

**O-288-17**

**TRADE MARKS ACT 1994  
IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION NO. 3146477  
BY CKL HOLDINGS N.V.  
TO REGISTER THE TRADE MARK:**

**Alexander**

**IN CLASSES 18, 20 AND 25**

**AND**

**IN THE MATTER OF OPPOSITION THERETO  
UNDER NO. 406950 BY MWUK LIMITED**

## **Background and pleadings**

1. On 27 January 2016, CKL Holdings N.V. (“the applicant”) applied to register the trade mark **Alexander** for goods in classes 18, 20 and 25. A priority date of 20 October 2015 is claimed. The application was published for opposition purposes on 8 April 2016. It is opposed by MWUK Limited (“the opponent”).

2. The opposition was filed on 8 July 2016 and, having been limited during proceedings, is now based only upon section 5(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (“the Act”). It is directed against the following goods in the application:

Class 18      Leather; trunks and suitcases; travelling cases; handbags; purses; wallets; umbrellas; parasols; walking sticks; whips; harness; saddlery.

Class 25      Clothing; footwear; headgear; swimwear; sportswear; leisurewear.

3. The opponent relies upon its European Union trade mark (“EUTM”) registration no. 10675718 for the trade mark **ALEXANDRA**, which has a filing date of 27 February 2012 and for which the registration procedure was completed on 26 February 2014. The earlier mark is registered for a range of goods and services, the full details of which are attached as an annex to this decision. The opponent relies upon all of the goods and services in the earlier registration.

4. In its Notice of Opposition, the opponent claims that there is a likelihood of confusion, including a likelihood of association, because the application is “visually and aurally confusingly similar to ALEXANDRA” and because the goods are identical or similar.

5. The applicant filed a counterstatement (subsequently amended), in which it denies any similarity between the goods at issue. It submits that the marks are “not visually similar”, that “there is no possibility that the marks could be found to be aurally similar”

and that “[c]onceptually, the earlier marks and the subject mark differ significantly” (paragraph 9).

6. The opponent has been represented throughout by Freeths LLP, the applicant by Trademarkers Merkenbureau C.V. Neither party filed evidence but both filed written submissions during the evidence rounds. Whilst neither party asked to be heard, the opponent filed submissions in lieu of a hearing. I have read all of the papers carefully and will bear both parties’ comments in mind, referring to them, as necessary, below.

## **Decision**

### **Section 5(2)(b): legislation and case law**

7. The opposition is based upon section 5(2)(b) of the Act which reads as follows:

“5 (2) A trade mark shall not be registered if because -

[...]

(b) it is similar to an earlier trade mark and is to be registered for goods or services identical with or similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is protected,

there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark”.

8. An earlier trade mark is defined in section 6 of the Act, the relevant parts of which state:

“6. - (1) In this Act an “earlier trade mark” means –

(a) a registered trade mark, international trade mark (UK) or Community trade mark or international trade mark (EC) which has a date of application for registration earlier than that of the trade mark in question, taking account (where appropriate) of the priorities claimed in respect of the trade marks,

(2) References in this Act to an earlier trade mark include a trade mark in respect of which an application for registration has been made and which, if registered, would be an earlier trade mark by virtue of subsection (1)(a) or (b), subject to its being so registered”.

9. In these proceedings, the opponent is relying upon the EUTM shown in paragraph 3, which qualifies as an earlier trade mark under the above provisions. As this EUTM had not completed its registration process more than 5 years before the publication date of the application in suit, it is not subject to proof of use, as per section 6A of the Act. The opponent can, as a consequence, rely upon all of the goods and services it has identified.

10. The following principles are gleaned from the decisions of the EU courts in *Sabel BV v Puma AG*, Case C-251/95, *Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc*, Case C-39/97, *Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co GmbH v Klijsen Handel B.V.* Case C-342/97, *Marca Mode CV v Adidas AG & Adidas Benelux BV*, Case C-425/98, *Matratzen Concord GmbH v OHIM*, Case C-3/03, *Medion AG v. Thomson Multimedia Sales Germany & Austria GmbH*, Case C-120/04, *Shaker di L. Laudato & C. Sas v OHIM*, Case C-334/05P and *Bimbo SA v OHIM*, Case C-591/12P.

