

O/1044/23

TRADE MARKS ACT 1994

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION NO. 505035

**TO REVOKE ON THE GROUNDS OF NON-USE
REGISTRATION NO. UK00900226233 FOR THE MARK:**

LONGINES

IN CLASSES 9 & 14

OWNED BY

**COMPAGNIE DES MONTRES LONGINES,
FRANCILLON S.A. (LONGINES WATCH CO., FRANCILLON LTD.)**

BACKGROUND AND PLEADINGS

1. These proceedings concern the following trade mark that is owned by Compagnie des Montres Longines, Francillon S.A. (Longines Watch Co., Francillon Ltd.) (“the proprietor”):

LONGINES

Registration no. 900226233¹

Filing date 15 April 1996; registration date 2 October 1998

Seniority date 2 November 1983

Registered for the following goods:

Class 9: Optical, surveying, nautical, electrotechnical, weighing, signalling, checking and photographic apparatus, instruments and utensils, measuring instruments; spectacles and spectacle frames.

Class 14: Precious metals and their alloys and goods in precious metals or coated therewith, not included in other classes; jewellery, precious stones; horological and chronometric instruments.

2. On 27 June 2022, Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. (“the applicant”) applied to partially revoke the proprietor’s mark. The applicant seeks the revocation of all of the class 9 goods and, in respect of the class 14 goods, seeks the revocation of all bar “analogue watches”. The application is brought in reliance upon sections 46(1)(a) and 46(1)(b) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (“the Act”).
3. The period during which the applicant alleges non-use under section 46(1)(a) is the five years after registration of the mark, being 3 October 1998 to 2 October 2003 with revocation sought from 3 October 2003. Under its section 46(1)(b)

¹ The proprietor’s mark is a comparable trade mark based on a pre-existing EUTM (being EUTM no 0226233). On 1 January 2021, in accordance with Article 54 of the Withdrawal Agreement between the UK and the European Union, the UK IPO created comparable UK trade marks for all right holders with existing EUTMs.

ground, the applicant is alleging non-use of the mark for the period of 27 June 2017 to 26 June 2022, with revocation sought from 27 June 2022, being the date of the application at issue.

4. The proprietor filed counterstatements wherein it defended all of the goods subject to the applications.²
5. Both parties filed evidence in chief with the proprietor also filing written submissions alongside its evidence. A hearing took place before me on 2 August 2023, by video conference. The proprietor was represented by Mr Daniel Selmi of 3 New Square, acting upon the instruction of Dentons, being the proprietor's legal representatives. The applicant was represented by Mr David Stone of Allen & Overy, who have represented the applicant throughout these proceedings.
6. Although the UK has left the EU, section 6(3)(a) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 requires tribunals to apply EU-derived national law in accordance with EU law as it stood at the end of the transition period. The provisions of the Act relied on in these proceedings are derived from an EU Directive. This is why this decision continues to make reference to the trade mark case-law of EU courts.

EVIDENCE

7. The proprietor's evidence in chief came in the form of the joint witness statement of Ms Mireille Koenig and Mr Antoine Haller dated 16 November 2022. Ms Koenig is the Chief Legal Officer at The Swatch Group Ltd ("the Swatch Group"), a position she has held since 2016. Mr Haller is the Head of Trademarks and Designs at The Swatch Group Ltd, a position he has held since 2021. Prior to taking this role, Mr Haller was an Anti-counterfeiting Officer at the Swatch Group. Their statement is accompanied by 49 exhibits, being MKAH1 to MKAH49. The evidence explains that both Ms Koenig and Mr Haller are authorised signatories of the proprietor and

² It is noted that, prior to the hearing, the proprietor's skeleton argument struck through some of the class 9 goods and confirmed that they were no longer being defended.

confirms that the proprietor belongs to the Swatch Group. A list of the companies within what is referred to as the Swatch Group is provided in the evidence, of which the proprietor is one.³

8. The applicant's evidence came in the form of the witness statement of Mr David Stone dated 16 January 2023. As set out above, Mr Stone is the applicant's legal representative and is, therefore, duly authorised to give evidence on the applicant's behalf. Mr Stone's statement is accompanied by twelve exhibits, being DAS1 to DAS9.
9. Given the voluminous nature of the evidence filed, I do not consider it appropriate or necessary to summarise the entirety of the evidence throughout the course of my decision. I will, however, summarise it to the extent that I consider it necessary to do so at the relevant parts of my decision.
10. For the avoidance of doubt, I confirm that I have taken all of the evidence and submissions into account.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

11. Throughout these proceedings and at the hearing, the parties made a number of arguments and submissions that I consider necessary to discuss as preliminary issues to my decision.

High Court proceedings and the related revocation proceedings

12. Throughout these proceedings, there has been reference by both parties to proceedings in the High Court of England and Wales between the applicant and several companies within the Swatch Group (the proprietor being one of them).⁴ The outcome of the High Court proceedings was the granting of an injunction in

³ MKAH1

⁴ *Montres Breguet SA & Ors v Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd* [2022] EWHC 1127 (Ch)

favour of the Swatch Group.⁵ The applicant claims that during those proceedings, the Swatch Group confirmed that it had not used its marks for ‘smartwatches’ and that it became apparent that there was no use for other goods contained in the specifications of other marks owned by companies within the Swatch Group. As a result, the applicant claims that the injunction is based on the overly broad specifications of the Swatch Group’s marks, for which there is no use. Consequently, the applicant now seeks the present revocation action against the proprietor’s mark. In addition to these proceedings, there are 12 other revocation actions brought by the applicant against 19 different trade marks owned by various companies within the Swatch Group.

13. On the point of the High Court proceedings, I note that there has also been mention of the judgment of Falk J wherein she stated at paragraph 175 that:⁶

“Marks such as those associated with Omega, Longines, Tissot and Swatch are very well-known. Their reputation is obvious. [...] Further, I would observe that the developers of apps using identical or similar signs to the marks clearly intended to imitate or at least to pay homage to the relevant marks, including exclusive marks such as Jaquet Droz. That rather demonstrates the existence of a reputation.”

14. While I accept that it may very well be the case that the proprietor and other companies within the Swatch Group enjoy a reputation, this is not at issue here. Further, it does not follow that because Falk J found there to be a reputation in the mark at issue before her then I must reach a similar conclusion here, i.e. that there has been genuine use of the mark at issue in the UK. Instead, my decision is based on an assessment of the evidence before me whilst taking into account the relevant case law and legislation. Falk J’s determination regarding a reputation is not relevant to this decision and I will say no more about it.

