

O/0274/26

TRADE MARKS ACT 1994

IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION NO. UK00004102117

BY JON SHIELD

TO REGISTER THE TRADE MARKS:

**Blood, sweat and tears**

**Blood sweat & tears**

(series of 2)

IN CLASS 25

AND

IN THE MATTER OF OPPOSITION THERETO

UNDER NO. 600003555

BY AFTAB KHAN

## **Background and pleadings**

1. On 20 September 2024, Jon Shield (“the applicant”) applied to register the series of trade marks shown on the cover page of this decision in the UK. The application was published for opposition purposes on 4 October 2024. Registration is sought for the following goods:

Class 25: Headgear; Headgear for wear; Sports headgear [other than helmets]; Thermal headgear; Parts of clothing, footwear and headgear; Visors [headwear]; Visors being headwear; Headwear; Caps [headwear]; Caps being headwear; Visors [clothing]; Sun visors [headwear]; Sports caps and hats; Beanie hats; Visors [hatmaking]; Hats; Headbands [clothing]; Headbands for clothing; Baseball caps and hats.

2. The application was opposed by Aftab Khan (“the opponent”) on 6 January 2025. The opposition is based upon section 5(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (“the Act”) against all applied-for goods.

3. The opponent relies on the following trade mark:

UK3758994



Filing date: 24 February 2022

Registration date: 17 June 2022

Relying on some of the goods registered as set out in Annex 1.

4. The opponent claims that the marks and goods are similar or identical and that this leads to a likelihood of confusion.

5. The applicant filed a counterstatement in which it denied the claims made by the opponent.

6. Rule 6 of the Trade Marks (Fast Track Opposition) (Amendment) Rules 2013, S.I. 2013 No. 2235, disapplies paragraphs 1-3 of Rule 20 of the Trade Mark Rules 2008, but provides that Rule 20 (4) shall continue to apply. Rule 20(4) states that:

“(4) The registrar may, at any time, give leave to either party to file evidence upon such terms as the registrar thinks fit.”

7. The net effect of these changes is to require the parties to seek leave in order to file evidence in fast track oppositions. Neither party sought leave to file any evidence.

8. Rule 62 (5) (as amended) states that arguments in fast track proceedings shall be heard orally only if (i) the Office requests it or (ii) either party to the proceedings requests it and the registrar considers that oral proceedings are necessary to deal with the case justly and at proportionate cost; otherwise, written arguments will be taken. A hearing was neither requested nor considered necessary. Following a careful consideration of the papers.

9. Both the applicant and the opponent are representing themselves.

10. The provisions of the Act relied upon in these proceedings are assimilated law, as they are derived from EU law. Although the UK has left the EU, section 6(3)(a) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (as amended by Schedule 2 of the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023) requires tribunals applying assimilated law to follow assimilated EU case law. That is why this decision refers to decisions of the EU courts which predate the UK's withdrawal from the EU.

## **Preliminary Issue**

11. I note that there are submissions made in the email addendum to the Form TM8 and counterstatement from the applicant about how he currently uses his mark (together with a link to his website). As there is no requirement to prove use in these proceedings, the decisions I make are notional and based upon the goods as they are registered and therefore I will consider this no further.

## **Decision**

### **Section 5(2)(b)**

12. Section 5(2)(b) of the Act is as follows:

“5(2) A trade mark shall not be registered if because-

(a) [...]

(b) it is similar to an earlier trade mark and is to be registered for goods or services identical with or similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is protected,

there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark”.

13. The opponent’s mark qualifies as an earlier mark, in accordance with section 6 of the Act. As the earlier mark has not been registered for five years or more before the application date of the contested mark, it is not subject to proof of use requirements. Therefore, the opponent can rely upon all of the goods identified in it’s Form TM7F.