The principles:

(a) The likelihood of confusion must be appreciated globally, taking account of all relevant factors;

(b) the matter must be judged through the eyes of the average consumer of the goods or services in question, who is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably circumspect and observant, but who rarely has the chance to make direct comparisons between marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them he has kept in his mind, and whose attention varies according to the category of goods or services in question;

(c) the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details;

(d) the visual, aural and conceptual similarities of the marks must normally be assessed by reference to the overall impressions created by the marks bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components, but it is only when all other components of a complex mark are negligible that it is permissible to make the comparison solely on the basis of the dominant elements;

(e) nevertheless, the overall impression conveyed to the public by a composite trade mark may be dominated by one or more of its components;

(f) however, it is also possible that in a particular case an element corresponding to an earlier trade mark may retain an independent distinctive role in a composite mark, without necessarily constituting a dominant element of that mark;

(g) a lesser degree of similarity between the goods or services may be offset by a great degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa;

(h) there is a greater likelihood of confusion where the earlier mark has a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the use that has been made of it;

(i) mere association, in the strict sense that the later mark brings the earlier mark to mind, is not sufficient;

(j) the reputation of a mark does not give grounds for presuming a likelihood of confusion simply because of a likelihood of association in the strict sense;

(k) if the association between the marks creates a risk that the public will wrongly believe that the respective goods or services come from the same or economically-linked undertakings, there is a likelihood of confusion.

### **Comparison of goods and services**

11. When making the comparison, all relevant factors relating to the goods and services in the specification should be taken into account. In *Canon*, the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) stated at paragraph 23 of its judgment:

“In assessing the similarity of the goods or services concerned, as the French and United Kingdom Governments and the Commission have pointed out, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services themselves should be taken into account. Those factors include, inter alia, their nature, their intended purpose and their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary”.

12. Guidance on this issue has also come from Jacob J. (as he then was) in the *Treat* case, [1996] R.P.C. 281, where he identified the factors for assessing similarity as:

- a) The respective users of the respective goods or services;
- b) The physical nature of the goods or acts of services;

- c) The respective trade channels through which the goods or services reach the market;
- d) In the case of self serve consumer items, where in practice they are respectively found or likely to be found in supermarkets and in particular whether they are, or are likely to be, found on the same or different shelves;
- e) The extent to which the respective goods or services are competitive. This inquiry may take into account how those in trade classify goods, for instance whether market research companies, who of course act for industry, put the goods or services in the same or different sectors.

13. The General Court (“GC”) confirmed in *Gérard Meric v Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market*, Case T-133/05, that, even if goods/services are not worded identically, they can still be considered identical if one term falls within the scope of another (or vice versa):

“29. In addition, the goods can be considered as identical when the goods designated by the earlier mark are included in a more general category, designated by trade mark application (Case T-388/00 *Institut fur Lernsysteme v OHIM- Educational Services (ELS)* [2002] ECR II-4301, paragraph 53) or where the goods designated by the trade mark application are included in a more general category designated by the earlier mark”.

### Class 18

14. The applicant seeks registration for the following goods in class 18:

Leather; trunks and suitcases; travelling cases; handbags; purses; wallets; umbrellas; parasols; walking sticks; whips; harness; saddlery.

15. The earlier mark is registered for the following goods in class 18:

Leather and imitations of leather, and goods made of these materials and not included in other classes; trunks and travelling bags; briefcases; handbags; work bags; holdalls; rucksacks; key cases; purses; wallets; umbrellas; walking sticks; belts.

16. The terms “leather”, “trunks”, “handbags”, “purses”, “wallets”, “umbrellas” and “walking sticks” are in both specifications and so are identical. “Whips”, “harness” and “saddlery” are all goods which may be made of leather and they fall within the earlier mark’s very broad term “leather and imitations of leather, and goods made of these materials”. These goods are identical on the principle outlined in *Meric*.

17. “Suitcases” and “travelling cases” in the applicant’s specification are items which are used for carrying personal belongings. They are similar in nature, purpose, method of use, users and channels of trade to “travelling bags” in the earlier specification. They may be in competition and, as these items may be sold as part of a set, there may be a complementary relationship. These goods are similar to a very high degree.

18. “Parasols” in the applicant’s specification are similar to a medium degree to “umbrellas” in the applicant’s specification. The respective goods share users and are similar in nature and method of use but they are different in purpose and have neither a competitive nor a complementary relationship.