⁵ The judgment of the High Court is presently subject to an appeal due to be heard on 5 and 6 December 2023

⁶ A copy of the full judgment is exhibited at DAS3

Relevant periods

15. As set out above, there are two sets of relevant periods for the present revocation application. The earlier period is the one relevant to the 46(1)(a) ground with the latter period being relevant to the 46(1)(b) ground. In its counterstatements, the proprietor clarified that it only sought to rely on use insofar as it covers the latter relevant period. As such, the proprietor's evidence only focused on the later relevant period. The basis for this was set out at the hearing by Mr Selmi wherein he confirmed that the proprietor relies on the provisions set out at section 46(3) of the Act which set out that:

“46 (3) - The registration of a trade mark shall not be revoked on the ground mentioned in subsection (1)(a) or (b) if such use as is referred to in that paragraph is commenced or resumed after the expiry of the five year period and before the application for revocation is made:

Provided that, any such commencement or resumption of use after the expiry of the five year period but within the period of three months before the making of the application shall be disregarded unless preparations for the commencement or resumption began before the proprietor became aware that the application might be made.”

16. So long as I am satisfied as to use and provided that said use commenced or resumed prior to the period of three months before the application date of the present proceedings, I agree with the proprietor's position in that the earlier relevant period is of no real consequence to the genuine use assessment I must make. That being said, it follows that if there is no use in respect of the later relevant period, the proprietor's failure to file any evidence in relation to the earlier relevant period means that the revocation will take effect from the earliest sought revocation date. So while I will make no reference to the earlier period in my assessment below, it may still have effect on these proceedings.⁷ For ease of reference going

⁷ On this point, I note that revocation of the undefended goods in the Class 9 mark will take effect from the earlier date.

forward, I will only refer to the one relevant period, being 27 June 2017 to 26 June 2022.

The proprietor's evidence

17. Prior to the hearing, the applicant filed a skeleton argument that contained detailed and extensive criticisms of the proprietor's evidence. Having reviewed and considered the issues raised by the applicant, I note that the majority of them relate to criticisms of the evidence insofar as they fail to demonstrate genuine use. While Mr Stone did not seek to raise all of these issues at the hearing, Mr Selmi set out that it was not appropriate for the applicant to raise these issues at such a late stage in the proceedings (being the skeleton argument stage) without formally challenging the evidence. While this point is noted, it is not necessary that the applicant raises such issues in evidence or request to cross-examine witnesses. On the contrary, it is common in proceedings before the Tribunal for an opposing party to raise issues with the sufficiency of the other side's evidence at the hearing stage or via written submissions in lieu. Further, I remind myself that the onus is on the party bearing the burden of proving use to file its best case as evidence in chief. Having said that, I do appreciate that where the party challenging the evidence appears to have avoided criticising the accuracy or sufficiency of it during the written procedure, only to unveil an extensive attack on its accuracy and sufficiency after the evidence rounds have closed, there is potential for unfairness. In the present case, I appreciate that the applicant's critique of the proprietor's evidence is extensive and was not unveiled until mere days before the hearing. However, in respect of the former point, I remind myself that the evidence filed in these proceedings was voluminous and spread over 49 exhibits. In such circumstances, it is not unsurprising that any criticisms of the same would also be extensive. In respect of the latter point, I note Mr Selmi's issues with the applicant's approach but note that he did not seek to make an application to allow for the proprietor to file evidence in response to the criticisms made. While I will say no more about this issue, I wish to point out, for the avoidance of doubt, that while I will give consideration to the applicant's criticisms, the conclusions I will reach in this decision will be based on my own assessment of the evidence before me.

18. Having said all of the above, I am of the view that there are two issues that I wish to directly address. The first relates to the applicant's claim that the proprietor's witnesses are not persons properly qualified to know the nature of the use of the mark. This is on the basis that they are members of the proprietor's legal team rather than the business itself. This issue is noted but I agree with Mr Selmi on this point in that it is not appropriate for the applicant to only seek to raise the issue at such a late stage in these proceedings. If the applicant wished to take issue with this point then it should have mentioned it in its evidence, thereby potentially prompting evidence in reply whereby the proprietor's witnesses could directly address the point. Without a direct challenge, I see no reason why I should disbelieve the proprietor's evidence simply because it came from employees in the Swatch Group's legal and trademarks teams. On this point, I note that evidence filed on behalf of companies is commonly given by persons of the same or similar employment status and such evidence is routinely accepted into proceedings before the Tribunal without issue.

19. The second issue raised relates to the evidence at large being discredited by the false statement by Ms Koenig and Mr Haller that "Longines has made genuine use of the Mark for the goods of its specification during the period in question."⁸ The applicant argues that this statement is 'obviously incredible'⁹ as the evidence clearly does not demonstrate use for everything. While this argument is noted, I do not agree. Even if it is not the case that the evidence shows genuine use for *all* goods in the proprietor's specification, the claim that it has is not sufficient to discredit the accuracy of the proprietor's evidence as a whole.¹⁰ Without any direct challenge to the evidence, I consider it reasonable to proceed on the basis that, if use is not shown for all goods, it may simply have been the case that Ms Koenig and Mr Haller believed that it had. This is not, in my view, an intentionally misleading statement that prompts me to question the truthfulness of the statement as a whole.

⁸See paragraph 25 of the witness statement of Ms Koenig and Mr Haller

⁹ In making this point, Mr Stone referred to the wording used in the case of *Pan World Brands Ltd v Tripp Ltd* [2008] RPC 2.

¹⁰ On this point, I refer to paragraph 44 of DRYSHOD (Case BL O/243/19) wherein Mr Phillip Johnson, sitting as the Appointed Person, set out that it was plainly wrong in law to suggest that just because some part of a witness's evidence are inaccurate, other parts should not be accepted.

