

O/1073/25

TRADE MARKS ACT 1994

**IN THE MATTER OF APPLICATION NUMBER UK00003908062
BY SPILSBURY HOLDINGS LIMITED
TO REGISTER THE FOLLOWING TRADE MARK:**

AZTEC

IN CLASSES 9, 36, 41 AND 42

AND

**AN OPPOSITION THERETO UNDER NUMBER 600002963
BY TV AZTECA S.A.B. DE C.V.**

BACKGROUND AND PLEADINGS

1. On 4 May 2023, Spilsbury Holdings Limited (“the Applicant”) applied to register the trade mark “**AZTEC**” in the UK. The application was accepted and published for opposition purposes on 14 July 2023 in respect of goods and services in Classes 9, 36, 41 and 42.¹

2. On 25 July 2023, TV AZTECA S.A.B. DE C.V. (“the Opponent”) filed a fast track opposition² opposing the application, to the extent of its Class 41 services, based upon section 5(2)(b) of the Trade Marks Act 1994 (“the Act”).³ The Opponent relies upon the following trade mark:

Trade mark number UK00003633382⁴

UK Filing date: 27 April 2021

EU Filing date: 27 July 2020

Registration date: 17 December 2021

Specification relied upon: Services in Class 41⁵

Representation:



3. In accordance with sections 6(1)(a) and 6A of the Act, respectively, the Opponent’s mark qualifies as an earlier mark but is not subject to proof of use. The Opponent may

¹ The full specification is listed in the Annex to this decision.

² The Trade Marks (Fast Track Opposition) (Amendment) Rules 2013, S.I. 2013 No. 2235 applies.

³ The provisions of the Act relied upon in these proceedings are assimilated law, as they are derived from EU law. Although the UK has left the EU, section 6(3)(a) of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (as amended by Schedule 2 of the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023) requires tribunals applying assimilated law to follow assimilated EU case law. That is why this decision refers to decisions of the EU courts which predate the UK’s withdrawal from the EU.

⁴ The trade mark application was filed in the UK pursuant to Article 59 of the Withdrawal Agreement between the UK and the EU. Accordingly, the application is deemed to have the same filing date as the trade mark (number 018278520) filed in the EU, which is 27 July 2020.

⁵ The services relied upon will be listed later in this decision.

rely upon its mark and the services identified for the purposes of these proceedings without demonstrating use.

4. The Opponent claims that the parties' marks are highly similar and that the respective services are identical, resulting in a likelihood of confusion.

5. The Applicant filed a counterstatement denying a likelihood of confusion on the basis of insufficient similarity between the marks and the services.

6. No hearing was held but both parties filed written submissions in lieu of a hearing. The Applicant is represented by Kilburn & Strode LLP and the Opponent by Lara Grant.

7. On 29 April 2024, a decision ("the original decision") was issued by N. R. Morris ("the original Hearing Officer") under BL number O/0384/24. The original decision was made from the papers and the original Hearing Officer held, in summary, that:

- i. the parties' services were identical/highly similar;
- ii. the marks were visually similar to a medium degree, aurally similar to a high degree and conceptually neutral;
- iii. there was a likelihood of indirect confusion; and thus
- iv. the opposition succeeded in full.

8. The Applicant appealed the original decision to the Appointed Person. The Opponent took no part in the appeal.

The Appeal and the Remittal

9. The Applicant (being the Appellant in the appeal proceedings) raised four grounds of appeal; Grounds 1-3 related to the interpretation and comparison of the parties' services and Ground 4 related to the conceptual comparison of the marks.

10. On 21 January 2025, Mr Philip Harris, sitting as the Appointed Person, issued a decision ("the appeal decision") under BL number O/0055/25. In summary, Mr Harris dismissed Ground 4 but upheld Grounds 1-3 and ordered that the case be remitted to

the Registry. Mr Harris addressed the Opponent's role in the remittal and set out the scope of the remittal at paragraphs 44-45 of the appeal decision:

"44. I am also conscious that whilst [the Opponent] has played no part in this appeal, given that re-determination will have to revisit the interpretation of [the Opponent's] specification, the comparison of services and the consequent impact on the global assessment of the likelihood of confusion, it may well wish to take a role or position in the final determination of the matter.

