

TRADE MARKS ACT 1994
and
THE TRADE MARKS (INTERNATIONAL REGISTRATION) ORDER 1996

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION NO M674543
IN THE NAME OF K2 SKI SPORT + MODE GMBH

AND

IN THE MATTER OF OPPOSITION THERETO UNDER NUMBER 70156
IN THE NAME OF C & J CLARK INTERNATIONAL LIMITED

**TRADE MARKS ACT 1994 and
The Trade Marks (International Registration) Order 1996**

**IN THE MATTER OF application No M674543
in the name of K2 Ski Sport + Mode GmbH**

And

**IN THE MATTER OF opposition thereto under No 70156
in the name of C & J Clark International Limited**

Background

1. International Trade Mark Registration No.674543 is in respect of the mark K2. On 10 July 1997, K2 Ski + Sport Mode GmbH sought to extend protection to the United Kingdom in respect of the following goods:

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|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Class 18 | Rucksacks, all-purpose sports bags, bags and containers for carrying and storing ice skates and roller skates, pack bags, handbags, travelling cases and valises, umbrellas and parasols. |
| Class 25 | Articles of clothing, footwear, headgear, gloves. |
| Class 28 | Games, playthings; gymnastic and sporting apparatus, in particular skis, ski poles, snowboards, firm gliding skis, surfboards, skateboards, in-line skates, ice skates, tennis rackets, golf clubs, roller skates; protective padding for ice skaters and roller skaters; knee pads, wrist pads elbow pads; special-purpose bags for sports equipment, in particular bags for skis and/or ski boots. |

2. On 19 August 1999, C & J Clark International Limited filed notice of opposition to this application, in which they say that they are the proprietors of four earlier trade marks, details of which are set out as an annex to this decision. The grounds of opposition are in summary:

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| 1. | Under Section 5(2)(b) | because the goods specified in the application are similar to those of the opponent's earlier mark and there exists a likelihood of confusion, and, |
| 2. | Under Section 5(4)(a) | by virtue of the law of passing off, |

3. **Under Section 6(1)(c)** because at the date of application the opponent's marks were well known marks within the meaning of Article 6 of the Paris Convention and registration of the application would be contrary to Section 5(2)(b) and Section 5(4) of the Act.

3. The applicants filed a Counterstatement in which they deny all of the grounds on which the opposition is based. Both sides request that costs be awarded in their favour.

4. Both sides filed evidence in these proceedings. The matter came to be heard on 22 January 2002, when the opponents were represented by Ms Jacqueline Reid of Counsel, instructed by Dechert, their trade mark attorneys, the applicants by Ms Emma Pettipher of Boulton Wade & Tennant, their trade mark attorneys. The applicants were not represented.

Opponent's evidence

5. This consists of a Statutory Declaration dated 25 February 2000, and comes from Judith Enid Derbyshire, Company Secretary of C & J Clark International Limited, a position she has held since 1991. Ms Derbyshire confirms that the facts contained in her Declaration come either from her own knowledge or from the company records to which she has full access.

6. Ms Derbyshire states that her company was founded more than 150 years ago and she gives an outline of its history. She says that they first used the trade mark K in relation to footwear in 1865, and refers to exhibit JED1 which consists of a book entitled K Shoes - the first 150 years 1842 - 1992, and which refers to the introduction of the "K" mark (signifying Kendal) in 1865, the mark being stamped on the sole. The book goes on to refer to the development of the K mark and its registration as a trade mark in 1875 which appears to be at odds with Ms Derbyshire who says that her company's trade mark has been registered since 1920, although this is of no consequence. She says that the registrations were acquired as a consequence of extensive use, promotion and education of the public since 1865 (in the case of footwear), that the letter K is distinctive of footwear and bags supplied exclusively by her company and it has in that time acquired a secondary meaning as a trade mark in the context of the products supplied by her company.

7. Ms Derbyshire says that the trade mark has been in continuous use in the United Kingdom in relation to items of footwear, bags and parts and fittings of such goods, referring to exhibit JED2 which she says consists of an example of such use. The exhibit consists of a shoe, the inner and outer sole bearing the mark K SHOES, the K being in a form of italicised script. There is no indication of the date of origin of the exhibit. Ms Derbyshire says that the trade mark is registered throughout the world (exhibit JED3 being a schedule of the registrations) and that until 1997, when the rights in the trade mark outside of the United Kingdom and Ireland were assigned to another company, her company had exported world wide.