New Limitation proposals

20. As set out above, the applicant's pleaded case in respect of the class 14 goods is that they be limited to just 'analogue watches'. During these proceedings, the applicant provided an alternative position, being a claim that the mark only survive in respect of 'watches other than smartwatches'. This issue first came to the Tribunal's attention via written correspondence from the applicant on 29 March 2023 and the proprietor's subsequent response on 6 April 2023. The proprietor sought to oppose the alternative argument being raised at such a late stage in these proceedings on the basis that it had not been specifically pleaded. After further correspondence between the parties, the Tribunal confirmed via email on 4 July 2023, that in revocation proceedings it is open for the Hearing Officer to reframe a trade mark specification by reference to the evidence filed and that it did not follow that if the application were to succeed, the specification could only be limited to that of the applicant's pleaded case. Instead, the Tribunal confirmed that the Hearing Officer may reach alternative conclusions based on the evidence filed and the issue as to whether such an amended specification should make reference to the exclusion of 'smartwatches' or not is something that the parties were free to make submissions on.

21. I note that in its skeleton argument filed prior to the hearing, the applicant sought to introduce a further alternative specification, being "watches other than smartwatches and connected watches". While Mr Selmi did not further the proprietor's opposition to the introduction of these alternative specifications at the hearing, he did raise the issue in his skeleton argument. As confirmed in the Tribunal's response discussed above, it is open to me during the course of this decision to determine a fair specification of the goods at issue in light of both the evidence before me and the relevant case law (cited in full below). As such, I am of the view that the applicant is entitled to raise the alternative arguments in respect of a fair specification.

22. So long as I am satisfied that the evidence and case law support such a finding, it may be that I conclude on a fair specification in line with one of the applicant's submitted specifications. Alternatively, I may conclude in line with the proprietor's position (that the proprietor maintains its class 14 specification in full) or conclude with finding an alternative term that I deem to constitute a fair specification (again, so long as the evidence and case law support such a finding).

23. So long as I am satisfied that the evidence and case law support such a finding, it may be that I conclude on a fair specification in line with one of the applicant's submitted specifications. Alternatively, I may conclude in line with the proprietor's position (that the proprietor maintains its class 14 specification in full) or conclude with finding an alternative term that I deem to constitute a fair specification (again, so long as the evidence and case law support such a finding).

DECISION

24. Section 46 of the Act states:

"46. - (1) The registration of a trade mark may be revoked on any of the following grounds-

(a) that within the period of five years following the date of completion of the registration procedure it has not been put to genuine use in the United Kingdom, by the proprietor or with his consent, in relation to the goods or services for which it is registered, and there are no proper reasons for non-use;

(b) that such use has been suspended for an uninterrupted period of five years, and there are no proper reasons for non-use;

(c) [...]

(d) [...]

(2) For the purpose of subsection (1) use of a trade mark includes use in a form (the “variant form”) differing in elements which do not alter the distinctive character of the mark in the form in which it was registered (regardless of whether or not the trade mark in the variant form is also registered in the name of the proprietor), and use in the United Kingdom includes affixing the trade mark to goods or to the packaging of goods in the United Kingdom solely for export purposes.

(3) The registration of a trade mark shall not be revoked on the ground mentioned in subsection (1)(a) or (b) if such use as is referred to in that paragraph is commenced or resumed after the expiry of the five year period and before the application for revocation is made:

Provided that, any such commencement or resumption of use after the expiry of the five year period but within the period of three months before the making of the application shall be disregarded unless preparations for the commencement or resumption began before the proprietor became aware that the application might be made.

(4) [...]

(5) Where grounds for revocation exist in respect of only some of the goods or services for which the trade mark is registered, revocation shall relate to those goods or services only.

(6) Where the registration of a trade mark is revoked to any extent, the rights of the proprietor shall be deemed to have ceased to that extent as from-

(a) the date of the application for revocation, or

(b) if the registrar or court is satisfied that the grounds for revocation existing at an earlier date, that date”.

25. Given that the proprietor's mark is a comparable mark, paragraph 8 of part 1, schedule 2A is relevant. It reads:

"8.— Non-use as defence in infringement proceedings and revocation of registration of a comparable trade mark (EU)

(1) Sections 11A and 46 apply in relation to a comparable trade mark (EU), subject to the modifications set out below.

(2) Where the period of five years referred to in sections 11A(3)(a) and 46(1)(a) or (b) (the "five-year period") has expired before [IP completion day]—

(a) the references in sections 11A(3) and (insofar as they relate to use of a trade mark) 46 to a trade mark are to be treated as references to the corresponding EUTM; and

(b) the references in sections 11A and 46 to the United Kingdom include the European Union.

(3) Where [IP completion day] falls within the five-year period, in respect of that part of the five-year period which falls before [IP completion day]—

(a) the references in sections 11A(3) and (insofar as they relate to use of a trade mark) 46 to a trade mark, are to be treated as references to the corresponding EUTM ; and

(b) the references in sections 11A and 46 to the United Kingdom include the European Union".

26. Section 100 is also relevant, which reads:

“If in any civil proceedings under this Act a question arises as to the use to which a registered trade mark has been put, it is for the proprietor to show what use has been made of it.”

27. In *Walton International Ltd & Anor v Verweij Fashion BV* [2018] EWHC 1608 (Ch) Arnold J summarised the law relating to genuine use as follows:

“114.....The CJEU has considered what amounts to “genuine use” of a trade mark in a series of cases: Case C-40/01 *Ansul BV v Ajax Brandbeveiliging BV* [2003] ECR I-2439, *La Mer* (cited above), Case C-416/04 P *Sunrider Corp v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)* [2006] ECR I-4237, Case C-442/07 *Verein Radetsky-Order v Bunderversvereinigung Kamaradschaft ‘Feldmarschall Radetsky’* [2008] ECR I-9223, Case C-495/07 *Silberquelle GmbH v Maselli-Strickmode GmbH* [2009] ECR I-2759, Case C-149/11 *Leno Merken BV v Hagelkruis Beheer BV* [EU:C:2012:816], [2013] ETMR 16, Case C-609/11 P *Centrotherm Systemtechnik GmbH v Centrotherm Clean Solutions GmbH & Co KG* [EU:C:2013:592], [2014] ETMR, Case C-141/13 P *Reber Holding & Co KG v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)* [EU:C:2014:2089] and Case C-689/15 *W.F. Gözze Frottierweberei GmbH v Verein Bremer Baumwollbörse* [EU:C:2017:434], [2017] Bus LR 1795.

115. The principles established by these cases may be summarised as follows:

(1) Genuine use means actual use of the trade mark by the proprietor or by a third party with authority to use the mark: *Ansul* at [35] and [37].