45. I therefore order that the case be remitted to the Registry for overall determination by a different Hearing Officer based on an interpretation of the specification of the Registration in line with the approach set out in [31] above,⁶ leaving the appointed Hearing Officer to settle the interpretation, re-assess the comparison of services and determine the overall opposition accordingly. It is also for the Registrar to make any further directions necessary." **[Footnote added]**

11. The Registry wrote to the parties on 7 August 2025 inviting either a request to be heard or the filing of written submissions. Neither party requested to be heard and only the Applicant filed written submissions in lieu of a hearing. I have considered these submissions, and all other papers filed during the course of the proceedings, in coming to my decision.

12. My reading of the appeal decision is that this decision will be confined to the interpretation of the Opponent's Class 41 services, an assessment of the comparison of services and a redetermination of the overall likelihood of confusion assessment. All other findings made by the original Hearing Officer in the original decision remain unchanged, on the basis that either they did not form part of the appeal or they were upheld. However, as the original Hearing Officer's interpretation of the Opponent's *entertainment services, including news bulletins, news programmes, documentaries, educational activities* has been overturned on appeal, it follows that I must reconsider

⁶ I will set out the correct approach, as held by Mr Harris in paragraph 31 of the appeal decision, later in this decision.

the average consumer for those services, based on the correct interpretation of their meaning.

DECISION

Preliminary point

13. I note the Applicant's submission that as the Opponent only pleaded identity of the services,⁷ in the event that the services are not found to be identical the opposition must be dismissed.⁸ On the basis that the Opponent brought the proceedings under section 5(2)(b) which, even on the Form TM7F itself, reads "It is similar to an earlier registered or protected mark and for identical or similar goods or services as the earlier mark" the opposition will proceed even if the services are found only to be similar.

Statutory provisions

14. Sections 5(2)(b) and 5A of the Act are as follows:

"5. [...]

(2) A trade mark shall not be registered if because –

(a) [...]

(b) it is similar to an earlier trade mark and is to be registered for goods or services identical with or similar to those for which the earlier trade mark is protected,

there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of association with the earlier trade mark."

And

⁷ See paragraphs 11 to 16 of the Opponent's statement of grounds.

⁸ See paragraph 6 of the Applicant's counterstatement.

“5A Where grounds for refusal of an application for registration of a trade mark exist in respect of only some of the goods or services in respect of which the trade mark is applied for, the application is to be refused in relation to those goods and services only.”

Relevant case law

15. The following principles are gleaned from the decisions of the Court of Justice of the European Union in *Sabel BV v Puma AG*, Case C-251/95, *Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc*, Case C-39/97, *Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co GmbH v Klijsen Handel B.V.* Case C-342/97, *Marca Mode CV v Adidas AG & Adidas Benelux BV*, Case C-425/98, *Matratzen Concord GmbH v OHIM*, Case C-3/03, *Medion AG v. Thomson Multimedia Sales Germany & Austria GmbH*, Case C-120/04, *Shaker di L. Laudato & C. Sas v OHIM*, Case C-334/05P and *Bimbo SA v OHIM*, Case C-591/12P.

The principles

(a) The likelihood of confusion must be appreciated globally, taking account of all relevant factors;

(b) the matter must be judged through the eyes of the average consumer of the goods or services in question, who is deemed to be reasonably well informed and reasonably circumspect and observant, but who rarely has the chance to make direct comparisons between marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them he has kept in his mind, and whose attention varies according to the category of goods or services in question;

(c) the average consumer normally perceives a mark as a whole and does not proceed to analyse its various details;

(d) the visual, aural and conceptual similarities of the marks must normally be assessed by reference to the overall impressions created by the marks bearing

in mind their distinctive and dominant components, but it is only when all other components of a complex mark are negligible that it is permissible to make the comparison solely on the basis of the dominant elements;

(e) nevertheless, the overall impression conveyed to the public by a composite trade mark may be dominated by one or more of its components;

(f) however, it is also possible that in a particular case an element corresponding to an earlier trade mark may retain an independent distinctive role in a composite mark, without necessarily constituting a dominant element of that mark;

(g) a lesser degree of similarity between the goods or services may be offset by a great degree of similarity between the marks, and vice versa;

(h) there is a greater likelihood of confusion where the earlier mark has a highly distinctive character, either per se or because of the use that has been made of it;

(i) mere association, in the strict sense that the later mark brings the earlier mark to mind, is not sufficient;

(j) the reputation of a mark does not give grounds for presuming a likelihood of confusion simply because of a likelihood of association in the strict sense;

(k) if the association between the marks creates a risk that the public might believe that the respective goods or services come from the same or economically-linked undertakings, there is a likelihood of confusion.