## Case law

14. The following standard summary of the principles applicable to the assessment of the likelihood of confusion was approved by the Supreme Court in *Iconix Luxembourg Holdings SARL v Dream Paris Europe Inc & Anor*, [2025] UKSC 25:

(a) The likelihood of confusion must be appreciated globally, taking account of all relevant factors;

(b) the matter must be judged through the eyes of the average consumer of the goods or services in question, who is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably circumspect and observant, but who rarely has the chance to make direct comparisons between marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them he has kept in his mind, and whose attention varies according to the category of goods or services in question;

(c) the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details;

(d) the visual, aural and conceptual similarities of the marks must normally be assessed by reference to the overall impressions created by the marks bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components, but it is only when all other components of a complex mark are negligible that it is permissible to make the comparison solely on the basis of the dominant elements;

(e) nevertheless, the overall impression conveyed to the public by a composite trade mark may be dominated by one or more of its components;

(f) however, it is also possible that in a particular case an element corresponding to an earlier trade mark may retain an independent distinctive role in a composite mark, without necessarily constituting a dominant element of that mark;

(g) a lesser degree of similarity between the goods or services may be offset by a great degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa;

(h) there is a greater likelihood of confusion where the earlier mark has a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the use that has been made of it;

(i) mere association, in the strict sense that the later mark brings the earlier mark to mind, is not sufficient;

(j) the reputation of a mark does not give grounds for presuming a likelihood of confusion simply because of a likelihood of association in the strict sense;

(k) if the association between the marks creates a risk that the public might believe that the respective goods or services come from the same or economically-linked undertakings, there is a likelihood of confusion.

### **Comparison of Goods**

15. In the judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) in *Canon*, Case C-39/97, the court stated at paragraph 23 that:

“In assessing the similarity of the goods or services concerned, as the French and United Kingdom Governments and the Commission have pointed out, all the relevant factors relating to those goods or services themselves should be taken into account. Those factors include, inter alia, their nature, their intended purpose and their method of use and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary”.

16. The relevant factors identified by Jacob J. (as he then was) in the *Treat* case, [1996] R.P.C. 281, for assessing similarity were:

(a) The respective uses of the respective goods or services;

- (b) The respective users of the respective goods or services;
- (c) The physical nature of the goods or acts of service;
- (d) The respective trade channels through which the goods or services reach the market;
- (e) In the case of self-serve consumer items, where in practice they are respectively found or likely to be, found in supermarkets and in particular whether they are, or are likely to be, found on the same or different shelves;
- (f) The extent to which the respective goods or services are competitive. This inquiry may take into account how those in trade classify goods, for instance whether market research companies, who of course act for industry, put the goods or services in the same or different sectors.

17. In *Gérard Meric v OHIM* ('Meric'), Case T-133/05, the GC stated that:

“29. In addition, the goods can be considered as identical when the goods designated by the earlier mark are included in a more general category, designated by trade mark application (Case T-388/00 *Institut für Lernsysteme v OHIM - Educational Services (ELS)* [2002] ECR II-4301, paragraph 53) or where the goods designated by the trade mark application are included in a more general category designated by the earlier mark”.

18. For the purposes of considering the issue of similarity of goods and services, it is permissible to consider groups of terms collectively where they are sufficiently comparable to be assessed in essentially the same way and for the same reasons (see *Separode Trade Mark* (BL O/399/10) and *BVBA Management, Training en Consultancy v. Benelux-Merkenbureau* [2007] ETMR 35 at paragraphs 30 to 38).

19. The applicant's opposed goods in class 25 are as follows:

*Headgear; Headgear for wear; Sports headgear [other than helmets]; Thermal headgear; Parts of clothing, footwear and headgear; Visors [headwear]; Visors being headwear; Headwear; Caps [headwear]; Caps being headwear; Visors [clothing]; Sun visors [headwear]; Sports caps and hats; Beanie hats; Visors [hatmaking]; Hats; Headbands [clothing]; Headbands for clothing; Baseball caps and hats.*

20. The full list of the goods relied upon by the opponent in class 25 can be found in Annex 1 of this decision. However, within that specification, I note that the opponent relies on the broad terms "*Parts of clothing, footwear and headgear*" and "*headwear*".

21. The term "*Parts of clothing, footwear and headgear*" are found identically in both specifications. Aside from these goods, the remaining goods of the applicant may all be classed as "*headgear/headwear*" (the terms being interchangeable in the context of class 25). While there are specific items of headwear listed in the opposing specifications that are identical to each other, for example, "*Caps being headwear*", all of the applicant's goods other than its "*Parts of clothing, footwear and headgear*" may be encompassed by the opponent's broad term "*headwear*", rendering them identical under the principle set out in *Meric*.

### **Average consumer and the purchasing act**

22. The average consumer is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably observant and circumspect. For the purpose of assessing the likelihood of confusion, it must be borne in mind that the average consumer's level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question: *Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer*, Case C-342/97.