(2) The use must be more than merely token, that is to say, serving solely to preserve the rights conferred by the registration of the mark: *Ansul* at [36]; *Sunrider* at [70]; *Verein* at [13]; *Leno* at [29]; *Centrotherm* at [71]; *Reber* at [29].

(3) The use must be consistent with the essential function of a trade mark, which is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the goods or services to the consumer or end user by enabling him to distinguish the goods or services from others which have another origin: *Ansul* at [36]; *Sunrider* at [70]; *Verein* at [13]; *Silberquelle* at [17]; *Leno* at [29]; *Centrotherm* at [71]. Accordingly, affixing of a trade mark on goods as a label of quality is not genuine use unless it guarantees, additionally and simultaneously, to consumers that those goods come from a single undertaking under the control of which the goods are manufactured and which is responsible for their quality: *Gözze* at [43]-[51].

(4) Use of the mark must relate to goods or services which are already marketed or which are about to be marketed and for which preparations to secure customers are under way, particularly in the form of advertising campaigns: *Ansul* at [37]. Internal use by the proprietor does not suffice: *Ansul* at [37]; *Verein* at [14] and [22]. Nor does the distribution of promotional items as a reward for the purchase of other goods and to encourage the sale of the latter: *Silberquelle* at [20]-[21]. But use by a non-profit making association can constitute genuine use: *Verein* at [16]-[23].

(5) The use must be by way of real commercial exploitation of the mark on the market for the relevant goods or services, that is to say, use in accordance with the commercial *raison d'être* of the mark, which is to create or preserve an outlet for the goods or services that bear the mark: *Ansul* at [37]-[38]; *Verein* at [14]; *Silberquelle* at [18]; *Centrotherm* at [71]; *Reber* at [29].

(6) All the relevant facts and circumstances must be taken into account in determining whether there is real commercial exploitation of the mark, including: (a) whether such use is viewed as warranted in the economic sector concerned to maintain or create a share in the market for the goods and services in question; (b) the nature of the goods or services;

(c) the characteristics of the market concerned; (d) the scale and frequency of use of the mark; (e) whether the mark is used for the purpose of marketing all the goods and services covered by the mark or just some of them; (f) the evidence that the proprietor is able to provide; and (g) the territorial extent of the use: *Ansul* at [38] and [39]; *La Mer* at [22]-[23]; *Sunrider* at [70]-[71], [76]; *Leno* at [29]-[30], [56]; *Centrotherm* at [72]-[76]; *Reber* at [29], [32]-[34].

(7) Use of the mark need not always be quantitatively significant for it to be deemed genuine. Even minimal use may qualify as genuine use if it is deemed to be justified in the economic sector concerned for the purpose of creating or preserving market share for the relevant goods or services. For example, use of the mark by a single client which imports the relevant goods can be sufficient to demonstrate that such use is genuine, if it appears that the import operation has a genuine commercial justification for the proprietor. Thus there is no *de minimis* rule: *Ansul* at [39]; *La Mer* at [21], [24] and [25]; *Sunrider* at [72] and [76]-[77]; *Leno* at [55].

(8) It is not the case that every proven commercial use of the mark may automatically be deemed to constitute genuine use: *Reber* at [32].”

28. Proven use of a mark which fails to establish that “the commercial exploitation of the mark is real”¹¹ because the use would not be “viewed as warranted in the economic sector concerned to maintain or create a share in the market for the goods and services protected by the mark”¹² is not, therefore, genuine use.

29. I am also guided by *Awareness Limited v Plymouth City Council*, Case BL O/236/13 (“*Plymouth Life*”), wherein Mr Daniel Alexander Q.C. as the Appointed Person stated that:

¹¹ *Jumpman*, Case BL O/222/16

¹² *Ibid.*

“22. The burden lies on the registered proprietor to prove use..... However, it is not strictly necessary to exhibit any particular kind of documentation, but if it is likely that such material would exist and little or none is provided, a tribunal will be justified in rejecting the evidence as insufficiently solid. That is all the more so since the nature and extent of use is likely to be particularly well known to the proprietor itself. A tribunal is entitled to be sceptical of a case of use if, notwithstanding the ease with which it could have been convincingly demonstrated, the material actually provided is inconclusive. By the time the tribunal (which in many cases will be the Hearing Officer in the first instance) comes to take its final decision, the evidence must be sufficiently solid and specific to enable the evaluation of the scope of protection to which the proprietor is legitimately entitled to be properly and fairly undertaken, having regard to the interests of the proprietor, the opponent and, it should be said, the public.

[...]

28. I can understand the rationale for the evidence being as it was but suggest that, for the future, if a broad class, such as “tuition services”, is sought to be defended on the basis of narrow use within the category (such as for classes of a particular kind) the evidence should not state that the mark has been used in relation to “tuition services” even by compendious reference to the trade mark specification. The evidence should make it clear, with precision, what specific use there has been and explain why, if the use has only been narrow, why a broader category is nonetheless appropriate for the specification. Broad statements purporting to verify use over a wide range by reference to the wording of a trade mark specification when supportable only in respect of a much narrower range should be critically considered in any draft evidence proposed to be submitted.”

30. In addition, in *Dosenbach-Ochsner Ag Schuhe Und Sport v Continental Shelf 128 Ltd*, Case BL 0/404/13, Mr Geoffrey Hobbs Q.C. as the Appointed Person stated that:

“21.The assessment of a witness statement for probative value necessarily focuses upon its sufficiency for the purpose of satisfying the decision taker with regard to whatever it is that falls to be determined, on the balance of probabilities, in the particular context of the case at hand. As Mann J. observed in *Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Comptroller- General of Patents* [2008] EWHC 2071 (Pat); [2008] R.P.C. 35:

[24] As I have said, the act of being satisfied is a matter of judgment. Forming a judgment requires the weighing of evidence and other factors. The evidence required in any particular case where satisfaction is required depends on the nature of the inquiry and the nature and purpose of the decision which is to be made. For example, where a tribunal has to be satisfied as to the age of a person, it may sometimes be sufficient for that person to assert in a form or otherwise what his or her age is, or what their date of birth is; in others, more formal proof in the form of, for example, a birth certificate will be required. It all depends who is asking the question, why they are asking the question, and what is going to be done with the answer when it is given. There can be no universal rule as to what level of evidence has to be provided in order to satisfy a decision-making body about that of which that body has to be satisfied.