8. Ms Derbyshire sets out the United Kingdom and world wide pairage sales figures for footwear sold under the trade mark, both by her company's own branded outlets and also by a range of other retail outlets. She gives the average prices for products sold in the United Kingdom under the trade mark as being in the ranges of around £30 to over £60, and based on

an assumed average of £50 per pair she extrapolates the pairage sales for 1997 to a turnover of nearly £62 million. Previous years pairage sales would in most instances be greater, and significantly so from 1986 to 1992.

9. Ms Derbyshire sets out the value of bags sold in the United Kingdom by her company in the years 1994 through to 1999, which for the years 1994 to 1996 range from around £6.5 to £7.5 million. She says that her company spends around £1.3 million annually advertising goods under the mark in the United Kingdom and Ireland, with advertisements being placed in many publications, (some of which she names). Examples of such advertisements are shown as exhibit JED4. The exhibit shows long standing and widespread use of the K trade mark, in the same form as in JED2, but also with the K on its own and in conjunction with other matter, such as K MIDDIES, K SKIPS, K PLUS FITTING SHOES, K's THE SHOE, K THE PEOPLE WHO STILL CARE ABOUT CRAFTSMANSHIP, CASUALS BY K. The exhibit relates entirely to shoes and boots, there being no mention of bags of any kind that I can see.

10. Ms Derbyshire says that in addition to this advertising her company has published point-of-sale material, examples of which are shown as exhibit JED5. The exhibit includes copies of a magazine entitled K NOW giving details of developments in their product range and referring to the "K customer", "K brand" and "K logo", a publication called KEY NOTES setting out promotions for the K range, and the Autumn/Winter catalogue 1997 detailing the range of K footwear and shoe care materials, the only mention of a bag being on page 37 which mentions a dap bag.

11. Ms Derbyshire goes on to refer to exhibit JED6, which consists of a list of the locations of her company's principal outlets, which they either own and run under the trade mark, are run under the CLARKS' trade mark, or are franchises. She says that her company promotes goods under the trade mark at exhibitions, mentioning The Footwear Fair held four times each year in Birmingham. Ms Derbyshire concludes her Declaration by explaining why she considers there to be a likelihood of confusion, and what she sees as the consequences.

Applicant's evidence

12. This consists of two Statutory Declarations. The first is 29 August 2000 and comes from John Wallace, a registered trade mark attorney and partner at Boulton Wade & Tennant, the applicant's representatives in these proceedings.

13. Mr Wallace begins by referring to exhibit JW1, which consists of details of the application in suit, Mr Wallace making specific reference to the goods covered by Class 25. He goes on to say, and explain why he considers the trade marks K and K2 to be dissimilar.

14. Mr Wallace next refers to exhibit JW2, which consists of details of two trade mark registrations for a stylised version of the mark K2, noting that both are registered in respect of items of footwear and co-exist with the opponent's K trade marks. The stylisation of these marks is such that it is by no means certain that they would be seen as the letter and numeral K2, or more arguably, the letter K. Mr Wallace continues by claiming that K2 is a trade mark that is well known for skis in the United Kingdom and would be recognised by prospective purchasers of sports and leisure shoes. He refers to exhibits JW3, JW4 and JW5, which

consist of prints taken from the Internet in August 2000, JW3 listing, inter alia, details of two web sites relating to the applicants and showing them to be primarily involved in products for use in sports activities, mostly winter sports. Exhibit JW4 is an extract from a web site entitled Peakware World Mountain Encyclopaedia showing K2 to be the name of the world's second highest mountain and is located in China-Pakistan. Exhibit JW5 consists of the results of an internet search for K, noting that it was only through a search for the term K SHOES that details of the opponents were retrieved, from which he asserts that this is how the opponents are known in this country.

15. The second Statutory Declaration is dated 13 October 2000, and comes from Emma Louise Pettipher, a registered trade mark attorney and partner at Boulton & Tennant, the applicant's representatives in these proceedings.