23. In *Iconix Luxembourg Holdings SARL v Dream Paris Europe Inc & Anor*, [2025] UKSC 25, the Supreme Court approved the comments of Arnold LJ in *Lidl Great Britain Ltd & Anor v Tesco Stores Ltd & Anor (Rev1)* [2024] EWCA Civ 262, where he pointed out that:

(a) Consumers who are ill-informed or careless, or consumers with specialised knowledge or who are excessively careful are excluded from consideration;

(b) The average consumer provides a standard which enables the courts to strike a balance between the competing interests involved, such as trade mark owners, their competitors and consumers;

(c) The average consumer is neither a single hypothetical person nor a mathematical average; assessment from the perspective of the average consumer does not involve a statistical test. There is no single meaning rule and if, having regard to the perceptions and expectations of the average consumer, the court considers that a significant proportion of the relevant public is likely to be confused, a finding of infringement may properly be made;

(d) Assessment from the perspective of the average consumer is intended to facilitate adjudication of trade mark disputes by providing an objective criterion, by promoting consistency of assessment and by enabling courts and tribunals to determine such issues so far as possible without the need for evidence;

(e) The average consumer's level of attention varies according to the category of goods or services in question; and

(f) the average consumer rarely has the opportunity to make direct comparisons between trade marks (or between trade marks and signs) and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of the trade mark they have kept in their mind.

24. For the goods at issue, the average consumer will likely consist of members of the general public, not discounting that there may be professional or business consumers also. The selection of such goods is largely a visual process, as the average consumer will wish to physically handle the goods to ensure the correct fit, whilst simultaneously appraising the overall aesthetic impact. If the consumer is buying online, then I also note they will see the marks on the websites. I do not, however, ignore the potential

for the marks to be spoken, for example, by sales assistants in a retail establishment or when making a purchase from a catalogue, over the telephone. However, in the latter circumstances, the consumer will have had an opportunity to view the goods, perhaps electronically via an online catalogue or website, or on paper. Therefore, when considering the aural impact of the marks, the visual impression of these goods will already have played a part in the consumer's mind.

25. Although the prices of individual items will vary greatly, I consider that the average consumer will pay an average degree of attention during the purchase of the goods as they will be mindful of factors such as colour, size and material etc.


### **Comparison of the marks**

26. It is clear from *Sabel BV v. Puma AG* (particularly paragraph 23) that the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details. The same case also explains that the visual, aural and conceptual similarities of the marks must be assessed by reference to the overall impressions created by the marks, bearing in mind their distinctive and dominant components. The CJEU stated at paragraph 34 of its judgment in Case C-591/12P, *Bimbo SA v OHIM*, that:

“.....it is necessary to ascertain, in each individual case, the overall impression made on the target public by the sign for which registration is sought, by means of, inter alia, an analysis of the components of a sign and of their relative weight in the perception of the target public, and then, in the light of that overall impression and all factors relevant to the circumstances of the case, to assess the likelihood of confusion.”

27. It would be wrong, therefore, to artificially dissect the trade marks, although, it is necessary to take into account the distinctive and dominant components of the marks and to give due weight to any other features which are not negligible and therefore contribute to the overall impressions created by the marks.

28. The respective trade marks are shown below:

Contested marks	Earlier mark
<p data-bbox="233 421 756 465"><b>Blood, sweat and tears</b></p> <p data-bbox="264 528 724 573"><b>Blood sweat &amp; tears</b></p> <p data-bbox="403 640 585 678">(series of 2)</p>	

29. Both contested marks are word marks. The first contains four words (and a comma) and I consider that the overall impression lies in the combination of these elements. The same finding applies to the second in the series of marks (although I note it is 3 words and an ampersand without the presence of the comma).

30. The earlier mark is comprised of the words 'BLOOD SWEAT TEARS' in a fairly standard typeface. This is presented over the top of a device made up of three curved lines arranged in an upside down triangular formation. I consider that the words are the dominant and distinctive component with the device and the slight stylisation playing lesser roles.

31. Visually, the marks all coincide with the inclusion of the words 'BLOOD' 'SWEAT' 'TEARS' and I bear in mind that normal and fair use of the applicant's word marks means that they may be used in any standard typeface, singular colour and in upper and lower-case lettering. They differ where the contested marks contain the word 'and', a comma and an ampersand, respectively. The earlier mark contains the device which has no replica in the contested marks. Given the words are almost entirely replicated within both contested marks and the earlier mark, I consider them to be visually similar to between a medium and a high degree.