22. When it comes to proof of use for the purpose of determining the extent (if any) to which the protection conferred by registration of a trade mark can legitimately be maintained, the decision taker must form a view as to what the evidence does and just as importantly what it does not ‘*show*’ (per Section 100 of the Act) with regard to the actuality of use in relation to goods or services covered by the registration. The evidence in question can properly be assessed for sufficiency (or the lack of it) by reference to the specificity (or lack of it) with which it addresses the actuality of use.”

31. The proprietor's mark is a comparable mark based on an earlier EUTM. This means that use of the mark in the EU prior to (and including) IP Completion Day (being 31 December 2020) is relevant to the present assessment.¹³ By virtue of being a Member State prior to this date, the UK still formed part of the relevant territory of the EU. From 1 January 2021 onwards, however, the relevant territory is the UK only. In relation to the period during which use in the EU is relevant, I refer to the case of *Leno Merken BV v Hagelkruis Beheer BV*, Case C-149/11, wherein the Court of Justice of the European Union noted that:

"It should, however, be observed that ... the territorial scope of the use is not a separate condition for genuine use but one of the factors determining genuine use, which must be included in the overall analysis and examined at the same time as other such factors. In that regard, the phrase 'in the Community' is intended to define the geographical market serving as the reference point for all consideration of whether a Community trade mark has been put to genuine use."

And

"50. Whilst there is admittedly some justification for thinking that a Community trade mark should – because it enjoys more extensive territorial protection than a national trade mark – be used in a larger area than the territory of a single Member State in order for the use to be regarded as 'genuine use', it cannot be ruled out that, in certain circumstances, the market for the goods or services for which a Community trade mark has been registered is in fact restricted to the territory of a single Member State. In such a case, use of the Community trade mark on that territory might satisfy the conditions both for genuine use of a Community trade mark and for genuine use of a national trade mark."

32. In respect of the framing of a fair specification, I remind myself of the case of *Euro Gida Sanayi Ve Ticaret Limited v Gima (UK) Limited*, BL O/345/10, wherein Mr

¹³ See paragraph 4 of Tribunal Practice Notice 2/2020

Geoffrey Hobbs Q.C., sitting as the Appointed Person, summed up the law as being:

“In the present state of the law, fair protection is to be achieved by identifying and defining not the particular examples of goods or services for which there has been genuine use but the particular categories of goods or services they should realistically be taken to exemplify. For that purpose the terminology of the resulting specification should accord with the perceptions of the average consumer of the goods or services concerned.”

33. Further, I note the case of *Property Renaissance Ltd (t/a Titanic Spa) v Stanley Dock Hotel Ltd (t/a Titanic Hotel Liverpool) & Ors* [2016] EWHC 3103 (Ch), Mr Justice Carr summed up the law relating to partial revocation as follows (at [47]):

“iii) Where the trade mark proprietor has made genuine use of the mark in respect of some goods or services covered by the general wording of the specification, and not others, it is necessary for the court to arrive at a fair specification in the circumstance, which may require amendment; *Thomas Pink Ltd v Victoria's Secret UK Ltd* [2014] EWHC 2631 (Ch) (“Thomas Pink”) at [52].

iv) In cases of partial revocation, pursuant to section 46(5) of the Trade Marks Act 1994, the question is how would the average consumer fairly describe the services in relation to which the trade mark has been used; *Thomas Pink* at [53].

v) It is not the task of the court to describe the use made by the trade mark proprietor in the narrowest possible terms unless that is what the average consumer would do. For example, in *Pan World Brands v Tripp Ltd* (Extreme Trade Mark) [2008] RPC 2 it was held that use in relation to holdalls justified a registration for luggage generally; *Thomas Pink* at [53].

vi) A trade mark proprietor should not be allowed to monopolise the use of a trade mark in relation to a general category of goods or services simply because

he has used it in relation to a few. Conversely, a proprietor cannot reasonably be expected to use a mark in relation to all possible variations of the particular goods or services covered by the registration. *Maier v Asos Plc* [2015] EWCA Civ 220 ("Asos") at [56] and [60].

vii) In some cases, it may be possible to identify subcategories of goods or services within a general term which are capable of being viewed independently. In such cases, use in relation to only one subcategory will not constitute use in relation to all other subcategories. On the other hand, protection must not be cut down to those precise goods or services in relation to which the mark has been used. This would be to strip the proprietor of protection for all goods or services which the average consumer would consider to belong to the same group or category as those for which the mark has been used and which are not in substance different from them; *Mundipharma AG v OHIM* (Case T-256/04) ECR II-449; EU:T:2007:46.”

34. During these proceedings, the parties made various submissions in respect of the evidential burden and the case law that is relevant to the assessment of proof of use. The applicant’s argument boiled the position down to being a three step test in that I must first examine the evidence relied on, then I must consider what does that evidence prove, as a whole, before making a determination as to what a fair specification is based on the use shown. The proprietor’s argument in response was that this was a ‘divide and conquer’ approach which did not take a wholistic view of the evidence. While I agree that I must take the evidence as a whole, this does not mean that just because it is voluminous and detailed that it is satisfactory in showing genuine use for all goods at issue. On this point I agree with the applicant in that if there are individual issues with different items of evidence that renders that specific evidence of little or no assistance, then that must affect the overall evidential picture. While I am entitled to make inferences based on the evidence before me, the sheer volume of evidence coupled with the fact that the proprietor is a large company does not simply mean that I must make every inference in favour of the proprietor. Put simply, if I am not satisfied that such an inference is reasonable to make then I will not make it. On this point, I remind

myself of the comments of Mr Daniel Alexander Q.C. in *Plymouth Life* (cited above and also referred to by the applicant at the hearing) that I will be justified in rejecting evidence if it is insufficiently solid. I do not consider this a necessarily controversial approach and I will proceed to assess genuine use in the way outlined in the case law.

Class 9

35. I have mentioned above that, prior to the hearing, the proprietor's skeleton argument set out that it no longer sought to defend "surveying, nautical, electrotechnical, weighing, signalling, checking and photographic apparatus, instruments and utensils, measuring instruments." It did, however, maintain its defence of "optical [...] apparatus" and "spectacles and spectacle frames" and I will discuss these further below.

Optical [...] apparatus; spectacles and spectacle frames.