Comparison of services

16. The services to be compared are as follows:

The Applicant's services	The Opponent's services
<p>Class 41: <i>Developing, arranging, and conducting educational and business conferences in the field of blockchain and programming languages; educational services, namely, developing, arranging and conducting classes, seminars, conferences, workshops, retreats, camps and field trips in the field of blockchains and distributed computing platforms, and distribution of training material in connection therewith.</i></p>	<p>Class 41: <i>Entertainment services, including news bulletins, news programmes, documentaries, educational activities; Electronic publishing services; Providing online electronic publications, not downloadable.</i></p>

17. In the appeal decision, Mr Harris held that this remitted decision should be based on an interpretation of the Opponent's specification in line with his approach at paragraph 31 of the appeal decision, which reads as follows:

“In short, the correct approach to interpreting the Registration's specification is a form of inclusive words in line with the literal meaning ascribed to them by the [original] Hearing Officer at [24] or the form adopted in BL O/0499/24 at [21], treating the opponent's specification as referring to services which have a main focus on entertainment but which can also be of an educational variety.”

18. I will interpret the Opponent's specification accordingly.

19. It is settled case law that I must make my comparison of the services on the basis of all relevant factors. These include the nature of the services, their purpose, their users and method of use, the trade channels through which they reach the market, and whether they are in competition with each other or are complementary: see *Canon*, paragraph 23, and *British Sugar Plc v James Robertson & Sons Limited*

(*TREAT Trade Mark*) [1996] RPC 281. As the General Court said in *Boston Scientific Ltd v OHIM*,⁹ goods/services are complementary when:

“...there is a close connection between them, in the sense that one is indispensable or important for the use of the other in such a way that customers may think that the responsibility for those goods lies with the same undertaking.”

20. In *Skykick UK Ltd & Anor v Sky Ltd & Ors (Rev1)* [2024] UKSC 36, Lord Kitchin set out the proper approach to considering terms in specifications:¹⁰

“365. [...] The correct approach, as a matter of principle, in considering a specification of services which is defined by terms which are not clear or precise, is to confine the terms used to the substance or core of their possible meanings: see, for example, *Reed Executive plc v Reed Business Information Ltd* [2004] EWCA Civ 159; [2004] RPC 40, at para 43. So too, if a specification of goods is defined by terms which are ambiguous, then it should be confined to those goods which are clearly covered. These principles are consistent with first, the requirement that the specifications of goods and services must be clear and precise so that others know what they can and cannot do; and secondly, general fairness because any ambiguity is the responsibility of the owner of the mark. If despite this, the words used are still unclear so that they cannot be interpreted, then it is permissible to disregard them. But, in my opinion, that will rarely be the case.”

21. The judgment of Jacob J (as he then was) in *Avnet Incorporated v Isoact Limited* is also relevant:¹¹

“In my view, specifications for services should be scrutinised carefully and they should not be given a wide construction covering a vast range of activities. They

⁹ Case T-325/06.

¹⁰ I note this decision was published after these proceedings commenced and after the original decision was issued in these proceedings. However, the message is the same as that communicated in an earlier High Court judgment: *Sky Plc & Ors v Skykick UK Ltd & Anor* [2020] EWHC 990 (Ch), cited in the original decision.

¹¹ [1998] F.S.R. 16.

should be confined to the substance, as it were, the core of the possible meanings attributable to the rather general phrase.”

22. I will turn now to the comparison.

23. When considering the literal meaning of the terms in the Applicant’s specification, they are educational services with the purpose of facilitating educational or business classes, seminars, conferences, workshops, retreats, camps and field trips as well as distributing related training materials. The services are further narrowed by way of being in the fields of blockchain and programming languages and/or blockchains and distributed computing platforms. The core purpose of these services is to arrange events for educational/business purposes and to distribute training material, in the aforementioned fields; in line with *Avnet*, it is these specific activities that I will consider in my comparison rather than the general phrase ‘educational services’.

