paragraphs 76 and 77 and *Environmental Manufacturing*, paragraph 34.

(h) The more unique the earlier mark appears, the greater the likelihood that the use of a later identical or similar mark will be detrimental to its distinctive character; *Intel*, paragraph 74.

(i) Detriment to the reputation of the earlier mark is caused when goods or services for which the later mark is used may be perceived by the public in such a way that the power of attraction of the earlier mark is reduced, and occurs particularly where the goods or services offered under the later mark have a characteristic or quality which is liable to have a negative impact of the earlier mark; *L’Oreal v Bellure NV*, paragraph 40. The stronger the reputation of the earlier mark, the easier it will be to prove that detriment has been caused to it; *L’Oreal v Bellure NV*, paragraph 44.

(j) The advantage arising from the use by a third party of a sign similar to a mark with a reputation is an unfair advantage where it seeks to ride on the coat-tails of the senior mark in order to benefit from the power of attraction, the reputation and the prestige of that mark and to exploit, without paying any financial compensation, the marketing effort expended by the proprietor of the mark in order to create and maintain the mark's image. This covers, in particular, cases where, by reason of a transfer of the image of the mark or of the characteristics which it projects to the goods identified by the identical or similar sign, there is clear exploitation on the coat-tails of the mark with a reputation (*Marks and Spencer v Interflora*, paragraph 74 and the court's answer to question 1 in *L’Oreal v Bellure*).

57. Reputation for section 5(3) of the Act constitutes a knowledge threshold.¹⁷ The applicant accepts that the evidence establishes a reputation.¹⁸ In line with my findings

¹⁷ See the judgment of HH Judge Hacon in *Burgerista Operations GmbH v Burgista Bros Limited* [2018] EWHC 35 (IPEC) at paragraph 69: “(6) Reputation constitutes a knowledge threshold, to be assessed according to a combination of geographical and economic criteria.”

¹⁸ Paragraph 28 of its written submissions in lieu of a hearing.

for enhanced distinctive character as a result of the use made of the earlier marks, I find that they can be relied upon for this ground in respect of scrubs and scourers, cleaning sprays and cleaners for kitchens, bathrooms and windows, polish, bleach, kitchen towel, bin liners, cleaning wipes, travel wipes, cloths, household gloves, dish drying mats and washing up brushes.

58. I need to decide whether the relevant public would make a link between the earlier marks and the applicant's mark. The factors identified in *Intel* are:

The degree of similarity between the conflicting marks

59. I adopt my earlier findings here.

The nature of the goods or services for which the conflicting marks are registered, or proposed to be registered, including the degree of closeness or dissimilarity between those goods or services, and the relevant section of the public

60. The respective goods are identical or similar to a medium to high degree.

The strength of the earlier mark's reputation

61. The shortcomings in the evidence support no more than an average reputation. This degree of reputation is also in line with the applicant's written submissions in lieu of a hearing.¹⁹

The degree of the earlier mark's distinctive character, whether inherent or acquired through use

62. The earlier marks have a medium degree of distinctiveness through use.

¹⁹ Paragraphs 45 and 46

Whether there is a likelihood of confusion

63. For the reasons already given, there is no likelihood of confusion.

64. Although it is unnecessary for there to be confusion to find a link, it is one of the factors, per *Intel*. The absence of a likelihood of confusion therefore carries weight in considering whether there is a link.²⁰ The strength of the reputation is a factor in whether the relevant public will make a link, as is the level of distinctive character of the earlier marks. Neither of these factors is strong. Even for identical goods, it is unlikely that the relevant public will make a link with the earlier mark when the common element is descriptive/non-distinctive and any similarity in concept is not very distinctive. If there is a link, it will not be an operative link.²¹ The link would be at such a weak level that it would not lead to any unfair advantage or detriment to the opponent's marks. The section 5(3) ground fails.

Overall outcome

65. The opposition fails and the application may proceed to registration.

Costs

66. The applicant has been successful and is entitled to an award of costs, based on the scale published in Tribunal Practice Notice 1/2023. I award costs in favour of the applicant as follows:

Considering the notice of opposition and preparing the counterstatement	£400
Considering the opponent's evidence and preparing evidence	£1000

²⁰ See the decision of Mr Phillip Johnson, sitting as the Appointed Person, in *E.ON SE v EONX Services Pty Ltd*, Case BL O/0433/24.

²¹ See the decision of Mr Phillip Johnson, sitting as the Appointed Person, in *Industria De Diseño Textil, S.A v Zarzar LLC*, BL O/1064/24.

Written submissions in lieu of a hearing	£450
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Total	£1850
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67. I order Aldi Stores Limited to pay to Tesco Stores Limited the sum of £1850. This sum is to be paid within twenty-one days of the expiry of the appeal period or within twenty-one days of the final determination of this case if any appeal against this decision is unsuccessful.

Dated this 28th day of September 2026

Judi Pike

For the Registrar

Annex

Earlier mark (i)

Class 1: Chemicals for the purification of water used in swimming pools; chlorine for swimming pools; desiccants for absorbing moisture.

Class 3: Non-medicated cosmetics and toiletry preparations; non-medicated dentifrices; perfumery, essential oils; bleaching preparations and other substances for laundry use; cleaning, polishing, scouring and abrasive preparations; bleaching preparations for household use; degreasing sprays; descaling preparations for household purposes; glass cleaning preparations; impregnated cloths for cosmetic use; impregnated cleaning pads impregnated with toilet preparations; cloths impregnated with a detergent for cleaning; polishing preparations; drain cleaning preparations; windscreen cleaning preparations; mould removing preparations; toilet cleaners; toilet cleaning gels; lavatory cleaning compositions; shoe cleaners [preparations]; dishwasher tablets; salt agents for dishwashing machines; eyeglass wipes impregnated with a detergent.

Class 5: Disinfectants; sanitizers for household use; disinfectants for swimming pools.

Class 6: Common metals and their alloys, ores; metal materials for building and construction; transportable buildings of metal; non-electric cables and wires of common metal; small items of metal hardware; metal containers for storage or transport; safes; aluminium foil.

Class 16: Paper and cardboard; printed matter; bookbinding material; photographs; stationery and office requisites, except furniture; adhesives for stationery or household purposes; drawing materials and materials for artists; paintbrushes; instructional and teaching materials; plastic sheets, films and bags for wrapping and packaging; printers' type, printing blocks; garbage bags of paper or of plastics; rubbish bags; carrier bags; parchment paper; plastic film for wrapping; cling film; plastic film for packaging.

Class 21: Household or kitchen utensils and containers; cookware and tableware; combs and sponges; brushes, except paintbrushes; brush-making materials; articles for cleaning purposes; unworked or semi-worked glass, except building glass; glassware, porcelain and earthenware; draining mat; anti-static cloths for household use; eyeglass cleaning cloths; gloves for household purposes; household gloves for cleaning purposes; fridge mats; microfiber cloths for cleaning; oven mats; cleaning pads; sponges; scouring sponges; cloths for cleaning; cookie sheets; baking tins; meal trays.

Class 24: Textiles and substitutes for textiles; household linen; curtains of textile or plastic; sponge cloths for textile use.