16. Ms Pettipher refers to Mr Wallace's Declaration, and in particular to the claim to the mark K2 being well known, a claim that she considers is supported by the sales figures for goods sold under the K2 trade mark in the United Kingdom. The figures relate to the years 1999 and 2000 (after the relevant date) and amount to £479,380 and £255,360 respectively for sales of clothing, skis, in-line skates, scooters and snow boards.

Opponent's evidence in reply

17. This consists of a Witness Statement dated 16 February 2001 from Sarah Schofield, an assistant solicitor at Dechert, the opponent's representatives in these proceedings.

18. Ms Schofield refers to the Declaration by Mr Wallace, and in particular, to his assertion that the marks are conceptually dissimilar because most people would know of and associate K2 with the mountain of that name, K2 whereas the letter K has no meaning other than as a letter. She challenges this view saying that it does not take into account the evidence that the letter K is a well known brand name of the opponents in relation to footwear and that Mr Wallace's assertion relies upon people making the association with the mountain. Ms Schofield asserts that it is possible that people seeing a letter K used as a brand name in connection with footwear and bags would assume there to be a link with the opponent's K brand, possibly as a sub-brand.

19. Ms Schofield goes to Mr Wallace's assertion that as his company owns other trade marks that have co-existed on the register with those of the opponents that the designation should also be allowed to co-exist. She says that there is no evidence that the applicants have ever used these marks in relation to footwear or bags, or that supports the claim that their marks are well known by those interested in buying sports and leisure wear. She says that the fact that references to the applicant's came up on an internet search for K2 cannot be taken as an indication of fame or reputation or even that the respective marks are co-existing, and the fact that references to the opponents goods are only retrieved by searching for K SHOES is possibly a result of the way that search engines ensure a more accurate search. Ms Schofield refers to the reputation claimed by the applicants, noting that Ms Pettipher states this to be in respect of skis and associated goods and accessories, there being no mention of footwear or bags.

That concludes my review of the evidence insofar as it is relevant to these proceedings.

Decision

20. Ms Reid confirmed that the opponents were not pursuing the ground under Section 6(1)(c). With this in mind I turn to consider the ground under Section 5(2)(b) of the Act. That section reads as follows:

“5.-(2) A trade mark shall not be registered if because-

(b) it is similar to an earlier trade mark and is to be registered for goods or services identical with or similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is protected, there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark”

21. An earlier trade mark is defined in Section 6 of the Act as follows:

“6.- (1) In this Act an “earlier trade mark” means-

(a) a registered trade mark, international trade mark (UK) or Community trade mark which has a date of application for registration earlier than that of the trade mark in question, taking account (where appropriate) of the priorities claimed in respect of the trade marks,”

22. In my consideration of a likelihood of confusion or deception I take into account the guidance provided by the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in *Sabel BV v Puma AG* [1998] E.T.M.R. 2, *Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc* [1999] E.T.M.R. 1, *Lloyd Schufabrik Meyer & Co GmbH v Klijsen Handel B.V.* [2000] 45 F.S.R. 77 and *Marca Mode CV v Adidas AG* [2000] E.T.M.R. 723. It is clear from these cases that:-

- (a) the likelihood of confusion must be appreciated globally, taking account of all relevant factors; *Sabel BV v Puma AG*, paragraph 22;
- (b) the matter must be judged through the eyes of the average consumer of the goods/services in question; *Sabel BV v Puma AG*, paragraph 23, who is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably circumspect and observant - but who rarely has the chance to make direct comparisons between marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them he has kept in his mind; *Lloyd Schufabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v Klijsen Handel B.V.* paragraph 27;
- (c) the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details; *Sabel BV v Puma AG*, paragraph 23; 15
- (d) the visual, aural and conceptual similarities of the marks must therefore be assessed by reference to the overall impressions created by the marks bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components; *Sabel BV v Puma AG*, paragraph 23;

- (e) a lesser degree of similarity between the marks may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the goods, and vice versa; *Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc*, paragraph 17;
- (f) there is a greater likelihood of confusion where the earlier trade mark has a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the use that has been made of it; *Sabel BV v Puma AG*, paragraph 224;
- (g) mere association, in the sense that the later mark brings the earlier mark to mind, is not sufficient for the purposes of Section 5(2); *Sabel BV v Puma AG*, paragraph 26;
- (h) further, the reputation of a mark does not give grounds for presuming a likelihood of confusion simply because of a likelihood of association in the strict sense; *Marca Mode CV v Adidas AG*, paragraph 41;
- (i) but if the association between the marks causes the public to wrongly believe that the respective goods come from the same or economically linked undertakings, there is a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of the section; *Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc*, paragraph 29.