32. Turning next to the aural comparison, I consider that 'BLOOD' 'SWEAT' and 'TEARS' will all have their ordinary every day pronunciations and they are found identically across all marks. The one difference is the inclusion of 'and' within the contested marks (I consider that most consumers would verbalise the ampersand as the word 'and'). Therefore, I find that both contested marks to be aurally similar to the earlier mark to a high degree.

33. In the Form TM8 and counterstatement, Mr Shield mentions that the saying 'blood sweat and tears' signifies hard work and toil. I find that it is indeed a well known idiom/saying and in my view the meaning put forward by Mr Shield is likely to be known by a significant proportion of the average consumer. He does also state that the meaning of the earlier mark, without the word 'and' is completely different. I do not believe this to be the case. The word 'and' does not carry the main conceptual content of the marks and I believe the earlier mark will still evoke the same meaning of hard work to the average consumer. They might simply view it as a shortened version of the idiom. Therefore, I find the marks to be conceptually identical.

### **Distinctive Character of the Earlier Mark**

34. In *Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co. GmbH v Klijsen Handel BV*, Case C-342/97 the CJEU stated that:

“22. In determining the distinctive character of a mark and, accordingly, in assessing whether it is highly distinctive, the national court must make an overall assessment of the greater or lesser capacity of the mark to identify the goods or services for which it has been registered as coming from a particular undertaking, and thus to distinguish those goods or services from those of other undertakings (see, to that effect, judgment of 4 May 1999 in Joined Cases C-108/97 and C-109/97 *Windsurfing Chiemsee v Huber and Attenberger* [1999] ECR I-0000, paragraph 49).

23. In making that assessment, account should be taken, in particular, of the inherent characteristics of the mark, including the fact that it does or does not contain an element descriptive of the goods or services for which it has been

registered; the market share held by the mark; how intensive, geographically widespread and long-standing use of the mark has been; the amount invested by the undertaking in promoting the mark; the proportion of the relevant section of the public which, because of the mark, identifies the goods or services as originating from a particular undertaking; and statements from chambers of commerce and industry or other trade and professional associations (see *Windsurfing Chiemsee*, paragraph 51).”

35. Registered trade marks possess varying degrees of inherent distinctive character, being lower where they are allusive or suggestive of a characteristic of the goods and/or services, ranging up to those with high inherent distinctive character, such as invented words which have no allusive qualities. The distinctive character of a mark can be enhanced by virtue of the use that has been made of it. I have been provided with no such evidence and, therefore, only have the inherent position to consider.

36. The earlier mark contains the words ‘BLOOD’ ‘SWEAT and ‘TEARS’ which, as I have said above, alludes to the idiom ‘blood sweat and tears’. It is not descriptive of the goods registered nor do I believe it to be allusive either. However, it is not an invented term or saying. The stylisation does not particularly add anything in terms of distinctiveness. Whilst the device is formed of a relatively simple 3 line device in a triangular shape, I do not consider it would go unnoticed. Therefore, I find the earlier mark as a whole to be inherently distinctive to a medium degree.

### **Likelihood of Confusion**

37. Confusion can be direct or indirect. Direct confusion involves the average consumer mistaking one mark for the other, while indirect confusion is where the average consumer realises the marks are not the same but puts the similarity that exists between the marks and the goods down to the responsible undertakings being the same or related. There is no scientific formula to apply in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion; rather, it is a global assessment where a number of factors need to be borne in mind. The first is the interdependency principle i.e. a lesser degree of similarity between the respective trade marks may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the respective goods and vice versa. It is necessary for

me to keep in mind the distinctive character of the earlier mark, the average consumer for the goods and the nature of the purchasing process. In doing so, I must be alive to the fact that the average consumer rarely has the opportunity to make direct comparisons between trade marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them that he has retained in his mind.

38. The following factors must be considered to determine if a likelihood of confusion can be established:

- I found the overall impression of the contested marks lies in the combination of all the elements. For the opponent's mark, the words are the dominant and distinctive component with the device and the slight stylisation playing lesser roles.
- I have found the earlier mark to be visually similar to between a medium and a high degree and aurally similar to the contested marks to a high degree.
- I have found the marks to be conceptually identical.
- I consider that the average consumer is likely to be members of the general public who will select the goods and services primarily by visual means, although I do not discount an aural component.
- I have concluded that an average level of attention will be paid during the purchasing process.
- The goods at issue are identical.
- The earlier mark is inherently distinctive to a medium degree.