#### Class 25

19. Registration is sought for the following goods in class 25:

Clothing; footwear; headgear; swimwear; sportswear; leisurewear.

20. The earlier specification is registered for the following, also in class 25:

Clothing; casual wear; work wear; uniforms; shirts, polo shirts, blouses, suits, trousers, jackets, waistcoats, skirts, dresses, jerseys, pullovers, knitwear, ties, scarves, cravates, cummerbunds, gloves, dress handkerchiefs, belts for wear, tunics, aprons, capes, coats; footwear; headgear.

21. “Clothing”, “footwear” and “headgear” have direct counterparts in the earlier specification and these goods are, accordingly, identical.

22. “Swimwear”, “sportswear” and “leisurewear” all fall within the wider category of “clothing” in the earlier specification. The goods are identical, based on the principle identified in *Meric*.

23. I have reviewed the other goods and services in the earlier specification. My view is that they are less similar to the goods applied for. As the opposition is no more likely to be successful where the goods and services are less similar, I do not intend to consider the opponent’s case based upon its remaining goods and services. Accordingly, the remainder of this decision will refer only to the goods in class 18 and 25, identified above, which I have found to be identical or similar.

### **The average consumer and the nature of the purchasing act**

24. As the case law above indicates, it is necessary for me to determine who the average consumer is for the respective parties’ goods. I must then decide the manner in which these goods are likely to be selected by the average consumer in the course of trade. In *Hearst Holdings Inc, Fleischer Studios Inc v A.V.E.L.A. Inc, Poeticgem Limited, The Partnership (Trading) Limited, U Wear Limited, J Fox Limited*, [2014] EWHC 439 (Ch), Birss J. described the average consumer in these terms:

“60. The trade mark questions have to be approached from the point of view of the presumed expectations of the average consumer who is reasonably well informed and reasonably circumspect. The parties were agreed that the

relevant person is a legal construct and that the test is to be applied objectively by the court from the point of view of that constructed person. The words “average” denotes that the person is typical. The term “average” does not denote some form of numerical mean, mode or median”.

25. The applicant does not specify who the average consumer of the parties’ goods will be but states:

“[...] it must be noted that fashion related goods are highly considered purchases. Consumers who purchase such products consider the look, quality, durability and price of the goods and whether such characteristics suit their style, intended use of the garment and budget. Therefore, the average consumer of the goods at issue in this opposition will employ a greater level of attention when comparing the marks when applied to the respective goods”.<sup>1</sup>

26. The opponent submits that the users of the goods are the general public.<sup>2</sup> It does not comment on the level of attention paid to the purchase or the nature of the purchasing process.

27. I agree with the opponent that the average consumer of these goods is a member of the general public.

28. These goods are generally sold through bricks and mortar retail premises and their online equivalents. In terms of how the goods will be selected, this will normally be via self-selection from a rail, shelf or other display in a retail store (or its online equivalent) or perhaps chosen from catalogues and brochures. In *New Look Limited v OHIM*, joined cases T-117/03 to T-119/03 and T-171/03, the GC considered the purchase of clothing and stated that:

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<sup>1</sup> Submissions, paragraph 8.

<sup>2</sup> Submissions filed on 11 May 2017, paragraphs 16(b) and 17(b).

“50 [...] Generally in clothes shops customers can themselves either choose the clothes they wish to buy or be assisted by the sales staff. Whilst oral communication in respect of the product and the trade mark is not excluded, the choice of the item of clothing is generally made visually. Therefore, the visual perception of the marks in question will generally take place prior to purchase. Accordingly the visual aspect plays a greater role in the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion”.

29. I do not rule out that there may be an aural component in selecting goods in either class but, when considered overall, the selection process will be mainly visual.

30. The consumer of the goods at issue will wish to ensure that the goods are suitable for the purpose and that they are, for example, the desired colour or style, particularly for those goods which are worn on the person. I am of the view that the average consumer will pay an average degree of attention in the selection of the goods.

### **Comparison of trade marks**

31. It is clear from *Sabel BV v Puma AG* (particularly paragraph 23) that the average consumer normally perceives a trade mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details. The same case also explains that the visual, aural and conceptual similarities of the trade marks must be assessed by reference to the overall impressions created by the trade marks, bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components.