36. The proprietor's claim in respect of the above goods sets out that in early 2020, it released a collection of optical and sun eyewear for men and women. A copy of the press release dated 3 January 2020 announcing this is provided.¹⁴ It appears to me that the majority of the evidence before me relates to sunglasses rather than spectacles and spectacle frames (more on spectacles below). Firstly the proprietor's mark is not registered specifically for sunglasses and I do not consider that sunglasses are a type of optical apparatus. This is on the basis that an optical apparatus is, in my view, an optical device such as a microscope or a telescope, for example. Further, for the avoidance of doubt, I do not consider that sunglasses can be said to fall within 'spectacles' or 'spectacle frames' either. As a result, sunglasses do not form part of the proprietor's specification so any reliance upon the use of such must fail. While that is my primary finding, I will proceed to consider the level of use associated with sunglasses on the basis that it is of no assistance to the proprietor in any event.

¹⁴ MKAH32

37. In respect of sunglasses, I note that the proprietor has provided invoices that cover UK and EU sales.¹⁵ I note that the recipients of both sets of invoices are redacted. The narrative evidence states that the invoices were to customers in the relevant territory. While this is noted, the shipping address for the first UK invoice is only partially redacted and includes reference to “The Swatch Group (UK) Limited”, thereby implying that it is an internal invoice. On this point, the applicant’s argument is that the invoices demonstrate internal use so, in accordance with *Ansul*, are not sufficient to prove genuine use. While I acknowledge that some invoices are addressed to companies within the Swatch Group, I am satisfied that the invoices cover shipments to parts of the distribution arm of the group and constitute distribution invoices. Therefore, I consider that they should be treated in the ordinary way, i.e. as if they were shipped to third party retailers. In such circumstances, it is ordinary for distribution invoices to be used to support a claim of use. Therefore, I consider it reasonable to infer from the invoices that they were meant for onward sale to consumers in that country and I have nothing before me to suggest that these goods were not eventually sold on to consumers.

38. While no total breakdown is provided for these invoices, I note that the narrative evidence sets out that they are just samples. Outside of this broad reference to ‘samples’, there is no information whatsoever as to the actual scale of use for sunglasses. Instead, I have only the invoices to determine the level of sales shown. Having reviewed these invoices, I note that they show eight sales in the UK and four in Spain.¹⁶ The sales covered by the invoices are all single transactions meaning that, in total, the invoices cover the total sale of 12 pairs of sunglasses between 4 August 2020 and 12 May 2022. This is a vanishingly small amount of sales when compared against the likely size of the relevant markets for sunglasses across the EU and the UK. Further, I do not consider the reference to the invoices being samples is particularly helpful as, as above, this is a broad statement that does not hint at an actual level of sales. Lastly, I note that the proprietor’s evidence

¹⁵ MKAH29 and MKAH30

¹⁶ I note that some entries in the EU invoices cover sunglasses, however, some are simply references to product numbers only. I have nothing to determine whether these actually cover sunglasses but, in light of the narrative evidence, I have included these in my total count.

makes reference to Kate Winslet being the face of the Longines sunglasses range. This is confirmed by way of two articles, one dated 26 November 2020 from The Moodie Davitt Report and the second dated 17 November 2020 from 'Duty Free Hunter'.¹⁷

39. Taking all of this evidence into account, I am of the view that the articles regarding Kate Winslet demonstrate some advertising/marketing efforts, however, I do not consider that this is sufficient to overcome the very limited evidence in respect of sales. I appreciate that the proprietor operates a sizeable watch business (as I will discuss further below). However, based on this fact alone, I am not willing to infer that a sufficient level of sales must automatically apply to any endeavour that the proprietor undertakes which, in these circumstances, is sunglasses. As demonstrated above, the evidence of sales is extremely limited and beside a vague reference to the invoices being samples, I have nothing to demonstrate a sufficient level of sales. On this point, I remind myself of the comments made in *Plymouth Life* and *Dosenbach* and the requirement set out in Section 100 of the Act that the burden to prove use falls on the proprietor. Taking all of the above into account, I find that if I am wrong to conclude that 'sunglasses' are not 'optical apparatus' (or 'spectacles' or 'spectacle frames', for that matter), the proprietor has failed to provide genuine use of them in any event.

40. I turn now to consider the evidence in respect of spectacles, which is a term contained within the proprietor's specification. I note that the only evidence filed by the proprietor in respect of these goods is a print-out from a third party website, being coolframes.co.uk, that shows three LONGINES spectacles for sale.¹⁸ This print-out is dated 18 May 2021 so is within the relevant period. While the presence on this third party website is noted, I have nothing before me to enable me to infer that a reasonable amount of sales would have stemmed from 'coolframes.co.uk'. Further, the entirety of the remaining evidence on this point is in respect of sunglasses. To put it briefly, the proprietor's evidence in respect of spectacles (or spectacle frames, for that matter) is insufficiently solid and the presence of just one

¹⁷ MKAH31

¹⁸ MKAH28

print-out, regardless of the size of the proprietor's watch business, is far from demonstrative of genuine use. I, therefore, find that the proprietor has failed to demonstrate genuine use for 'spectacle and spectacle frames'.

Class 14

Horological and chronometric instruments.

41. I note that, in the evidence before me, the only goods that can be said to fall within this category are the proprietor's range of watches. The evidence in respect of these goods is extensive and I see no reason to go over it in full detail. However, I will address certain points briefly. Firstly, I note that the proprietor has provided sample invoices¹⁹ that show the wholesale of £8,352,455.21 worth of watches between 2017 and 2022.²⁰ The evidence sets out that these sales figures are not reflective of the total level of sales for LONGINES watches but cover just a proportion of the trade for the same in the UK. I have some issue with the reference to the use being representative of only 'a proportion' of the proprietor's sales on the basis that this is a very broad and subjective statement. I have nothing to suggest what proportion is being referred to. That being said, and even acknowledging that the figures provided are wholesale figures thereby meaning that I am unable to determine a sufficiently solid level of final turnover in respect of actual sales to consumers, the figures provided are clearly significant. Even if the turnover provided does not particularly represent a large market share (on the basis that, in my view, the relevant market for watches across the relevant territory is likely to be very large, with annual turnover in the region of billions of pounds),²¹ it is still at a significant enough level to demonstrate genuine use.