24. The literal meaning of the Opponent’s *entertainment services, including [...] educational activities* is entertainment services which incorporate an educational aspect. I do not find this term to be unclear or ambiguous. Despite the additional aim of educating its users, these services are principally entertaining in nature, their main purpose being to provide users with amusement or enjoyment. This is in contrast to the Applicant’s services, the main purpose of which is to arrange events and distribute training materials for educational/business purposes. Despite the core purpose of these services differing, the Opponent’s *entertainment services, including [...] educational activities* are not limited by their content and so could extend to blockchain-related material. As such, there is a possibility of an overlap in the users of the parties’ services. However, even if the Opponent’s services educate on the same subject as the Applicant’s services, users will not think they are so important for one another that they are expected to originate from the same undertaking; in line with the case law, I do not consider the services to be complementary. The difference in nature and purpose of these services also leads me to conclude that there is no competitive relationship between them. If the Opponent’s services take place in similar settings to the Applicant’s, i.e. camps or field trips, for example, there may be a degree of overlap in the way the parties’ services are accessed and used. Overall, I find only a low

degree of similarity between the Applicant's services and the Opponent's *entertainment services, including [...] educational activities*.

25. I will also consider the Applicant's services against the Opponent's *electronic publishing services and providing online electronic publications, not downloadable*. Though these are worded differently, both entail making content available (i.e. publishing) online. The Applicant's services which arrange events for educational/business purposes are too far removed from the Opponent's publishing services for me to find any similarity. Despite the possibility of online publications being used as training material in the Applicant's events, the specific activities involved in the services - which are of a different nature, have different purposes and are accessed and used in different ways - will not be seen as indispensable to one another to the extent that users assume the same undertaking is responsible. The services are not complementary, neither are they in competition. A potential overlap in user in specific circumstances where users are interested in the Applicant's educational/business events and also interested in accessing online publications related to the subject of the event, is not sufficient by itself for a finding of similarity.

26. There is, however, an overlap between the Applicant's *...distribution of training material in connection therewith*. In circumstances where the training material is provided online and the electronic publications provided by the Opponent are on the same subjects as the Applicant's training material, the services will be accessed and used in a similar way and users may believe the same undertaking is responsible, resulting in a complementary relationship. Overall, I find a low to medium degree of similarity between these services. However, this relates to one part of one of the Applicant's terms and so does not improve the Opponent's position beyond my findings in relation to *entertainment services, including [...] educational activities*.

The average consumer and the purchasing act

27. The identification of the average consumer in the original decision emanated from an incorrect interpretation of the Opponent's services, which were broadly described as "educational activities". As such, I will reconsider this assessment. The findings in the original decision relating to the Applicant's services were not appealed and so it is

not open to me to reconsider them; as a reminder, the original Hearing Officer found as follows:¹²

- i. the average consumer of the Applicant's services will, in almost all cases, be the professional public; those with an interest in, or working within, the subject areas to which the terms are limited;
- ii. the purchasing act will be primarily visual, though there will sometimes be an aural aspect; and
- iii. the level of attention paid by the professional public will be high.

28. The average consumer is deemed to be reasonably well-informed and circumspect, and the word "average" denotes that the person is typical.¹³ For the purpose of assessing the likelihood of confusion, it must be borne in mind that the average consumer's level of attention is likely to vary according to the category of goods or services in question.¹⁴ The relevant services are those for which I have found a degree of similarity.

29. The average consumer of the Opponent's entertainment services (including educational activities) will be either a professional or a member of the general public looking, for example, to learn about a particular subject or topic in a fun or entertaining setting. The Opponent's *electronic publishing services* and *providing online electronic publications, not downloadable* are broad terms with potential for an equally broad range of average consumers, varying depending on the content of those publications. As such, the average consumer of these services could include any member of the general public as well as professionals seeking to access publications in their particular field of interest.

30. The Opponent's services will be selected after exposure to the mark on printed material, websites, and various forms of advertising, which suggests that the visual impact of the mark will be of most significance. However, I do not discount the potential for verbal use of the mark through word-of-mouth recommendations and information

¹² Paragraphs 29 and 30 of the original decision refer.

¹³ *Hearst Holdings Inc, Fleischer Studios Inc v A.V.E.L.A. Inc, Poeticgem Limited, The Partnership (Trading) Limited, U Wear Limited, J Fox Limited*, [2014] EWHC 439 (Ch).