39. I believe that the identity of the goods and concepts together with the high level of visual and aural similarities means that the average consumer, paying an average degree of attention, will likely overlook or misremember the differences between the marks (i.e. the inclusion of 'and' or '&' and ',' in the contested marks and the device element of the earlier mark) and mistake one mark for the other. Following the interdependency principle, the high/identical levels of similarity mentioned above counteract the low to medium distinctiveness of the earlier mark. Therefore, I find there to be a likelihood of direct confusion.

40. In the event that I am wrong in finding there to be a likelihood of direct confusion, I will now go on to consider whether there could be indirect confusion. Mr Iain Purvis Q.C. (as he then was) said further in *L.A. Sugar Limited v Back Beat Inc*:

“Instances where one may expect the average consumer to reach such a conclusion tend to fall into one or more of three categories:

(a) where the common element is so strikingly distinctive (either inherently or through use) that the average consumer would assume that no-one else but the brand owner would be using it in a trade mark at all. This may apply even where the other elements of the later mark are quite distinctive in their own right (“26 RED TESCO” would no doubt be such a case).

(b) where the later mark simply adds a non-distinctive element to the earlier mark, of the kind which one would expect to find in a sub-brand or brand extension (terms such as “LITE”, “EXPRESS”, “WORLDWIDE”, “MINI” etc.).

(c) where the earlier mark comprises a number of elements, and a change of one element appears entirely logical and consistent with a brand extension (“FAT FACE” to “BRAT FACE” for example).”

41. These examples are not exhaustive but provide helpful focus, as was confirmed by Arnold LJ in *Liverpool Gin Distillery Limited & Ors v Sazerac Brands, LLC & Ors* [2021] EWCA Civ 1207:

“This is a helpful explanation of the concept of indirect confusion, which has frequently been cited subsequently, but as Mr Purvis made clear it was not intended to be an exhaustive definition.”<sup>1</sup>

42. In the case of indirect confusion, the average consumer has noticed the differences between the marks but still believes them to be linked. The differences that the average consumer might notice are the slight stylisation of the words and the addition

---

<sup>1</sup> Paragraph 12

of the triangle device. As previously mentioned, I have found the device element to play a secondary role within the mark. The average consumer, seeing that the extraneous matter in the mark as being of lower distinctiveness and by virtue of imperfect recollection of the word elements, will then see the contested marks as simply another way of using the earlier mark. Therefore, I find that indirect confusion is likely to occur.

## **Conclusion**

43. The opposition has been successful and registration is refused for all applied for goods, subject to any appeal.

## **Costs**

44. The opponent has been successful and is entitled to a contribution towards its costs, based upon the scale published in Tribunal Practice Notice 1/2023 as these proceedings commenced after 1 February 2023. The applicant would normally be entitled to a contribution towards its costs.

45. However, as the parties are unrepresented, upon receipt of the admissible form TM8 the tribunal wrote to the parties and invited them to indicate whether they intended to make a request for an award of costs. The parties were informed that, if so, they should complete a Pro Forma, providing details of their actual costs and accurate estimates of the amount of time spent on various activities associated with the proceedings. They were informed that “if the pro forma is not completed and returned, costs, other than official fees arising from the action (excluding extensions of time) may not be awarded”.

46. The opponent did not file a completed Pro Forma. Therefore, I can only award them their official fee of £100.

47. I order JON SHIELD to pay AFTAB KHAN the sum of £100. This sum should be paid within 21 days of the expiry of the appeal period or, if there is an appeal, within 21 days of the conclusion of the appeal proceedings.