42. While use of goods under this term is not a point of dispute in the present case (on the basis that the applicant seemingly accepts some use as its application was aimed at all goods save for 'analogue watches'), the issue here is what is a fair

¹⁹ MKAH5 to MKAH9 and MKAH49

²⁰ See paragraph 8 of the witness statement of Ms Koenig and Mr Haller

²¹ I have no evidence on this point

specification as a result of the use shown. The proprietor's position is that it should maintain the term as it is registered and, at the hearing, Mr Selmi took me to a range of evidence that he argued supported this position. This included references to time-keeping services that it provides at sporting events. For example, there is evidence before me showing the proprietor's branding's presence at the 2019 Longines FEI Jumping Nations Cup of Great Britain²² and at the 2019 World Artistic Championship.²³ Further, there is a diagram provided that shows the set-up of the proprietor's timekeeping services at a horse race.²⁴ The proprietor's position is that this shows the intricacies of the proprietor's timekeeping services.

43. The proprietor's position is that the above term covers timekeeping instruments at large and the services shown in the evidence include the provision of complicated systems which have optical, electrical, technical, checking, signalling, surveying and photographic elements. Mr Selmi submitted that all of these types of goods are required to keep time with incredible levels of precision and accuracy and, as such, there is no reason why the provision of this service should be excluded from the specification for the above term. The proprietor's position is noted and I appreciate that the provision of these time keeping services goes beyond use of just 'analogue watches'. While that may be the case, the evidence is, at best, demonstrative of the provision of a service and not the actual provision of any goods. Just because those services may include setting up devices such as cameras and a sectional photocell,²⁵ for example, this is not the actual provision of those goods in line with the commercial *raison d'être* of the mark. On this point, I enquired with Mr Selmi as to whether the customer, in obtaining these timekeeping services, keeps the goods used as part of the services. It was his understanding that they do not keep the goods but what the proprietor is doing is providing timekeeping services or sponsorship activities.

44. Taking all of the above into account, I am not convinced that the evidence that Mr Selmi took me to points towards use of any goods that can be said to fall within the

²² MKAH37

²³ MKAH39

²⁴ MKAH44

²⁵ Being goods referred to in the diagram at MKAH44

above term. Put simply, the arguments put forward by Mr Selmi can only be said to point towards the provision of timekeeping services. On this point, even if I were satisfied that it related to the actual provision of goods, it appears to me that the goods provided in the course of the horse racing diagram, for example, are all goods that would naturally fall within class 9, being display screens, a wireless modem, a tablet device application, sectional photocells and finish line cameras, amongst others. This leaves me with only the proprietor's watch goods in support of its claim to maintain the broader term included in its specification.

45. On this point, the proprietor submitted that there are a number of authorities that provide support for the full specification being maintained despite use only being shown for one category of goods. These authorities include the *Euro Gida* and *Titanic Spa* cases (both of which are cited above). In addition, the proprietor made reference to the case of *Guccio Gucci SPA* (Case BL O/424/14) and a Tribunal decision, being *IWATCH* (Case BL O/307/16), wherein the Hearing Officer determined that the use of watches and the parts and fittings of the same was sufficient to grant a fair specification for the broader term which, in that case, was "horological and chronometric apparatus and instruments". In response, the applicant referred to the case of *Roger Maier and Another v ASOS*²⁶ in support of the argument that where terms are sufficiently broad and have identifiable sub-categories within them that are capable of being viewed independently, then use in relation to only one or more of those sub-categories does not constitute use of the mark in relation to all the other sub-categories.

46. Because I consider that it is of no relevance, I will discuss the proprietor's reference to the *IWATCH* decision first. At paragraph 39 of that decision, the Hearing Officer confirmed that the use of "horological and chronometric apparatus and instruments" was not contested by the applicant and, further, he set out that nothing turned on this issue. Therefore, I fail to see how it is relevant to the assessment I must now make. Conversely, I note that there is an additional UK IPO decision before me (as submitted by the applicant) wherein a different Hearing Officer found

²⁶ [2015] EWCA Civ 220

that use of watches alone was such that a specification of ‘horological and chronometric instruments’ was unsustainable and, in that case, the term was limited to ‘watches’.²⁷ While these decisions are noted, neither of them are binding upon me and I will say no more about them.

47. Moving to the actual application of the aforementioned case law, I note that the wording of the test set out in *Euro Gida* was that it must be based on ‘the perceptions of the average consumer’. As for *Titanic Spa*, I note that at paragraph 47(iv), Mr Justice Carr looked at how an average consumer would fairly describe goods²⁸ in relation to which the trade mark has been used. Further, the latter case explains that use in relation to one sub-category will not constitute use in relation to all other sub-categories of goods. Similarly, I note that, as per paragraph 65 of *ASOS*, a specification is not to be cut down to precise goods for which the mark has been used if the average consumer considers that the goods used form their own sub-categories. In such a scenario, the mark must be limited accordingly. Lastly, the *Guccio Gucci* case sets out that the real question is not whether a narrow specification would suffice, but whether the wide specification is justifiable and makes more sense. The answer to this question is, as set out by Mr Alexander Q.C., dependent upon (to some degree) the nature of the wider specification.

48. For the most part, the wording of the tests set out in the case law discussed above confirm that the assessment of a fair specification is, in essence, focused on the perception of the average consumer. In considering that position, I am not convinced that average consumers would, upon viewing a range of watches (regardless of if they were digital, automatic or analogue), seek to use the broader term of *horological and chronometric instruments*. Instead, the average consumer is likely to be satisfied that the term ‘watches’ (being all that the use covers) forms its own sub-category of goods and use that term to describe the use put forward by the proprietor. As a result (and to borrow the wording used in the *Guccio Gucci* case), I am not convinced that this broader specification is justifiable and neither

²⁷ HAMILTON & INCHES, Case BL O/090/17

²⁸ While services are specifically referred to in the *Titanic Spa* case, the question applies equally to goods, as is the case here

does it make more sense in light of the use made of it. As such, I conclude that the proprietor should not be permitted to retain the full term.

49. In light of the above, the issue now before me is what specification is appropriate. The applicant's case is that the specification should be limited to either "analogue watches" or "watches other than connected watches or smartwatches". During the hearing, Mr Selmi set out that the average consumer would not categorise the goods in such an artificial way. In respect of the term 'analogue watches', I agree with Mr Selmi and I see no reason why the average consumer would, upon being confronted with a series of watches, seek to describe them using the precise type of watch that they are. Even if it were the case that an undertaking only sold analogue watches (or digital ones, for that matter), I see no reason why the average consumer would look to make such a distinction in their description of the same. As a result, I reject the applicant's pleaded case that these goods should be limited to 'analogue watches'.