32. The CJEU stated at paragraph 34 of its judgment in Case C-591/12P, *Bimbo SA v OHIM*, that:

“.....it is necessary to ascertain, in each individual case, the overall impression made on the target public by the sign for which registration is sought, by means of, inter alia, an analysis of the components of a sign and of their relative weight in the perception of the target public, and then, in the

light of that overall impression and all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, to assess the likelihood of confusion”.

33. It would be wrong, therefore, artificially to dissect the trade marks, although it is necessary to take into account the distinctive and dominant components of the trade marks and to give due weight to any other features which are not negligible and therefore contribute to the overall impressions created by the trade marks.

34. The trade marks to be compared are as follows:

<b>Opponent’s trade mark</b>	<b>Applicant’s trade mark</b>
ALEXANDRA	Alexander

35. The opponent contends that the marks are visually similar and submits that “consumers are likely to pay more attention to the beginning of a word than to the end; the beginnings of the respective trade marks are clearly identical “Alexand” and “Alexand” [...]”.<sup>3</sup> It submits that the marks are aurally similar as “in this instance the emphasis is on the first and third syllables of the respective word marks which are identical in both trade marks [...]”.<sup>4</sup> It argues that there is conceptual similarity because “the respective trade marks are merely different forms (male and female) of the same name”.<sup>5</sup>

36. The applicant disputes that there is any similarity between the marks. It claims that there is no visual similarity because “the two word marks will not be considered similar, since the differing last two letters in the marks is a significant alteration which will not go

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<sup>3</sup> Ibid., paragraph 10.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid., paragraph 11.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid., paragraph 12.

unnoticed by the average consumer”.<sup>6</sup> Regarding the aural comparison, the applicant states that “there is no possibility that the marks could be found to be aurally similar” and that “[the] significantly different last syllable is sufficient to differentiate the two marks. [...] the word elements of earlier marks, when taken and read as a whole, are aurally dissimilar to the subject mark based on clear differences in syllables, rhythm, and pronunciation”.<sup>7</sup> It submits that the marks are conceptually different because the application contains “the common male English first name” whilst the earlier mark is “a female name of European origin”.<sup>8</sup>

37. Both marks are single-word marks, with no other element to contribute to the overall impression. The opponent’s mark is presented in capital letters and will be recognised as the reasonably common female name “ALEXANDRA”. The applicant’s mark is the name “Alexander”, presented in title case. It may be perceived as a fairly common male forename or as a surname. The differing use of upper and lower case is not relevant, as notional and fair use would permit use of either mark in capitals, title case or lower case.

38. The marks share the first seven letters (“ALEXAND-“/ “Alexand-“). They both also contain the letter “R”/“r” and differ only in that their final two letters are “-RA” and “-er”, respectively. The marks are visually similar to a high degree.

39. In a similar vein, the marks are each four syllables in length. The first three syllables are identical, with a difference in their last syllable. They are aurally similar to a high degree.

40. I indicated, above, that the average consumer will recognise “ALEXANDER” as a male forename or a surname and that “Alexandra” is likely to be seen as a female forename. I do not consider that the average consumer will trouble him-/herself to identify the origin of either name. If the average consumer perceives both marks as forenames, one male, one female, there is a medium degree of conceptual similarity. If

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<sup>6</sup> Submissions, paragraph 7(a).

<sup>7</sup> Ibid., paragraph 7(b).

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., paragraph 7(c).

“ALEXANDER” were perceived as a surname, there is marginally less similarity but the conceptual similarity overall is still of a medium degree.

### **Distinctive character of the earlier trade mark**

41. The distinctive character of a trade mark can be appraised only, first, by reference to the goods in respect of which registration is sought and, secondly, by reference to the way it is perceived by the relevant public – *Rewe Zentral AG v OHIM (LITE)* [2002] ETMR 91. In determining the distinctive character of a trade mark and, accordingly, in assessing whether it is highly distinctive, it is necessary to make an overall assessment of the greater or lesser capacity of the trade mark to identify the goods for which it has been registered as coming from a particular undertaking and thus to distinguish those goods from those of other undertakings - *Windsurfing Chiemsee v Huber and Attenberger* Joined Cases C-108/97 and C-109/97 [1999] ETMR 585. In *Lloyd Schuhfabrik*, the CJEU stated that:

“22. In determining the distinctive character of a mark and, accordingly, in assessing whether it is highly distinctive, the national court must make an overall assessment of the greater or lesser capacity of the mark to identify the goods or services for which it has been registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods or services from those of other undertakings (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 May 1999 in Joined Cases C-108/97 and C-109/97 *Windsurfing Chiemsee v Huber and Attenberger* [1999] ECR I-2779, paragraph 49).