23. In their statement of grounds the opponents say that they are the proprietors of a large number of trade mark registrations consisting of or incorporating the letter K, making specific mention of four, details of which are set out as an annex to this decision. The combined specifications of these registrations cover handbags, purses, footwear and parts of footwear. Ms Reid confirmed that the opponents had no problems with Class 28 of the designation, their objection being against the specifications in Classes 18 and 25 primarily because they contain identical goods to those covered by the opponent's earlier trade marks. Thus I consider that the application insofar as Class 28 is concerned is free of objection and may proceed to protection in the United Kingdom.

24. The applicants admit that Class 25 of their designation covers identical goods, namely footwear. This would, in my view, be by virtue of the specific term "footwear" and also in the more general term "clothing". The applicants do not accept that Class 18 of their designation covers goods that are either identical nor similar to handbags and purses, but as the specification of the opposed mark makes specific mention of handbags this is not tenable. The item "handbags" may take many forms and I would deem the items "rucksacks, all-purpose sports bags, pack bags, travelling cases and valises" to be capable of being similar in nature, for the same purpose and likely to reach the market through the same channels of trade, and consequently, to be similar goods. That the specification of the opposed mark is not limited in any way means, notionally at least, that the relevant consumer and the mode by which the goods reach them is in both cases, one and the same.

25. Turning to the respective marks. The opponent's earlier marks consist of a single element, the letter "K" so there can be no dispute as to the dominant component. The applicants contend that being composed of a single letter the opponent's earlier marks deserve limited protection, in essence, that they are of low distinctive character. It has long been held in this

country, and more recently before OHIM, that marks composed of single letters should be regarded as having either no, or little distinctive character as unused marks. That may well be the case, but it is registered (which under Section 72 of the Act is prima facie evidence of its validity) and therefore has afforded some protection. It is also not an unused mark having a history dating back to 1865 and a level of pairage sales that by most standards must be regarded as significant even though the level of sales is not put into the context of the market as a whole. It is a mark that has established itself on goods that consumers will have need of throughout their life and therefore I have no hesitation in concluding that the mark has a significant reputation and functions perfectly well as a badge of origin for the opponent's footwear although the evidence does not establish that this would also be the case in respect of purses or handbags.

26. Whether or not the item is a top end designer label or a high street shoe shop brand, the purchase of footwear will be a considered action by the consumer; he or she looking not only at the attractiveness of the style, but also the fit, and more often than not, actually trying the article for comfort and look prior to the purchase.

27. The opponents make much of the fact that their goods are sold alongside other brands where visual distinction will be of importance. In the React trade mark case [2000] RPC 285 Simon Thorley QC sitting as the Appointed Person considered the question of the importance of the eye and the ear in the selection of clothing and went on to say:

“There is no evidence to support [Counsel's] submissions that, in the absence of any particular reputation, consumers select clothes by the eye rather than by placing orders by word of mouth. Nevertheless, my own experience tells me it is true of most casual shopping. I have not overlooked the fact that catalogues and telephone orders play a significant role in that trade, but in my experience the initial selection of goods is still made by eye and subsequent order usually placed primarily by reference to a catalogue number. I am therefore prepared to accept that a majority of the public rely primarily on visual means to identify the trade origin of clothing, although I would not go so far as to say that aural means of identification are not relied upon.”

28. Although that case refers to clothing in general I would consider that the same comments hold true for footwear, handbags and the like. The applicants are silent on the question of how consumers purchase their goods but given their nature I see no reason to infer that this would be other than by the usual trading practices for such goods, that is, by visual selection.