50. In considering the alternative argument that the specification should be limited to 'watches other than connected watches and smartwatches', I make a similar finding to that reached above. Put simply, I see no reason why the average consumer would look to articulate specific exclusions when considering the use made of the goods by the proprietor. In considering this point, I remind myself that the applicant argued that the present situation can be likened to goods such as 'alcoholic beverages, except beers' in class 33 on the basis that it is a term that explicitly excludes goods from another class (beers are natural to class 32).²⁹ While this is noted, the average consumer is unlikely to get into such a level of granularity when describing what goods the proprietor sells and I agree with Mr Selmi's argument that such a term is artificial. As a result, I reject the applicant's alternative case that these goods should be limited to 'watches other than connected watches and smartwatches'.

²⁹ Additional references to other goods were mentioned but, for illustrative purposes, I have only mentioned one example.

51. I consider that the most appropriate conclusion in the circumstances is that the term be limited to “watches”. This is on the basis that when confronted with the use before me, the average consumer would simply refer to it as covering “watches”. Further, I consider that this term is a suitable sub-category of goods and is sufficiently broad enough so as to offer appropriate protection to the proprietor. Further, it is not too limiting that it can be said to strip the proprietor of any fair protection associated with the use made of the mark.

52. In respect of the fair specification point, I note that submissions were put before me regarding the effect of the Nice Classification. At the hearing, Mr Selmi made reference to the case of *Pathway*³⁰ wherein Carr J held, at paragraph 79 of his judgment, albeit obiter, that the Nice Classification would be relevant to revocation if the term were unclear or imprecise. In the present case, the arguments of the applicant are noted, however, as set out above, the assessment I must make is based on the perception of the average consumer. Put simply, I find that the average consumer would view “watches” as being a term that is sufficiently clear and precise in describing the goods at issue. As a result, I see no reason why the Nice Classification would be relevant and find that the addition of an exclusion regarding ‘connected watches’ and ‘smartwatches’ would not assist in adding clarity. I consider that the exclusion of such in a class 14 specification serves no purpose (they are naturally excluded by virtue of being class 9 goods, in any event) and would not be something that average consumers would refer to in their description of the goods shown in evidence.

Precious metals and their alloys and goods in precious metals or coated therewith, not included in other classes; jewellery, precious stones.

53. In respect of the above, the proprietor’s position is that watches are also items of jewellery and goods made in precious metals and goods containing precious stones. As such, I am of the view that I can deal with all of the above terms together. I appreciate that some of the proprietor’s watches are made using precious metals,

³⁰ *Pathway IP SARL v Easygroup Ltd* [2018] EWHC 3608 (Ch)

coated therewith or incorporating precious stones. However, the evidence before me does not cover any sales of those metals or their alloys in their raw form and neither does it show sales of any types of precious stones on their own. In my view, the fact that the proprietor may sell gold watches (for example) or watches that contain precious stones does not demonstrate a genuine attempt on the part of the proprietor to enter into or maintain a share in the market for precious metals or precious stones. As such, I am of the view that this argument fails. Even though the proprietor's position can sustain an argument that the proprietor should be entitled to keep a limited version of "goods in precious metals or coated therewith", I see no real benefit in granting such a term. It is my view that any limitation would be "watches in precious metals or coated therewith" (the same does not apply to 'goods in precious stones' as no such term exists in the proprietor's specification) and given that the protection of "watches" at large does not limit the proprietor as to what materials it uses, the protection offered by the additional term does not add any further protection beyond that created by "watches". As such, I do not consider it necessary to permit the retaining of this term.

54. As for jewellery, I accept that watches are commonly sold in jewellery stores. However, I do not consider that the average consumer would describe them as jewellery. Instead, the average consumer would simply refer to the use before me as watches and, as above, the proprietor is permitted to maintain its mark for such goods. Even if this approach is wrong and watches would be considered a type of jewellery, the only evidence in respect of "jewellery" is the watches offered by the proprietor. I am of the view that use of this category of goods alone would not be sufficient to permit the proprietor to retain the term "jewellery" at large. Instead, in light of the use before me, I consider that any such term would be limited to "jewellery, namely watches". Similar to the position in the previous paragraph, this offers nothing further beyond the protection granted by "watches" on the basis that the watch goods of the proprietor may continue to incorporate jewellery elements such as precious stones and metals.

CONCLUSION

55. The outcome of this decision is that the proprietor's mark is to be revoked for the following goods:

Class 9: Optical, surveying, nautical, electrotechnical, weighing, signalling, checking and photographic apparatus, instruments and utensils, measuring instruments; spectacles and spectacle frames.

Class 14: Precious metals and their alloys and goods in precious metals or coated therewith, not included in other classes; jewellery, precious stones; horological and chronometric instruments.

56. The mark may, however, remain registered for those goods that I have found use for, being those I have determined as being reflective of a fair specification. Those goods are as follows:

Class 14: Watches.

57. As I have set out above, the proprietor did not seek to file any evidence in respect of the earlier relevant period in respect of the 46(1)(a) grounds. Instead, it chose to rely on the provision set out in section 46(3) of the Act. This means that where the mark is to be revoked, it is to be done so from the earliest date sought. Therefore, the revoked goods under the proprietor's mark have an effective revocation date of 3 October 2003.

COSTS

58. In the parties' skeleton arguments, they indicated their intention to claim costs off the scale. As I have mentioned above, these proceedings are connected to a series of 13 different revocation applications between the parties. At the first hearing of the connected proceedings, it was decided that the issue of costs was not to be

addressed at any of the connected hearings. Instead, the parties requested that the issue of costs be dealt with at the conclusion of all matters. I agreed with this proposal.

59. In discussing the issue of costs at that hearing, it was mentioned that the parties wished to file additional documents in support of their claim for off-scale costs. So while I make no decision on costs at this stage, I do hereby direct the parties to file any written submissions and additional documentation in support of their costs claim within 28 days from the date of issue of this decision. Upon the receipt of these submissions and additional documents, I will list one hearing to deal with the costs for all of these connected matters.

APPEAL PERIOD

60. For the avoidance of doubt, I wish to point out that the appeal period relating to this decision will not begin to run until I have issued my supplementary decision on costs.

Dated this 6th day of November 2023

A COOPER

For the Registrar