**Dated this 27<sup>th</sup> day of March 2026**

**L Nicholas  
For the Registrar**

## **Annex 1:**

Class 25: Clothing; Clothes; Outer clothing; Cashmere clothing; Bandeaux [clothing]; Women's clothing; Bodies [clothing]; Embroidered clothing; Knitwear [clothing]; Cloth bibs; Cyclists' clothing; Playsuits [clothing]; Slipovers [clothing]; Jerseys [clothing]; Weatherproof clothing; Casual clothing; Denims [clothing]; Combinations [clothing]; Furs [clothing]; Shorts [clothing]; Collars [clothing]; Babies' clothing; Ties [clothing]; Clothing layettes; Beach clothes; Beach clothing; Gabardines [clothing]; Aprons [clothing]; Men's clothing; Boys' clothing; Fishing clothing; Paper clothing; Bottoms [clothing]; Mufflers [clothing]; Handwarmers [clothing]; Cowls [clothing]; Visors [clothing]; Headbands [clothing]; Baby clothes; Infants' clothing; Drawers [clothing]; Mitts [clothing]; Rainproof clothing; Linen clothing; Dance clothing; Woven clothing; Wristbands [clothing]; Tops [clothing]; Knitted clothing; Oilskins [clothing]; Motorcyclists' clothing; Hoods [clothing]; Leisure clothing; Infant clothing; Children's clothing; Childrens' clothing; Sports clothing; Leather clothing; Gloves [clothing]; Waterproof clothing; Plush clothing; Girls' clothing; Swaddling clothes; Clothing for men, women and children; Footwear for men; Coats for men; Outerclothing for men; Socks for men; Footwear for men and women; Suspender belts for men; Bathing suits for men; Layettes [clothing]; Jackets [clothing]; Kerchiefs [clothing]; Chaps (clothing); Maternity clothing; Thermal clothing; Belts [clothing]; Muffs [clothing]; Capes (clothing); Slips [clothing]; Veils [clothing]; Wraps [clothing]; Athletic clothing; Triathlon clothing; Windproof clothing; Silk clothing; Work clothes; Woolen clothing; Ladies' clothing; Latex clothing; Womens' outerclothing; Womens' underclothing; Womens' undergarments; Coats for women; Underclothing for women; Underwear for women; Footwear for women; Bathing costumes for women; Suspender belts for women; Motorists' clothing; Boas [clothing]; T-shirts; Printed t-shirts; Short-sleeved T-shirts; Shirts; Golf shirts; Casual shirts; Sport shirts; Tennis shirts; Sleep shirts; Camouflage shirts; Sweat shirts; Collared shirts; Soccer shirts; Night shirts; Aloha shirts; Yoga shirts; Shirt-jacs; Maternity shirts; Corduroy shirts; Under shirts; Pique shirts; Yokes (Shirt -); Sports shirts; Football shirts; Knit shirts; Fishing shirts; Turtleneck shirts; Rugby shirts; Polo shirts; Shirt yokes; Tee-shirts; Dress shirts; Shirt fronts; Ramie shirts; Hunting shirts; Woven shirts; Shirts for suits; Short-sleeve shirts; Short-sleeved shirts; Open-necked shirts; Hooded sweat shirts; Long-sleeved shirts; American football shirts; Button down shirts; Shirts and slips; Mock turtleneck shirts; Sports shirts

with short sleeves; Button-front aloha shirts; Moisture-wicking sports shirts; Padded shirts for athletic use; Snap crotch shirts for infants and toddlers; Hoodies; Pants; Dress pants; Pirate pants; Nurse pants; Cargo pants; Lounge pants; Chino pants; Corduroy pants; Leather pants; Sweat pants; Baby pants; Waterproof pants; Sports pants; Hunting pants; Petti-pants; Capri pants; Ski pants; Jogging pants; Wind pants; Tap pants; Weatherproof pants; Cycling pants; Track pants; Denim pants; Pants (Am.); Camouflage pants; Stretch pants; Yoga pants; Sleep pants; Snow pants; Maternity pants; Babies' pants [underwear]; Warm-up pants; Nappy pants [clothing]; Horse-riding pants; American football pants; Babies' pants [clothing]; Moisture-wicking sports pants; Padded pants for athletic use; Footwear; Footwear [excluding orthopedic footwear]; Pumps [footwear]; Infants' footwear; Children's footwear; Sneakers [footwear]; Rubbers [footwear]; Golf footwear; Athletics footwear; Athletic footwear; Footwear uppers; Casual footwear; Footwear soles; Fishing footwear; Ladies' footwear; Beach footwear; Climbing footwear; Sports footwear; Trainers [footwear]; Uppers (Footwear -); Leisure footwear; Tips for footwear; Wooden shoes [footwear]; Soles for footwear; Heelpieces for footwear; Insoles for footwear; Footwear (Tips for -); Footwear for sport; Footwear for sports; Footwear for snowboarding; Welts for footwear; Footwear (Welts for -); Footwear made of wood; Traction attachments for footwear; Inner socks for footwear; Footwear made of vinyl; Footwear not for sports; Footwear for use in sport; Fittings of metal for footwear; Japanese split-toed work footwear (jikatabi); Footwear for track and field athletics; Non-slipping devices for footwear; Footwear (Fittings of metal for -); Flip-flops for use as footwear; Japanese footwear of rice straw (waraji); Parts of clothing, footwear and headgear; Headwear; Peaked headwear; Children's headwear; Caps [headwear]; Visors [headwear]; Bonnets [headwear]; Leather headwear; Fishing headwear; Caps being headwear; Visors being headwear; Sun visors [headwear]; Socks; Men's socks; Bed socks; Trouser socks; Ankle socks; Anklets [socks]; Sports socks; Sock suspenders; Tennis socks; Thermal socks; Slipper socks; Woollen socks; Pop socks; Footless socks; Water socks; Toe socks; Yoga socks; Anti-perspirant socks; Socks and stockings; Men's dress socks; Sweat-absorbent socks; Japanese style socks (tabi covers); Socks for infants and toddlers; Underwear; Briefs [underwear]; Disposable underwear; Jockstraps [underwear]; Thermal underwear; Trunks [underwear]; Maternity underwear; Knitted underwear; Women's underwear; Men's underwear; Functional underwear; Ladies' underwear; Long underwear; Anti-sweat underwear; Boy shorts