29. Insofar as they have a letter in common the marks K and K2 have some visual and aural similarity, differing only in respect of the addition of a numeral to the mark applied for. But in short marks minor differences can have a disproportionate effect on similarity. In this case both marks are, in effect, letter marks and can to that extent be said to have some conceptual similarity, and it may well be that the applicant's mark could be said to be a natural extension of the opponent's mark, the next mark in a range.

30. The applicant's evidence and submissions refer to the fact that their mark is the name of a mountain, well known because of its height. This fact has not been established in evidence as a matter of general knowledge but is one that I consider is likely to be known to the reasonably

well informed. That said, I do not consider that a consumer embarking on the selection of everyday footwear will necessarily bring to mind the mountain when they see the term K2. But the position may well be different in respect of footwear specifically for activities such as mountaineering, rock climbing and skiing where the connection with the mountain may be established by the nature of the goods.

31. The applicant's mark has two elements, the letter K in conjunction with a numeral 2 but I see no reason why either element should be considered to be any more or any less distinctive or dominant than the other. The opponent's case relies upon the proposition that the addition of the numeral "2" in the applicants' mark is insufficient to indicate a different trade origin to the public, possibly being seen as a sub or subsequent brand in the K range, and also that the letter "K" will be picked out of the applicants' mark and through poor recollection will be confused with the opponents' mark. In the SABEL- PUMA case it was said "The average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details." which, if applied to this case would support the view that there is little likelihood of confusion.

32. Ms Reid referred me to trade mark registrations for the mark K2 owned by the applicants and to their claims that they have co-existed with the opponent's K trade mark registrations on the trade marks register. These marks may well be intended as the letters K2 but are stylised to the extent that they would not necessarily be seen as either the letters K2 or the letter K stylised with other matter.

33. Taking all of the above into account and adopting the "global" view advocated by the Court of Justice, I consider that the consumer familiar with the opponent's mark may, on seeing the applicant's mark in use, particularly in relation to footwear, may bring to mind the opponent's, but given the well known other meaning of the term K" and the other factors set out above, will not be deceived into believing that the goods come from them or an economically linked undertaking, and that there is no likelihood of confusion. The ground under Section 5(2)(b) fails accordingly.

34. Turning to the ground under Section 5(4)(a). That section reads as follows:

"5.(4) A trade mark shall not be registered if, or to the extent that, its use in the United Kingdom is liable to be prevented-

- (a) by virtue of any rule of law (in particular, the law of passing off) protecting an unregistered trade mark or other sign used in the course of trade, or"

35. The opponents contend that they would succeed in an action for passing off against the applicants should their mark be used in the United Kingdom. A helpful summary of the elements of an action for passing off can be found in Halsbury's Laws of England 4th Edition Vol. 48 (1995 reissue) at paragraph 165. The guidance given with reference to the speeches in the House of Lords in Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd - v - Borden Inc [1990] RPC 341 and Erven Warnik BV - v - J. Townend & Sons (Hull) Ltd [1979] AC 731 is (with footnotes omitted) as follows:

The necessary elements of the action for passing off have been restated by the House of Lords as being three in number:

- (1) that the plaintiff's goods or services have acquired a goodwill or reputation in the market and are known by some distinguishing feature;
- (2) that there is a misrepresentation by the defendant (whether or not intentional) leading or likely to lead the public to believe that the goods or services offered by the defendant are goods or services of the plaintiff; and
- (3) that the plaintiff has suffered or is likely to suffer damage as a result of the erroneous belief engendered by the defendant's misrepresentation.

The restatement of the elements of passing off in the form of this classical trinity has been preferred as providing greater assistance in analysis and decision than the formulation of the elements of the action previously expressed by the House. This latest statement, like the House's previous statement, should not, however, be treated as akin to a statutory definition or as if the words used by the House constitute an exhaustive, literal definition of "passing off", and in particular should not be used to exclude from the ambit of the tort recognised forms of the action for passing off which were not under consideration on the facts before the House.

36. Further guidance is given in paragraphs 184 to 188 of the same volume with regard to establishing the likelihood of deception or confusion. In paragraph 184 it is noted (with footnotes omitted) that:

To establish a likelihood of deception or confusion in an action for passing off where there has been no direct misrepresentation generally requires the presence of two factual elements:

- (i) that a name, mark or other distinctive feature used by the plaintiff has acquired a reputation among a relevant class of persons; and
- (i) that members of that class will mistakenly infer from the defendant's use of a name, mark or other feature which is the same or sufficiently similar that the defendant's goods or business are from the same source or are connected.