23. In making that assessment, account should be taken, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of the mark, including the fact that it does or does not contain an element descriptive of the goods or services for which it has been registered; the market share held by the mark; how intensive, geographically widespread and long-standing use of the mark has been; the amount

invested by the undertaking in promoting the mark; the proportion of the relevant section of the public which, because of the mark, identifies the goods or services as originating from a particular undertaking; and statements from chambers of commerce and industry or other trade and professional associations (see *Windsurfing Chiemsee*, paragraph 51)".

42. I have no submissions from either party regarding the distinctiveness of the earlier trade mark. As the opponent has filed no evidence in support of a claim of enhanced distinctiveness, I have only the inherent position to consider. Invented words usually have the highest degree of distinctive character; words which are descriptive of the goods relied upon normally have the lowest. I bear in mind that, whilst neither descriptive nor allusive of the goods, the earlier mark is a fairly common name, and that names are often used in relation to the goods at issue. As a consequence, while not inherently highly distinctive, the earlier mark has an average degree of inherent distinctive character.

### **Likelihood of confusion**

43. There is no simple formula for determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion. The factors considered above have a degree of interdependency (*Canon* at [17]) and a global assessment of the competing factors must be made (*Sabel* at [22]), considering the various factors from the perspective of the average consumer and deciding whether the average consumer is likely to be confused. In making my assessment, I must keep in mind that the average consumer rarely has the opportunity to make direct comparisons between trade marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them he has retained in his mind (*Lloyd Schuhfabrik* at [26]). Confusion can be direct (where the average consumer mistakes one mark for the other) or indirect (where the average consumer realises the marks are not the same but puts the similarity that exists between the marks/goods down to the responsible undertakings being the same or related).

44. In making my decision, I bear in mind the comments of the GC in *El Corte Inglés, SA v OHIM*, Cases T-183/02 and T-184/02, where it noted that the beginnings of words tend to have more visual and aural impact than the ends. The court stated:

“81. It is clear that visually the similarities between the word marks MUNDICOLOR and the mark applied for, MUNDICOR, are very pronounced. As was pointed out by the Board of Appeal, the only visual difference between the signs is in the additional letters ‘lo’ which characterise the earlier marks and which are, however, preceded in those marks by six letters placed in the same position as in the mark MUNDICOR and followed by the letter ‘r’, which is also the final letter of the mark applied for. Given that, as the Opposition Division and the Board of Appeal rightly held, the consumer normally attaches more importance to the first part of words, the presence of the same root ‘mundico’ in the opposing signs gives rise to a strong visual similarity, which is, moreover, reinforced by the presence of the letter ‘r’ at the end of the two signs. Given those similarities, the applicant’s argument based on the difference in length of the opposing signs is insufficient to dispel the existence of a strong visual similarity.

82. As regards aural characteristics, it should be noted first that all eight letters of the mark MUNDICOR are included in the MUNDICOLOR marks.

83. Second, the first two syllables of the opposing signs forming the prefix ‘mundi’ are the same. In that respect, it should again be emphasised that the attention of the consumer is usually directed to the beginning of the word. Those features make the sound very similar”.<sup>9</sup>

45. The marks have a high degree of visual and aural similarity and are conceptually similar to a medium degree. The earlier mark is possessed of an average degree of

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<sup>9</sup> See also *Castellani SpA v OHIM*, T-149/06 and *Spa Monopole, compagnie fermière de Spa SA/NV v OHIM*, T-438/07; in *CureVac GmbH v OHIM* (T-80/08) identical beginnings between marks were not decisive.