[underwear]; Sweat-absorbent underwear; Underwear (Anti-sweat -); Sweat-absorbent underclothing [underwear]; Gussets for underwear [parts of clothing]; Sports headgear [other than helmets]; Gym boots; Gym suits; Gym shorts; Articles of sports clothing; Articles of underclothing; Articles of clothing; Sport stockings; Sports overuniforms; Sports shoes; Sports garments; Sports bibs; Sports vests; Sports singlets; Sports wear; Sports jerseys and breeches for sports; Sports jackets; Sports caps; Sports jerseys; Sport shoes; Sports bras; Sport coats; Foulards [clothing articles]; Boxing shorts; Boxing shoes; Toe boxes; Football boots; Football jerseys; Football shoes; Replica football kits; American football shorts; American football bibs; American football socks; Football boots (Studs for -); Studs for football boots; Studs for football shoes; Tennis shorts; Tennis sweatbands; Tennis shoes; Tennis skirts; Tennis dresses; Tennis pullovers; Tennis wear; Shorts; Cycling shorts; Fleece shorts; Bib shorts; Walking shorts; Short trousers; Trousers shorts; Bermuda shorts; Sliding shorts; Swim shorts; Maternity shorts; Short petticoats; Boxer shorts; Rugby shorts; Sweat shorts; Board shorts; Golf shorts; Short sets [clothing]; Short overcoat for kimono (haori); Padded shorts for athletic use; Arm warmers [clothing]; Wrist bands; Wrist warmers; Shoulder wraps; Beach wraps; Sweat bands for the wrist; Shoulder wraps [clothing]; Shoulder wraps for clothing; Wrap belts for kimonos (datemaki); Garter belts; Waist belts; Fabric belts; Tuxedo belts; Suspender belts; Leather belts [clothing]; Money belts [clothing]; Belts of textile; Belts (Money -) [clothing]; Fabric belts [clothing]; Belts for clothing; Belts made of leather; Knee highs; Knee-high stockings; Knee warmers [clothing]; Vests; Athletics vests; Fishing vests; Quilted vests; Vest tops; Waistcoats [vests]; Camouflage vests; Fleece vests; Scrimmage vests; Running vests; Vests (Fishing -); Hunting vests; Long sleeved vests; Wind-resistant vests; Men's and women's jackets, coats, trousers, vests; Vests for use in barber shops and salons; Wind vests; Down vests; Athletics shoes; Athletic uniforms; Athletics hose; Athletic tights; Athletic shoes; Bras; Bra straps; Nursing bras; Strapless bras; Adhesive bras; Moisture-wicking sports bras; Bra straps [parts of clothing]; Fitted swimming costumes with bra cups; Clothes for sports; Sports over uniforms; Clothes for sport; Boots for sports; Clothing for sports; Combative sports uniforms; Sports [Boots for -]; Boots for sport.