While it is helpful to think of these two factual elements as successive hurdles which the plaintiff must surmount, consideration of these two aspects cannot be completely separated from each other, as whether deception or confusion is likely is ultimately a single question of fact.

In arriving at the conclusion of fact as to whether deception or confusion is likely, the court will have regard to:

- (a) the nature and extent of the reputation relied upon;

- (b) the closeness or otherwise of the respective fields of activity in which the plaintiff and the defendant carry on business;
- (c) the similarity of the mark, name etc. used by the defendant to that of the plaintiff;
- (d) the manner in which the defendant makes use of the name, mark etc. complained of and collateral factors; and
- (e) the manner in which the particular trade is carried on, the class of persons who it is alleged is likely to be deceived and all other surrounding circumstances.”

37. I have already accepted the opponents to have a strong and longstanding reputation in respect of footwear and I see no reason why this should not also be the case in respect of goodwill. The evidence of this in relation to handbags and purses is far less certain.

38. On a notional comparison based on the marks K and K2 I found there to be no likelihood of confusion. However, the position under Section 5(4)(a) is somewhat different in that although the opponent’s trade has primarily been carried out under a mark consisting of a single letter K, in later years this has extended to use of the letter in conjunction with a suffix and/or a prefix such as K MIDDIES, K SKIPS, K PLUS FITTING SHOES, K’s THE SHOE, CASUALS BY K, K CDX, K PLUS, BIG K, etc. Ms Reid took the view that this would be seen by the consumers as sub-branding and a natural extension of the brand they already know so well. With the exception of the K CDX mark these K derivatives are no more than the letter K used in conjunction with an ordinary word of varying descriptive relevance for the goods. The K CDX mark is closer to K2 but is still visually, aurally and conceptually quite different.

39. The question is therefore whether having established the concept of the K brand being used with other elements, would the applicant’s mark if used in connection with the goods on which the opponents have built their reputation and goodwill be mistakenly viewed as a sub or connected brand. In her submissions Ms Reid stated that the opponent’s goods will be sold in outlets where a range of brands would appear side by side. Thus I consider that the additional factors established and by judicial notice, swing the balance towards the public being likely to believe that footwear sold under the K2 mark are those of the opponents, and consequently, that there is misrepresentation.

40. The potential for damage through the diversion of trade appears self evident, and taking all factors into account I therefore come to the view that the opposition under Section 5(4)(a) succeeds, but not in respect of the application in its entirety. The opponent’s have a strong claim to a reputation and goodwill in respect of footwear; they claim that this extends to handbags and purses but in my view there is insufficient evidence to establish this to be the case. As the application covers goods that I would not consider to be either the same nor similar to footwear, if the applicants file a Form TM21 within one month from the end of the appeal period to reduce their application in Class 25 to a specification of:

Articles of clothing, headgear, gloves; but not including footwear or similar goods to footwear.

I will, in the event of no appeal, allow this application to proceed to registration. If the applicants fail to file the Form TM21 within one month from the end of the appeal period, the application will be refused in its entirety. The application insofar as Class 18 and Class 28 are concerned are unaffected and are to proceed as published.

The opposition having succeeded I order the applicants to pay the opponents the sum of £835 as a contribution towards their costs. This sum to be paid within seven days of the expiry of the appeal period or within seven days of the final determination of this case if any appeal against this decision is unsuccessful.

Dated this 6th day of June 2002

Mike Foley
for the Registrar
The Comptroller General

Annex

Number	Mark	Class	Specification
401594	K	25	Boots and shoes.
813990	K	25	Articles of footwear and parts thereof, all included in Class 25.
813989		25	Articles of footwear and parts thereof, all included in Class 25.

A large, bold, black, stylized letter 'K' with a thick, rounded, cursive-like font.

1579284		18	Handbags and purses; all included in Class 18.
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A large, bold, black, stylized letter 'K' with a thick, rounded, cursive-like font, identical to the one above.