(inherent) distinctive character. The goods will be purchased with an average degree of attention. Whilst some of the goods are identical, others are similar only to a medium degree. This is important because a lower degree of similarity between the goods can, because of the interdependency principle, be sufficient to offset a high degree of similarity between the marks. However, in my view, this is a case in which the high degree of visual and aural similarity between the marks is not offset by a lesser degree of similarity between the goods. Although the last two letters of the marks are different, they do not create a clear conceptual distinction which would have a sufficient impact on the average consumer to preclude a likelihood of confusion. Given that the purchase is likely to be primarily visual, the high degree of visual similarity is a particular factor in my consideration. Bearing in mind the effects of imperfect recollection, in the context of widely available goods which are selected with an average degree of attention, and even where the goods have only a medium degree of similarity, I find that there is a likelihood of direct confusion.

## **Conclusion**

46. The opposition has succeeded in full. Subject to appeal, the application will be refused for the opposed goods, namely:

Class 18      Leather; trunks and suitcases; travelling cases; handbags; purses; wallets; umbrellas; parasols; walking sticks; whips; harness; saddlery.

Class 25      Clothing; footwear; headgear; swimwear; sportswear; leisurewear.

## **Costs**

47. The opponent has been successful and is entitled to a contribution towards its costs. Neither party filed evidence. The opponent filed two sets of written submissions but I take into account that there is a degree of repetition. Awards of costs in proceedings commenced after 1 July 2016 are governed by Annex A of Tribunal Practice Notice

("TPN") 2 of 2016. Using the above TPN as a guide but bearing in mind my comments, above, I award costs to the opponent on the following basis:

Official fees	£200
Preparing the Notice of Opposition and considering the counterstatement:	£200
Written submissions:	£300
<b>Total:</b>	<b>£700</b>

48. I order CKL Holdings N.V. to pay MWUK Limited the sum of **£700**. This sum is to be paid within fourteen days of the expiry of the appeal period or within fourteen days of the final determination of this case if any appeal against this decision is unsuccessful.

**Dated this 23<sup>rd</sup> day of June 2017**

**Heather Harrison  
For the Registrar  
The Comptroller-General**

## Annex

### EUTM 10675717

- Class 5 First aid kits.
- Class 9 Protective clothing and equipment; protective masks, respiratory masks, safety goggles; protective footwear; protective headwear; protective helmets.
- Class 14 Goods in precious metals or coated therewith, not included in other classes; jewellery; bracelets, brooches, tie clips, tie pins, cuff links; key rings; horological and chronometric instruments; clocks; watches.
- Class 18 Leather and imitations of leather, and goods made of these materials and not included in other classes; trunks and travelling bags; briefcases; handbags; work bags; holdalls; rucksacks; key cases; purses; wallets; umbrellas; walking sticks; belts.
- Class 25 Clothing; casual wear; work wear; uniforms; shirts, polo shirts, blouses, suits, trousers, jackets, waistcoats, skirts, dresses, jerseys, pullovers, knitwear, ties, scarves, cravates, cummerbunds, gloves, dress handkerchiefs, belts for wear, tunics, aprons, capes, coats; footwear; headgear.
- Class 35 Advertising services; the bringing together for the benefit of others of a variety of clothing, casual wear, work wear, footwear, headgear and equipment, namely first aid kits, protective clothing, protective masks, respiratory masks, safety goggles, protective footwear, protective headwear, protective helmets, jewellery, bracelets, brooches, tie clips, tie pins, cuff links, key rings, horological and chronometric instruments, clocks, watches, goods made of leather and imitations of leather, trunks and travelling bags, briefcases, handbags, holdalls, rucksacks, key cases, purses, wallets, umbrellas, walking sticks, belts, textile and textile goods, bathroom towels and hand towels, work wear, shirts, polo shirts, blouses, suits, trousers, jackets, waistcoats, skirts, dresses, jerseys, pullovers, knitwear, ties, scarves, cravates, cummerbunds, gloves, dress handkerchiefs, tunics, aprons, capes, coats, enabling customers to conveniently view and purchase those goods from shop premises, from a catalogue, by mail order or by means of telecommunications including via the internet.
- Class 40 Tailoring services; embroidery services; engraving of goods; printing services; custom laser scribing of goods; custom printing of goods; custom

imprinting of clothing with decorative designs, words and logos; custom imprinting of leather goods with decorative designs, words and logos; information, advisory and consultancy services in relation to all the aforesaid services.

Class 42 Design of clothing and leather goods; information, advisory and consultancy services in relation to all the aforesaid services.