¹⁴ *Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer*, Case C-342/97.

provided by telephone. The services will be accessed fairly regularly and selected after consideration of a broad range of factors, including the particular field of interest and the cost. Whilst there is an educational nature to some of the services, those services are principally entertaining in nature and so even for professional users the level of attention paid to the selection will be no more than medium.

Comparison of marks

31. In the original decision, the original Hearing Officer made the following findings:

- i. the overall impression of the Opponent's mark is dominated by the word element ("azteca"), with the device element (being the largest element) playing a visual role, albeit a lesser one than the word element;
- ii. the overall impression of the Applicant's mark resides solely in the word "AZTEC"; and
- iii. the marks are visually similar to a medium degree, aurally similar to a high degree and conceptually neutral on the basis that AZTEC and AZTECA will be viewed as invented or non-English words with no clear concept.

32. Aside from the Applicant's ground of appeal criticising the original Hearing Officer's conceptual comparison of the marks, which, within the constraints of the pleaded appeal, was dismissed by Mr Harris, the various findings within the overall marks' comparison did not form part of the appeal. Accordingly, it is not appropriate to make a redetermination of those findings.

Distinctive character of the earlier mark

33. In the original decision, the original Hearing Officer found the Opponent's earlier mark to be inherently distinctive to a high degree on the basis that a significant proportion of the average consumers would see "azteca" as an invented word or a non-English word with no known meaning. In the absence of evidence, no finding of enhanced distinctiveness was made. It is not open to me to make a redetermination of these findings.

Likelihood of confusion

34. Confusion can be direct or indirect. Direct confusion involves the average consumer mistaking one mark for the other, while indirect confusion is where the average consumer realises the marks are not the same but puts the similarity that exists between the marks and the goods/services down to the responsible undertakings being the same or related. There is no scientific formula to apply in determining whether there is a likelihood of confusion; rather, it is a global assessment where a number of factors need to be borne in mind. The first is the interdependency principle, i.e. a lesser degree of similarity between the respective trade marks may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the respective goods/services and vice versa. As I mentioned above, it is necessary for me to keep in mind the distinctive character of the Opponent's trade mark, the average consumer for the goods/services and the nature of the purchasing process. In doing so, I must be alive to the fact that the average consumer rarely has the opportunity to make direct comparisons between trade marks and must instead rely upon the imperfect picture of them that he has retained in his mind.

35. I bear in mind the following findings, which I have either determined in this remitted decision or adopted from the original decision:

- i. the Applicant's services are similar either to a low degree or between a low and medium degree to the Opponent's services;
- ii. the average consumer of the Applicant's services is a professional who will pay a high degree of attention to a mainly (but not wholly) visual selection;
- iii. the average consumer of the Opponent's services is either a professional or a member of the general public who will pay a medium degree of attention to a mainly (but not wholly) visual selection;
- iv. the marks are visually similar to a medium degree, aurally similar to a high degree and conceptually neutral; and
- v. the Opponent's mark is inherently distinctive to a high degree.

36. I will address direct confusion first. With no strong conceptual hook for either mark, due to the textual elements being invented or non-English words, and on account of

those words being highly visually and aurally similar, I consider the average consumer may imperfectly recall AZTEC for AZTECA, or vice versa, by simply misremembering the final letter 'A' in the Applicant's mark. This is all the more likely when bearing in mind that consumers often pay more attention to the beginning of marks, though this is a general rule of thumb.¹⁵ That being said, the device element plays a role in the Opponent's mark given its size and is certainly not negligible. Even if the average consumer misremembers the word element, they will notice that there are visual differences between the marks, particularly when considering the selection of the services is mainly visual, or at least will involve a visual aspect even if the mark is also encountered aurally. Accordingly, I do not consider there to be a likelihood of direct confusion.

37. I turn now to indirect confusion, described by Iain Purvis QC (as he then was), sitting as the Appointed Person, in *L.A. Sugar Limited v By Back Beat Inc*:¹⁶

"16. Although direct confusion and indirect confusion both involve mistakes on the part of the consumer, it is important to remember that these mistakes are very different in nature. Direct confusion involves no process of reasoning – it is a simple matter of mistaking one mark for another. Indirect confusion, on the other hand, only arises where the consumer has actually recognised that the later mark is different from the earlier mark. It therefore requires a mental process of some kind on the part of the consumer when he or she sees the later mark, which may be conscious or subconscious but, analysed in formal terms, is something along the following lines: 'The later mark is different from the earlier mark, but also has something in common with it. Taking account of the common element in the context of the later mark as a whole, I conclude that it is another brand of the owner of the earlier mark'.

17. Instances where one may expect the average consumer to reach such a conclusion tend to fall into one or more of three categories:

¹⁵ See *El Corte Inglés, SA v OHIM*, Cases T-183/02 and T-184/02.

¹⁶ BL O/375/10.

(a) where the common element is so strikingly distinctive (either inherently or through use) that the average consumer would assume that no-one else but the brand owner would be using it in a trade mark at all. This may apply even where the other elements of the later mark are quite distinctive in their own right (“26 RED TESCO” would no doubt be such a case).

(b) where the later mark simply adds a non-distinctive element to the earlier mark, of the kind which one would expect to find in a sub-brand or brand extension (terms such as “LITE”, “EXPRESS”, “WORLDWIDE”, “MINI”, etc.).

(c) where the earlier mark comprises a number of elements, and a change of one element appears entirely logical and consistent with a brand extension (“FAT FACE” to “BRAT FACE” for example).”

38. I have already found that the textual components of the marks may be imperfectly recalled, with the letter ‘A’ possibly being overlooked. Whilst I have found that the large figurative device in the Opponent’s mark will be noticed, such a stylistic difference will be viewed by the average consumer as consistent with a rebranding or a mark variant, and the average consumer will thus be confused as to whether the undertakings are the same or related. In circumstances where the average consumer misremembers the word element and notices only the difference in the figurative element, I find there to be a likelihood of indirect confusion. I find this to be the case even considering the low degree of similarity between the relevant services.

Conclusion

39. The opposition has succeeded and the application is refused registration in respect of its Class 41 services. The application may proceed to registration in relation to its goods and services in Classes 9, 36 and 42.

COSTS

40. In the appeal decision, Mr Harris said the following in relation to costs:

“46. Since the matter is remitted the costs [in the original decision] are set aside. The costs of the appeal are to be treated as costs incurred in the opposition and dealt with accordingly at the conclusion of the proceedings in the Registry, albeit on the normal scale.”

41. The Opponent has been successful and is entitled to an award of costs in its favour. Since the Opponent played no part in the appeal, I award no costs in relation thereto. In line with the scale set out in Tribunal Practice Notice 1/2023, and considering that these were fast-track opposition proceedings,¹⁷ I award costs on the following basis:

Official fee	£100
Preparing a statement and considering the other side’s statement	£250
Preparing written submissions in lieu of a hearing	£200
Total	£550

42. I therefore order Spilsbury Holdings Limited to pay TV AZTECA S.A.B. DE C.V. the sum of £550. This sum should be paid within 21 days of the expiry of the appeal period or, if there is an appeal, within 21 days of the final determination of the appeal proceedings.

Dated this 18th day of November 2025

Mrs E Fisher
For the Registrar

¹⁷ Costs in fast-track opposition proceedings are capped at £600, excluding official fees, made up of £250 for filing and considering the appropriate forms and up to £350 for filing written submissions.

Annex

Class 9 Computer application software for blockchain-based platforms; software platforms for distributed applications and software using a consensus engine incorporating blockchain technology for securing data with cryptographic information; computer software platforms for developing and building of distributed software applications and distributed computing platforms; computer software platforms for blockchains.

Class 36 Cryptocurrency services; providing a digital currency or digital token for use by members of an on-line community via a global computer network; cryptocurrency services, namely a digital currency or digital token, incorporating cryptographic protocols, used to operate and build applications and blockchains on a decentralized computer platform.

Class 41 Developing, arranging, and conducting educational and business conferences in the field of blockchain and programming languages; educational services, namely, developing, arranging and conducting classes, seminars, conferences, workshops, retreats, camps and field trips in the field of blockchains and distributed computing platforms, and distribution of training material in connection therewith.

Class 42 Software development services; design, development and implementation of software for distributed computing platforms; design, development and implementation of software in the field of blockchains; research and development of computer software; software development and product development consulting in the field of distributed computing platforms; software development and product development consulting in the field of blockchains.